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Summary 
 
This paper considers the issue of unemployment one of the most pressing issues facing 
the UK and other governments, as the current recessions deepens. It begins by trying to 
accurately date the beginning of the current downturn in the British economy, arguing 
that it is clear that the recession commenced in the 2nd quarter of 2008. It then examines 
whether this recession is substantively different from past downturns in the UK and 
argues that, although the extreme rationing up of credit marks the current recession as 
different, some of the labour market consequences, such as the concentration of 
unemployment among the young and other disadvantaged groups, is typical of past 
experience.  
 
The paper reviews past literature on the causes of unemployment, arguing that the origin 
of the present difficulties lies with a collapse in demand rather than with frictions in the 
labour market caused by institutional inflexibilities. There is a large literature on the 
negative impact of unemployment both on society and on individuals. The adverse 
societal consequences are reviewed in the next section, while we discuss some of our 
own research on the adverse consequences on the individual in Section 6.  
 
Just as in previous recessions, it is becoming clear that some groups will suffer a much 
higher incidence of unemployment during this downturn and therefore suffer to a greater 
than average extent the adverse individual effects that we discussed in Section 6. The 
evidence on the composition of these groups is reviewed and presented along with some 
of our own research on this issue in the following section.  
 
One of the key groups who are likely to be affected by the recession is the young. In 
Section 8, we review the particular difficulties faced by them in trying to secure a footing 
in the labour market. In the last two decades many governments have introduced policies 
(collectively described as Active Labour Market Policies or ALMPs) for direct 
intervention in the labour market to improve outcomes for particular groups and for the 
young in particular. The next section reviews the evidence on the success of these 
policies. The final section discusses some policy proposals which we offer to alleviate 
what we believe will be the very serious adverse consequences of the likely increase in 
unemployment in the UK over the short to medium 
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"You take my life when you do take the means whereby I live" 
The Merchant of Venice, Act IV, William Shakespeare. 
 
1.  Introduction 
The UK, the Euro area and the European Union as a whole all entered 2009 in recession.  
There is a possibility that this recession will be the deepest and longest lasting since the 
Great Depression.  We expect negative growth to continue in the UK for several more 
quarters at least, although how long it does so will depend on the effectiveness of the 
various fiscal and monetary stimuli, including 400 basis points of cuts in interest rates 
that have been undertaken recently.   
 
For most of the time since the turn of the millennium the UK labour market had 
performed very well on a variety of measures, including employment growth and 
unemployment.  Between January 2000 and April 2008 employment grew by nearly two 
million from 27,310,000 to 29,541,000.  Over the same period the employment to 
population rate (EPOP) grew from 59.3% to 69.3%.  The level of unemployment was 
little changed although the unemployment rate fell from 5.8% to 5.2% as the labour force 
increased.  It wasn’t all good news, because youth unemployment, particularly of 18-24 
year olds, increased from 12.7% in 2000 to 14.5% in 2008, whereas the youth rate 
declined across the rest of the OECD.  This should all be placed in context though.  
Before the onset of recession, at the start of 2008, Appendix A shows that unemployment 
in the UK at 5.1% was still higher than in Austria (4.0%); Denmark (3.2%); Ireland 
(4.9%); Japan (3.9%); Netherlands (2.8%); Norway (2.5%) and USA (4.9%). 
 
The UK labour market performed well on these indicators in comparison to most other 
EU and OECD countries. Indeed, Pissarides (2006) described the recent performance of 
the UK labour market as a "European success story".1  Figure 1 plots the unemployment 
rates for ten countries (Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the 
Netherlands, Sweden, the UK and the USA) for the period 1960-2007.2  It is apparent 
from these data that: 
 
a) pre-1980 the UK had lower unemployment rates than the US.  This pattern reversed 
between 1980 and 2000.  The reasons for this switch still remain unclear.   
 
b) UK unemployment rates track closely those in Australia and Canada.   
 
c) UK rates have generally been higher than those in Japan, Sweden and the Netherlands. 
Since 2002 rates in Sweden have been higher. 
 
                                                 
1 C. Pissarides (2006), 'Unemployment in Britain: a European success story', in Structural Unemployment 
in Western Europe, edited by M. Werding, CESifo Seminar Series, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.  
 
2  The data are provided by the Bureau of Labor Statistics in the US, approximating U.S. concepts. 
ftp://ftp.bls.gov/pub/special.requests/ForeignLabor/lfcompendiumt02.txt 
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d) Since the early 1990s UK unemployment rates have been below those in France, 
Germany and Italy whereas the UK had generally higher rates before then.  
 
The situation in the UK labour market has worsened markedly since April 2008 on every 
measure. Unemployment increased by 300,000 between April and November 2008 and 
from 5.2% to 6.1%.  The outlook for the UK labour market is grim. 
 
Labour markets have also loosened sharply over the last year in a number of other 
countries since the start of 2008, especially in Ireland (+3.4 percentage points), Spain 
(+4.1pp), Sweden (+1.2pp) and the United States (+1.5pp), with the numbers in 
parentheses the percentage point increase in the unemployment rate between December 
2007 and the latest available data for October or November 2008. The joblessness crisis 
which the UK faces is being replicated across many of the world’s industrialized 
countries.  
 
This paper fills in some of the detail behind this stark picture of the current UK recession. 
The paper compares this recession with other recent downturns, noting the similarities 
and differences that have emerged thus far. It then focuses on unemployment, considering 
why we should be concerned about this issue, what we know from recent experience 
about the characteristics of the unemployed and what we know about the well-being of 
the unemployed. We specifically consider the causes and consequences of rising youth 
unemployment. The penultimate section examines the experience of labour-market 
measures designed to reduce the burden of unemployment and summarizes what is 
known about their effectiveness. The final section considers what measures should be 
taken to combat the rise in unemployment. 
 
2.  Dating the Recession 
The NBER dating committee dated the start of the recession in the United States to 
December 2007 when non-farm payrolls started to fall.3  Using the same method it 
appears that the start of the recession in the UK was April 2008.  This is illustrated in 
Table 1, which reports employment data and monthly changes for both the UK and the 
US.  Redundancies also started to rise and vacancies started falling during 2008.  
Redundancies were approximately 100,000 higher in the quarter Sep-Nov 2008 compared 
with the quarter March-May 2008.4 Vacancies were approximately 150,000 lower in 
December compared with April 2008.  Youth unemployment also increased sharply 
(Figure 2).  
 
Over the past decade or so a disproportionate part of the growth in the number of jobs 
was in self-employment.  Between 2001 and 2006, the number of employees increased by 
3.5%, while the number of self-employed workers increased by 13.7%.  Along with other 
indicators self-employment also started to decline from its high point in April 2008 
                                                 
3 http://www.nber.org/cycles/dec2008.html  
 
4 Labour Market Statistics, First Release, ONS, January 2009. 
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(Figure 3).   Between the three month period December 2007-February 2008 and the 
three month period September-November 2008, the numbers of employees fell by 30,000 
compared with a decline of 42,000 in the number of self-employed, even though, at the 
end of 2008 the self-employed only account for 13% of workers.  This decline is 
unsurprising given the earlier finding that as much as a half of the prior growth in self-
employment was driven by house prices, which freed up capital constraints, which are 
known to be especially important for the self-employed.5  The onset of the credit crunch 
and the consequent decline in house prices was predictably going to hit the self-employed 
especially hard, and so it has turned out.  
 
Appendix Table A1 presents evidence on standardized unemployment rates in Europe, 
the United States and Japan from 1996-2007.  A number of facts stand out from the 
tables.  First, unemployment in the UK started to increase from 2005.  Apart from Ireland 
and Portugal, unemployment rates fell elsewhere over this period.  Appendix Table A2 
presents the most up to date information on unemployment rates from December 2007 to 
October 2008, with three observations for November.  It is clear from the table that the 
UK was not alone in seeing a significant turn around in its labour market in the spring of 
2008.  Unemployment appears to have started to increase in both the EU and the Euro 
area from March 2008. The Euro area, including France, Italy, Portugal and Sweden, 
experienced increased unemployment in Spring 2008, coincident with the most recent 
upturn in the UK.  If one looks at employment growth, this also turned negative in both 
the EU and the Euro area in 2008 Q2, confirming that this was the date of the start of the 
recession using the NBER definition.  
 
Table 2 presents evidence on GDP growth rates.  It is apparent that, despite the fact that 
the NBER Dating Committee called the US recession as having started in 2007 Q4, at the 
time of writing (January 2009), the US has still not had two consecutive quarters of 
negative GDP growth.  Interestingly, though, since 2007 Q4 the Euro area has, as have 
Denmark, Germany, Estonia, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Sweden and Japan.  The UK 
has now had one quarter of zero growth, which in our view, will likely subsequently be 
revised down to negative growth, followed by two successive quarters of negative 
growth. The Q42008 estimate was 1.5%, the worst since Q2 of 1980.  It is apparent that 
there is widespread slowing in the rest of the EU.  In 2008 Q3, out of the twenty-nine 
countries for whom there are estimates, fourteen had negative growth in that quarter.  
With the exception of Ireland, France, Slovenia and the Netherlands, which have each 
experienced two quarters of zero growth, output in 2008 Q3 was lower than in the second 
quarter.  There is evidence of slowing in other parts of the world, including China and 
India.  The world economy is slowing fast.   
 
Table 3 presents evidence on the duration of unemployment in the UK.  Data are 
available on both ILO unemployment and the claimant count.  It is also apparent from the 
                                                 
5 On the importance of capital constraints for the self-employed see D.G. Blanchflower and A.J. Oswald 
(1998), ‘What makes an entrepreneur?’ Journal of Labor Economics, January, 16(1), pp. 26-60. On the role 
house prices in stimulating self-employment see D.G. Blanchflower and C. Shadforth (2007), 
‘Entrepreneurship in the UK’, Foundations and Trends in Entrepreneurship, Vol. 3, No. 4, pp. 257–364. 
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claimant count that unemployment started to rise, quite sharply, from April 2008. It is 
also apparent that the numbers of those unemployed for less than six months is the 
category that is increasing fastest.  By the spring and summer of 2008 there had been 
relatively few redundancies.  It appears that firms had stopped hiring and this especially 
impacted new entrants, hence the rapid increase in youth unemployment.  To this point 
long-term unemployment is not a major problem: that is likely to change as the recession 
proceeds.   
 
Redundancies are starting to hit rapidly - in the financial sector and elsewhere.  The 
downturn is affecting senior executives as well as shop-floor workers: last year, the 2008 
National Management Salary Survey revealed that the redundancy rate among senior 
management teams in the UK had reached 3 per cent. Its value had more than doubled 
over the previous 12 months. 
 
A number of other data series have also shown the dramatic slowing of the UK economy.  
The fear of unemployment increased sharply in 2008 in both the EU and especially in the 
UK (Figure 4).6  Here the fear of unemployment is the survey balance of people of 
respondent's views on what they expect to happen to unemployment over the following 
12 months. That series started its inexorable rise from July 2007.7  The rise in this series 
is especially evident from August 2008.  In the first two columns of Table 4 we present 
the average survey balance for consumers by country since 1985 and the values for 
January.8  It is apparent that the fear of unemployment has risen rapidly across the EU 
since August 2008.  It is above its survey average in every country.  The fear of 
unemployment is high and rising, even in countries such as Austria, Denmark and the 
Netherlands, which have relatively low unemployment rates.  
 
                                                 
6 For more on the fear of unemployment see D.G. Blanchflower and C. Shadforth (2009), 'Fear, 
Unemployment and Migration', forthcoming in the Economic Journal and D.G. Blanchflower and H. 
Lawton, 'The impact of the recent expansion of the EU on the UK labour market', forthcoming in EU 
Enlargement and the Labor Markets, edited by Martin Kahanec and Klaus F. Zimmermann, IZA and 
Praeger.  
7 The data are downloadable from http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/db_indicators/surveys9185_en.htm  
The questions are as follows.  a) Consumers - Q7 How do you expect the number of people unemployed in 
this country to change over the next 12 months? The number will. increase sharply, increase slightly, 
remain the same, fall slightly, fall sharply, don’t know.  The consumer balance is calculated as [(% increase 
sharply) - (.5*increase slightly] - [(% decrease sharply) - (.5*decrease slightly].  b) Firms - Q7 How do you 
expect your firm’s total employment to change over the next 3 months? It will increase remain unchanged 
or decrease.  The industry balance is just %increase-%decrease. 
 
8 The data are available for Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Ireland, Greece, France, Italy, Netherlands, the 
UK since 1985; Portugal and Spain since 1986 Finland since 1987 Hungary and Latvia since 1993; Austria 
and Sweden since 1995; Slovenia since 1996; Slovakia since 1999;  Poland, Romania, Cyprus and 
Lithuania since 2001; Luxembourg and Malta since 2002 
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In the remaining columns of Table 4 we also present the employment intentions balances 
of firms in four sectors – manufacturing, services, retailing and construction.  Negative 
balance means the firms expect employment to decrease over the next three months.  We 
present the survey averages from 1985 and the January 2009 level.  The data are entirely 
consistent with the fear of unemployment data from consumers.  For the EU as a whole, 
and the Euro area and for every country, firms expect significant declines in employment 
across all four sectors.  The proportion saying they will cut employees is much larger 
than the survey averages in nearly all countries and especially so in the UK and Sweden. 
 
Table 5 reports recent time series on the fear of unemployment series in the UK, which 
has grown steadily above its long run average of 23 from early in 2008.  We also report 
recent changes in the EU firm data for the four sectors reported in Table 4 above.  Each 
of these series deteriorated markedly from April/May 2008.   A similar story also applies 
to employment expectations in CIPS manufacturing and services which also started 
falling sharply from the spring of 2008.  The final part of Table 5 reports new evidence 
on both the current employment situation and employment expectations from individuals 
sampled by the Nationwide.  Both indices fell from around May/June, well before the 
collapse of Lehmans.  The very low reading for the expected availability of jobs in 
January 2009 is particularly notable.  Only 15% of respondents in January 2009 said that 
there would be many/some jobs available in six months time compared with 37% in June 
2008.   
 
The EU also publishes an overall sentiment index each month for member countries 
summarizing business and consumer views, based on responses from both individuals 
and firms.9  Figure 5 plots the series for the UK and for the EU.  The series dropped off a 
cliff in 2008 and now stands at its lowest point since the survey began in 1985. Notably 
in the UK the series has now declined every month since March 2008.  The highest point 
of the index was reached in September 2007. 
 
Consistent with evidence of a slackening labour market reported by the ONS there has 
also been a rapid slowing in a number of qualitative measures relating to the labour 
market.  These include the CIPS employment surveys for manufacturing and services 
(Figure 6); the REC survey of the Demand for Staff (Figure 7) and surveys of 
employment intentions conducted by the Bank of England's agents (Figure 8).  
Interestingly both the CIPS and the REC survey indicator for temporary placements, 
which are conducted monthly, all reached their peaks in April 2008.  The REC survey 
balance for permanent placements reached its peak in March 2008. Both the REC and 
both CIPS surveys are at historic lows.  The CIPS surveys in particular forecast the 
downturn well.  They do a much better job than any of the more quantitative indicators, 
which are traditionally used in macro models, which in part explains why so many 
forecasters and commentators did not see the downturn coming, or if they did, its 
severity. 
                                                 
9 The Economic Sentiment Indicator is a composite measure (average = 100) published by the EU monthly 
for each member country.  http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/db_indicators/db_indicators8650_en.htm 
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The BCC is conducted quarterly and reached its peak in 2007Q4 and the survey balances 
for manufacturing and services are plotted in Figure 9.  The balances are firm's views 
response to the question: 'what changes do you expect to your workforce over the next 3 
months: increase/remain constant/decrease?'  The balances are determined by subtracting 
the percentage of companies reporting decreases from the percentage of companies 
reporting increases.    
 
The most recent survey for 2008Q4 which covers almost 6,000 businesses employing 
over 680,000 people has very recently become available. The respondents are spread 
throughout the United Kingdom. Businesses were surveyed by postal and online 
questionnaires over the period 17th November to 10th December 2008. An important event 
of note within the survey period was the Chancellor of the Exchequer’s Pre-Budget 
Report, released on 24 November, meaning a large proportion of survey responses were 
given in light of the announcements. Furthermore, this is the first Quarterly Economic 
Survey since the collapse of Lehman Brothers and the ensuing global financial turmoil. 
The survey showed stark deteriorations in employment intentions in both manufacturing 
and services.  Of particular interest is the fact that the BCC provides data by firm size and 
by region for both manufacturing and services: we present the data for 2008Q3 and 
2008Q4 (weighted). (Source: British Chambers of Commerce Quarterly Economic 
Survey, Q42008). 
        Manufacturing        Services 
              Q32008           Q42008           Q32008           Q42008 
National -11 -41 3 -24 
  1-19 employees 14 -19 9 -5 
  20-199 employees -8 -29 -2 -28 
  200-499 employees -7 -56 -11 -27 
  500+ employees -22 -45 15 -41 
Scotland -33 -24 14 -49 
North East 29 -66 11 -48 
North West -11 -5 2 -10 
Yorkshire & Humberside -30 -51 -3 -28 
East Midlands -10 -41 12 -16 
West Midlands -12 -43 14 -18 
Wales -38 -47 -1 -28 
Eastern 1 -6 -4 -18 
South East -7 -27 -16 -17 
South West -5 -58 8 -32 
London 40 -13 9 -25 
Northern Ireland -13 -11 -9 -41 
 
The BCC survey makes clear the sharp deterioration in employment expectations that 
occurred in the fourth quarter of 2008.  This occurred in manufacturing and services in 
every region and was especially pronounced in larger firms. 
 
Not only has there been a slowing of a number of qualitative measures, there has also 
been a marked slowing in nominal wage growth.  This is illustrated below from the 
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Average Earnings Index: we present the latest available, three month on three month, 
seasonally adjusted growth rates of earnings including bonuses.  Just as we found earlier 
with unemployment, earnings growth appears to have peaked in April 2008 in the UK 
and has declined quite rapidly subsequently since then.  In the private sector has slowed 
even more rapidly since April 2008.  Wages in the public sector are less influenced by 
movements of the unemployment rate than are wages in the private sector.10  In 
November 2008 earnings growth was lower in manufacturing (2.8%) than in services 
(3.4%).    
 
                                  UK       Private sector                                        UK      Private sector  
November 2006  4.2% 4.3%  April 2008 4.0% 3.9% 
September 2007 4.1% 4.4% May 2008 3.9% 3.9% 
October 2007 4.0% 4.2% June 2008 3.5% 3.6% 
November 2007 4.0% 4.2% July 2008 3.5% 3.5% 
December 2007 3.8% 3.9% August 2008 3.4% 3.4% 
January 2008 3.9% 4.1% September 2008 3.3% 3.1% 
February 2008 3.7% 3.7% October 2008 3.3% 3.2% 
March 2008 4.0% 3.9% November 2008 3.1% 2.9% 
 
It is even more apparent that there has been a slowing in wages in 2008 from LFS data 
which has the advantage that it is a random sample of wage workers.11  Below we present 
the earnings of workers from the LFS for the most recent five quarters.  There has been 
little or no earnings growth in 2008, whether based on hourly or weekly earnings.  Mean 
weekly earnings in 2008Q1 were £511 compared with £513 in 2008 Q3 while hourly 
earnings rose from £11.41 to £11.46.  
 
     Weekly earnings     Hourly earnings 
  All          Public      Private            All           Public         Private  
2007 Q3 £495 £511 £489 £11.44 £12.49 £11.06 
 Q4 £498 £514 £493 £11.52 £12.47 £11.16 
2008 Q1 £511 £533 £504 £11.83 £12.95 £11.41 
 Q2 £514 £534 £507 £11.77 £12.85 £11.34 
 Q3 £513 £529 £508 £11.87 £12.97 £11.46 
 
Source: ONS http://www.statistics.gov.uk/statbase/Product.asp?vlnk=14365 
                                                 
10 Labour Market Statistics First Release, January 2009 Table 15 and D.G. Blanchflower and A. J. Oswald 
(1994), The Wage Curve, MIT Press. 
 
11 The Average Earnings Index (AEI) presented above, and the experimental Average Weekly Earnings 
(AWE) are both based on the Monthly Wages and Salaries Survey is a survey of 8,500 firms who have 
twenty or more employees.  The wages of workers, in the smallest firms have a high, negative, wage-
unemployment elasticity (Blanchflower and Oswald, 1994).  Hence, the exclusion of workers in these small 
firms in the survey used to calculate both the AEI and the AWE in a period when unemployment is rising 
sharply, is likely to generate upward biased estimates.  Both the AEI and the AWE have the disadvantage 
that, because they are based on an average wage at a firm they miss any variation in wages within a firm 
which would be picked up in the LFS.  
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Interestingly, can be seen below, there is evidence from the LFS for the UK as a whole 
for full-time workers, that earnings growth was muted across the whole of the earnings 
distribution in both the last half of 2007 and the second quarter of 2008.  There is 
evidence that average wages declined between Q2 208 and Q3 2008 in the highest deciles 
of both the hourly and weekly earnings distributions. 
 
                                 Weekly Earnings                                         Hourly earnings                         
 Lowest Lower Upper Highest Lowest Lower Upper Highest
 decile quartile quartile decile decile quartile quartile decile 
2007 Q3 £223 £290 £606 £855 £5.68 £7.29 £15.18 £21.59 
2007 Q4 £231 £300 £612 £846 £5.78 £7.46 £15.18 £21.26 
2008 Q1 £231 £300 £616 £865 £5.78 £7.50 £15.47 £22.26 
2008 Q2 £231 £300 £623 £884 £5.78 £7.50 £15.54 £22.20 
2008 Q3 £231 £301 £615 £865 £5.89 £7.58 £15.59 £21.92 
 
It is clear from the labour market data, which in previous recessions has tended to be a 
lagging indicator, that the UK and the Euro area had both entered recession by April of 
2008.12  Such a conclusion is also confirmed when one examines other qualitative data 
including consumer and business confidence and a panoply of scores reported by the 
Bank's agents.13  The quantitative data such as GDP, for both the Euro area and the UK, 
now confirms that the turning point was 2008 Q2.  GDP growth was flat in 2008 Q2, 
which was the first quarter for 16 years there had not been positive growth. GDP fell by 
0.6% in 2008 Q3. Business investment fell in the second quarter.  Growth in consumer 
spending has declined significantly during 2008. Spending on both services and durable 
goods fell in Q2. By the spring of 2008 the UK had entered recession.  There were many 
broad similarities with what had happened a few months earlier in the United States.  
 
There has been some suggestion that the world economy turned sharply downwards in 
September of 2008 after the failure of Lehman Brothers.  There certainly appears to have 
been a widespread collapse of confidence in the banking systems of the industrialized 
world.  However, the collapse of Lehman Brothers had little or nothing to do with falls in 
electricity output in China, declining car sales in Brazil, falls in Japanese or German 
industrial production, job losses in the US, declining manufacturing output in the UK, 
declining global trade or falls in the Baltic Dry.  All of these declines were in train well 
before the collapse of Lehman Brothers.  For example, the US housing market turned in 
January 2006, the US economy went into recession in December 2007 and the EU, the 
Euro area and the UK were already in recession by April 2008.  Japan first experienced 
                                                 
12 Indeed, if one looks at the claimant count that would suggest the start of the recession was even earlier in 
January 2008 when the count was at its low point of 794,900.  In November 2008 the claimant count stood 
at 1,071,900. 
 
13 D.G. Blanchflower (2008) 'Inflation, expectations and monetary policy', Bank of England Quarterly 
Bulletin, pp 229-237, Volume 48 No. 2, Q2 and D.G. Blanchflower (2009),  'Where next for the UK 
economy?', Scottish Journal of Political Economy, forthcoming, February. 
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negative growth in Q2 2008 (Table 2).   Moreover, the Baltic Dry Index had already 
fallen from 11,793 on May 20th 2008 to 4,747 on September 15th, when Lehmans filed for 
bankruptcy.  The UK house price bubble had also burst well before September 2008.  For 
example, the Nationwide Housing Index had already fallen by 11.4% between January 
and August 2008, of which 7.3% occurred between May and August of 2008 alone, while 
the Halifax House Price Index fell 11.2% between January and August 2008 and by 7.9% 
from May to August 2008.  None of this had much of anything to do with the collapse of 
Lehman Brothers; these events were already in train.  The fact that these economies were 
already in a significant recession was likely the cause of Lehman's demise rather than the 
reverse.  
 
3.  Comparisons with Previous Recessions 
How does this recession compare with other recent downturns? The last two recessions 
occurred in the early 1990s and 1980s. During these periods GDP contracted for five 
successive quarters, and it took over three years for output to gradually recover to its pre-
recession level. So if past recessions are any guide UK GDP is likely to continue 
contracting until at least the second half of 2009.  Previous recessions have varied 
substantially in the severity and duration of their effects on the labour market. The 
unemployment rate rose for four years following the first oil shock in the early 1970s, 
from 3.4% to 5.7% and by 5.5pp between 1980 and 1982, remaining in double figures 
until 1987. The unemployment rate rose for 3 years in the early 1990s rising by 3.8pp and 
only fell back to its pre-recession level by the end of 1997. So the current deterioration in 
labour market conditions is likely to persist for the foreseeable future.  Past recessions 
may have led to adverse effects on the supply potential of the economy. Long-term 
unemployment, particularly at a young age, is damaging to future labour market 
prospects both for the individuals involved and the economy as a whole. Workers may 
lose their skills, causing a loss of human capital. High rates of unemployment may mean 
there is a mismatch between those skills that workers possess and those for which there is 
demand within the economy. People may also be less likely to participate in the labour 
market the longer their spell of unemployment persists.14   
 
Thus far, we only have a relatively small amount of data, but some interesting trends 
have emerged. First, it is clear that the labour market is not so flexible as to absorb 
significant shocks to output without some adjustment to the quantity of labour demanded.  
Figure 10 shows the claimant count unemployment rate and the deviation of GDP from 
its long-run trend (measured on the right-hand vertical axis) for the period 1971 to 2008. 
Major turning points in the unemployment series are indicated by grey vertical lines. It 
shows that: 
 
1. The unemployment rate and deviations from trend GDP are strongly negatively 
correlated throughout this period.    
 
                                                 
14 D.G. Blanchflower (2009), ‘Macroeconomic policy responses in the UK’, Leverhulme Globalisation 
Lecture, University of Nottingham, 29th January 2009. 
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2. Turning points in output typically precede those in unemployment. This timing 
reflects firm uncertainty over downturns in demand, the desire to hoard skilled labour and 
increased stock building. This finding is evident from Figure 10, and can be confirmed 
with a standard Granger causality test.  A simple VAR model with a four period lag 
shows that the impulse response of unemployment to changes in output is concentrated in 
the following three quarters. There is no significant feedback from unemployment to 
output.15     
 
Second, previous recessions have varied substantially in the severity and duration of their 
effects on unemployment.  Measured from the turning points in unemployment the 
recession associated with the first oil shock began in 1973 Q4 when ILO unemployment 
was 3.4%.  Unemployment continued to rise until it reached 5.7% in 1977 Q4. The 
“Thatcher crash” began in 1979 Q2 (5.3%) and continued until 1984 Q2 (11.8%), by 
which time the unemployment rate had been in double figures for two full years.  Finally, 
the last recession, which followed the “Lawson boom” began in 1990 Q2 (6.9%). The 
unemployment rate rose for the next 11 quarters, peaking at 10.6 per cent in 1993 Q1. 
The unemployment rate starts this recession (5.4%) from a lower level than the recession 
of the 1990s. But if past experience does provide any pointer to the duration of the 
present downturn, the portents are not good. At just under three years, the 1990s 
recession was the shortest in recent experience.  Further indication that cyclical upturns in 
unemployment in the UK tend to be between three and six years long comes from the 
Great Depression which lasted for four years between 1929 and 1932, during which time 
the national insurance unemployment rate rose from 10.4 per cent to 22.1 per cent. 
 
Third, a number of economists have argued that oil spikes have significant 
macroeconomic effects.  James Hamilton, for example, has pointed out that “nine out of 
ten of the US postwar recessions since WWII were preceded by a spike up in the price of 
oil".16  Chen et al (2008), for example, conclude that "the paper’s elasticities therefore are 
large enough to be consistent with the belief that oil shocks play an influential role in 
shaping business downturns". The literature suggests that it does take considerable time 
for the adverse effects of an oil price shock to feed through to the real economy.  One 
possibility is that the negative effects of the oil shock have been under-estimated and the 
delayed impacts will be almost as marked as in previous oil shocks.  The worry then is 
that the rise in oil, commodity and food prices which preceded the recession may have 
effects on the labour market well after these price increases have themselves dissipated, 
                                                 
15 To ensure stationarity and following the application of Dickey-Fuller and Phillips-Perron tests, the VAR 
system was estimated in first-differences of the unemployment rate and the deviation of output from its 
trend. Details available on request. 
 
16 Hamilton, James D. (1983), 'Oil and the macroeconomy since World War II', Journal of Political 
Economy, 91(2), pp. 228-248. Hamilton, J. D. (2008), 'Oil and the macroeconomy', in the New Palgrave 
Dictionary of Economics, Second Edition.  Carruth, A.A., M. A. Hooker, and A.J. Oswald (1998), 
'Unemployment equilibria and input prices: theory and evidence', Review of Economics and Statistics, 80, 
621-628.  Chen, N, L. Graham and A.J. Oswald (2007), 'Oil prices, profits, and recessions: an inquiry using 
terrorism as an instrumental variable', University of Warwick DP #809. 
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leading to additional unemployment. Past experience suggests that the repercussions of 
oil shocks take years to dissipate. 
 
The conventional description of past recessions is that the increase in unemployment has 
been driven by the fall in outflow rates - see e.g. Pissarides (1986), Layard, Nickell and 
Jackman (1991), OECD (1994), and Nickell (1999).17 Thus, as inflows exceed outflows, 
the stock of unemployment increases and its duration extends. Burgess and Turon (2005) 
argue that this literature does not properly account for the data generating process 
including the inter-temporal identity linking stocks and flows, which jointly determine 
duration.18   They argue, using a VAR model of flows, that 85 per cent of the innovations 
in the stock of unemployment can be explained using only inflow data. The notion that 
inflows play an important role in determining unemployment dynamics partly switches 
the policy focus towards preventing redundancies rather than providing assistance to the 
unemployed to find jobs. 
 
Reinhardt and Rogoff (2009) show that financial crises have "deep and lasting effects on 
asset prices, output and employment".19  More often than not, they argue, the aftermath of 
severe financial crises share three characteristics. First, asset market collapses are deep 
and prolonged.  Real housing price declines average 35 percent stretched out over six 
years, while equity price collapses average 55 percent over a downturn of about three and 
a half years. Second, the aftermath of banking crises is associated with large declines in 
output and employment. The unemployment rate rises an average of 7 percentage points 
over the down phase of the cycle, which lasts on average over four years. Output falls 
(from peak to trough) an average of over 9 percent, although the duration of the 
downturn, averaging roughly two years, is considerably shorter than for unemployment. 
Third, the real value of government debt tends to explode, rising an average of 86 percent 
in the major post–World War II episodes. 
 
The concern here is that the current recession will be deeper and longer lasting than 
previous downturns.  The extent of the monetary contraction is historically large as is the 
scale of the fiscal and monetary responses. We are now in a coordinated global 
slowdown. With an impaired monetary transmission mechanism it is hard to know how 
long it will take for the UK economy to recover.    
 
                                                 
17 Layard, R., Nickell, S. J. and Jackman, R. (1991), Unemployment: Macroeconomic Performance and the 
Labour Market, OUP: Oxford.  Nickell, S. J. (1999), 'Unemployment in Britain’, in P. Gregg and J. 
Wadsworth (eds.), The State of Working Britain, MUP: Manchester.  OECD (1994), The OECD Jobs 
Study, OECD: Paris. Pissarides, C. (1986), 'Unemployment and vacancies in Britain’, Economic Policy, 
vol. 3, pp. 499–560. 
 
18 Burgess, S. and Turon, H. (2005), ‘Unemployment dynamics in Britain’, The Economic Journal, 115 
(April), 423–448. 
 
19 C.M. Reinhart and K.S. Rogoff (2009), 'The aftermath of financial crises', NBER Working Paper 
#14656. 
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4.  Causes of Unemployment 
The orthodox explanation of unemployment that argues that institutions matter20 has been 
subject to fairly extensive econometric testing, and in recent years, the validity of the 
empirical results supporting this view has been called into question. It has proved 
difficult to estimate a set of cross-country panel unemployment regressions that contain a 
lagged unemployment rate and a full set of year and country dummies and show that any 
of the labour market rigidity variables work.  This is a crucial test.  This is the first main 
similarity between European labour markets: labour market institutions do not tend to 
cause unemployment. The major exception is changes in the replacement rate, which, in 
some specifications, do appear to be negatively correlated with changes in the 
unemployment rate.  Blanchard and Wolfers (2000) have argued that “the interaction of 
shocks and institutions does a good statistical job of fitting the evolution of 
unemployment both over time and across countries.” This result is questionable because 
it is obtained in an over-fitted model — few data points and lots of variables —and the 
results appear to be driven by the cross-section variation rather than by any time series 
changes.21  There are only eight time series data points as they use five year averages 
from 1960-1995.   
 
As an illustration, we ran a pooled cross country time-series using the CEP/OECD 
Institutions data for 1975-2002 for eighteen OECD countries (Australia; Austria; 
Belgium; Canada; Denmark; Finland; France; Germany; Ireland; Italy; Japan; 
Netherlands; Norway; Portugal; Spain; Sweden; United Kingdom  and the United States).  
We included controls for union density (udnet_vis), the strictness of employment 
protection legislation (epl), gross benefit replacement rates data (brr1) and the tax wedge 
(tw).22  The dependent variable was the log of the unemployment rate and the equation 
includes a full set of country and year dummies.  Coefficients and t-statistics are as 
follows.  Only the lagged dependent variable is significant in any specification, whether 
the model is run without year dummies or country dummies (column 1); with year 
dummies (column 2) or both country and year dummies (column 3).  The 'flexibility' 
explanation of unemployment is wrong.    
 
 
     (1)   (2)           (3) 
Log of unemployment ratet-1 .9333 (80.39) .9415 (70.61) .9405 (72.11) 
Union density   -.0004 (0.91) -.0006 (1.52) .0011 (0.89) 
                                                 
20  R. Layard, S.N. Nickell and R. Jackman (2005), Unemployment, macroeconomic performance and the 
labour market, Oxford University Press, 2nd edition.  S.N. Nickell (2006), 'A picture of European 
unemployment: success and failure', in Structural unemployment in Western Europe, edited by M. 
Werding, CESifo Seminar Series, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA. 
 
21 Blanchard, O., and Wolfers, J. (2000), 'The role of shocks and institutions in the rise of European 
unemployment: The aggregate evidence', Economic Journal, 110 (462) 1–33. 
 
22 The names in parentheses are variable names as explained in W. Nickell (2006), 'The CEP – OECD 
Institutions Data Set (1960-2004)', Centre for Economic Performance, LSE, September. 
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Employment protection  .0376 (1.62) .0118 (0.55) -.0442 (0.77)   
Benefits    -.0002 (0.24) -.0002 (0.35) -.0002 (0.21) 
Tax wedge  .0002 (0.24) .0009 (1.06)   .0030 (1.62) 
Year dummies                                No  Yes    Yes 
Country dummies  No  No  Yes 
R2 .9434  .9540 .9647 
N     480                           480                               480 
(Dependent variable =log of unemployment ratet) 
 
In a recent article, Howell et al (2007) econometrically examined the impact of these 
rigidity variables, or what they call Protective Labor Market Institutions (PLMIs), and 
concluded that: “while significant impacts for employment protection, benefit generosity, 
and union strength have been reported, the clear conclusion from our review of these 
studies is that the effects for the PLMIs is distinctly unrobust, with widely divergent 
coefficients and levels of significance.” Indeed, in his published comments on the Howell 
et al. article, Jim Heckman (2007) argues that the authors “…are convincing in showing 
the fragility of the evidence on the role of labour market institutions in explaining the 
pattern of European unemployment, using standard econometric methodology.” Freeman 
(2007) also finds the evidence for the impact of these institutional variables less than 
convincing “despite considerable effort, researchers have not pinned down the effects, if 
any, of institutions on other aggregate economic outcomes, such as unemployment and 
employment”.23  In a recent article, Horst Feldmann examined how the quality of 
industrial relations affects unemployment in developing countries and found relatively 
moderate effects, especially for females.24 
 
There is no evidence in the UK that over the last year or so that union density, benefits, 
the tax wedge or employment protection has risen.  Interestingly, both Spain and Ireland, 
which have seen big changes in unemployment over the past twenty years (Appendix 1), 
always had low levels of all of these rigidity variables and these have not increased over 
time.  What is true is that unemployment in Europe is higher than it is in the United 
States and Western Europe has more job protection, higher unemployment benefits, more 
union power, and a more generous welfare state. But that is a cross-section correlation 
and it tells us little or nothing about time series changes.    
 
                                                 
23 D. Howell, D. Baker, A. Glyn and J. Schmitt (2007), 'Are protective labour market institutions at the root 
of unemployment? A critical review of the evidence', Capitalism and Society, 2(1), pp. 171. Heckman, J. 
(2007), 'Comments on 'Are protective labour market institutions at the root of unemployment? A critical 
review of the evidence by David Howell, Dean Baker, Andrew Glyn and John Schmitt', Capitalism and 
Society, 2(1), Article 5, pp. 15.   R.B. Freeman (2007), 'Labor market institutions around the world', NBER 
WP#13242. Blanchflower, D.G. (2001), 'Unemployment, wellbeing and wage curves in Eastern and 
Central Europe', Journal of the Japanese and International Economies, 15(4), pp. 364-402. 
 
24 H. Feldmann (2009), 'The quality of industrial relations and unemployment in developing countries', 
Review of Development Economics, 13(1), pp. 56–69. 
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The increases in unemployment we have observed in the UK over the last year or so are 
not due to decreases in labour market flexibility.  It is not that frictions in the market have 
increased: rather, there has been a collapse in the demand for labour as product demand 
has fallen, which in turn reflects severe credit rationing, falling consumer confidence, 
responses to transitory shocks in raw materials prices and delayed response by monetary 
authorities to these developments. None of these issues directly impinge on the labour 
market or on the extent to which institutional arrangements affect its efficiency.   
 
5.  Why Do We Care About Unemployment? 
The major reasons cited in the literature for why we care about unemployment are as 
follows: 
 
1) Because of the lost output involved.  During a long period of unemployment, workers 
can lose their skills, causing a loss of human capital.  
 
2) Unemployment is a stressful life event that makes people unhappy.25   
 
3) Unemployment increases susceptibility to malnutrition, illness, mental stress, and loss 
of self-esteem, leading to depression.26   Goldsmith, Veum and Darity (1996, 1997) 
found, for example, using data from the NLSY that being jobless injures self-esteem and 
fosters feelings of externality and helplessness among youths.  Moreover, they also found 
evidence that the psychological imprint of joblessness persists. 
 
                                                 
25 L. Winkelmann and R. Winkelmann (1998), 'Why are the unemployed so unhappy?  Evidence from 
panel data', Economica, 65(257), pp. 1-15.  A.E. Clark and A.J. Oswald (1994), 'Unhappiness and 
unemployment', Economic Journal, 104(424), pp. 648-659.  B.S. Frey and A. Stutzer (2002), Happiness 
and Economics, Princeton University Press.  Ahn, N., J.R. García and J.F. Jimeno (2004), 'The impact of 
unemployment on individual well-being in the EU', European Network of Economic Policy Institutes, 
Working Paper No 29. 
 
26 M. Linn, R. Sandifer and S. Stein (1985),  'Effects of unemployment on mental and physical health', 
American Journal of Public Health,  75, pp. 502-506.  M. Frese and G. Mohr (1987), 'Prolonged 
unemployment and depression in older workers: a longitudinal study of intervening variables, Social 
Science and Medicine, 25, pp. 173-178. P. Jackson and P. Warr (1987), 'Mental health of unemployed men 
in different parts of England and Wales', British Medical Journal, 295, p. 525. M.H. Banks and P.R. 
Jackson (1982), 'Unemployment and the risk of minor psychiatric disorder in young people: cross-sectional 
and longitudinal evidence', Psychological Medicine, 12, pp. 789-798.  Darity, W.R. Jr. and A.H. Goldsmith 
(1996), 'Social psychology, unemployment and macroeconomics', Journal of Economic Perspectives, 10(1), 
Winer, pp. 121-140.  A.H. Goldsmith, J.R. Veum and W. Darity (1996),  'The psychological impact of 
unemployment and joblessness', Journal of Socio-Economics, 25(3), April, pp. 333-358.  A.H. Goldsmith, 
J.R. Veum and W. Darity (1997), 'Unemployment, joblessness, psychological well-being and self-esteem: 
theory and evidence', Journal of Socio-Economics, 26(2), April, pp. 133-158. M.H. Brenner and A. 
Mooney (1983), Unemployment and health in the context of economic change', Social Science and 
Medicine, 17(16), pp. 1125-1138. 
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4) Increases in the unemployment rate tend to be associated with increases in the suicide 
rate.27  The unemployed appear to have a higher propensity to commit suicide.  
 
5) Being unemployed can also reduce the life expectancy of workers.28   
 
6) Unemployment increases the probability of poor physical health outcomes such as 
heart attacks in later life.29 
 
7) The long-term unemployed are at a particular disadvantage trying to find work.30  The 
effects of unemployment appear to depend a lot on how long the person has been 
unemployed for.  People's morale sinks as the duration of unemployment rises.  Long-
term unemployment is especially harmful.  "The long-term unemployed have largely 
given up hope," (Layard, 1986, p.96).31 
 
                                                 
27 S. Platt (1984), 'Unemployment and suicidal behaviour: a review of the literature', Social Science and 
Medicine, 19(2), pp. 93-115. C. Pritchard (1992), ' Is there a link between suicide in young men and 
unemployment? A comparison of the UK with other European Community Countries?', The British Journal 
of Psychiatry, 160, pp. 750-756.  T.A. Blakely, S.C.D. Collings, J. Atkinson (2003), 'Unemployment and 
suicide. Evidence for a causal association?', Journal of Epidemiology and Community Health, 57, pp. 594-
600.  D.S. Hamermesh and N.M. Soss. 'An economic theory of suicide', Journal of Political Economy, 
January/February 1974, 82(1), pp. 83-98.  D.G. Blanchflower and R.B. Freeman (2000), 'The Declining 
Economic Status of Young Workers in OECD Countries,' in D.G. Blanchflower and R.B. Freeman 
(editors),   Youth Employment and Joblessness in Advanced Countries, University of Chicago Press and 
NBER.   M.C. Daly, D.J. Wilson and N.J. Johnson (2008), ' Relative status and well-being: evidence from 
U.S. suicide deaths', Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco Working Paper 2007-12. 
http://www.frbsf.org/publications/economics/papers/2007/wp07-12bk.pdf 
 
28 Brenner and Mooney (1984) ibid, K.A. Moser, P.O. Goldblatt, A.J. Fox and D.R. Jones (1987), 
'Unemployment and mortality: comparison of the 1971 and 1981 longitudinal study census samples', 
British Medical Journal; 1, pp.86-90.  K.A. Moser, P.O. Goldblatt, A.J. Fox and D.R. Jones (1990), 
'Unemployment and mortality' in: Goldblatt P., editor. Longitudinal study: mortality and social 
organisation. London: OPCS, 1990. (Series LS No. 6.) 
 
29 N. Beale and S. Nethercott (1987), 'The health of industrial employees four years after compulsory 
redundancy', Journal of the Royal College of  General  Practitioners, 37 pp. 390-394. L. Iverson and S. 
Sabroe (1988), 'Participation in a follow-up study of health among unemployed and employed people after 
a company closedown: drop outs and selection bias,' Journal of  Epidemiology and Community Health,  42: 
396-401. I. Mattiasson, F. Lindgarde, J.A. Nilsson and T. Theorell (1990), 'Threats of unemployment and 
cardiovascular risk factors: longitudinal study of quality of sleep and serum cholesterol concentrations in 
men threatened with redundancy', British Medical Journal, 301, pp. 461-466. 
 
30 S. Machin and A. Manning (1999), 'The causes and consequences of long-term unemployment in 
Europe', in Handbook of Labor Economics, Volume 3C, edited by O.C. Ashenfelter and D. Card, North 
Holland 
 
31 R. Layard (1986), How to beat unemployment, Oxford University Press. 
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8) Unemployment while young, especially of long duration, causes permanent scars 
rather than temporary blemishes.32  For the young a spell of unemployment does not end 
with that spell; it raises the probability of being unemployed in later years and has a wage 
penalty.  These effects are much larger than for older people. 
 
9) As unemployment rates increase, crime rates tend to rise, especially property crime.33   
Indeed, there is some recent evidence that property crime has now started to increase in 
the UK. According to the British Crime Survey for the period July to September 2008, 
police recorded domestic burglaries rose by four per cent.34 Thornberry and Christensen 
(1984), for example, find evidence that a cycle develops whereby involvement in crime 
reduces subsequent employment prospects which then raises the likelihood of 
participating in crime. Fougere et al (2006) find that increases in youth unemployment 
causes increases in burglaries, thefts and drug offences.  Hansen and Machin (2002) find 
a statistically significant negative relationship between the number of offences reported 
by the police over a two year period for property and vehicle crime and the proportion of 
workers paid beneath the minimum before its introduction.35  Hence, there are more 
crime reductions in areas that initially, had more low-wage workers. Falk and Zweimuller 
(2005) find a significant positive relation between unemployment and right-wing criminal 
activities. Carmichael and Ward (2001) found in Great Britain that youth unemployment 
and adult unemployment are both significantly and positively related to burglary, theft, 
fraud and forgery and total crime rates. For each of these offence categories the 
relationship between youth unemployment and the specific crime was found to be 
somewhat stronger. Carmichael and Ward (200) found that there is a systematic positive 
relationship between burglary rates and male unemployment regardless of age.36 
                                                 
32 David Ellwood (1982), 'Teenage Unemployment: Permanent Scars or Temporary Blemishes?' in The 
Youth Labor Market Problem: Its Nature, Causes and Consequences, edited by Richard B. Freeman and 
David A. Wise, pp. 349-390. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982 
 
33 T. Thornberry and R. Christensen (1984), 'Unemployment and criminal involvement.  An investigation 
of reciprocal causal structures', American Sociological Review, 56, pp. 609-627.   M. Lin (2008), 'Does 
unemployment increase crime?  Evidence from US data, 1974-2000', Journal of Human Resources, 43(2), 
Spring, pp. 413-436. S. Raphael and R. Winter-Ebmer (2001), 'Identifying the effect of unemployment on 
crime', Journal of Law and Economics, 44(1), pp. 259-283.   D. Fougere, F. Kramarz and J. Pouget (2006) 
'Youth unemployment and crime in France', CEPR Discussion paper # 5600.  For a discussion of the 
relationship between unemployment and crime see R.B. Freeman (1999), 'The economics of crime', in 
Handbook of Labor Economics, Volume 3C, edited by O.C. Ashenfelter and D. Card, North Holland.   
 
34 Crime in England and Wales Quarterly Update to September 2008, Home Office Statistical Bulletin, 
Second Edition 01/09, Home Office, 22nd January 2009. 
 
35 K. Hansen and S. Machin (2002), 'Spatial crime patterns and the introduction of the UK Minimum 
Wage', Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, 64, pp. 677-699. 
 
36 A. Falk and J. Zweimuller (2005), ‘Unemployment and right-wing extremist crime’ CEPR Discussion 
Paper  #4997.  F. Carmichael and R. Ward (2001), ‘Male unemployment and crime in England and Wales’, 
Economics Letters, 73, pp. 111–115. F. Carmichael and R. Ward (2000), ‘Youth unemployment and crime 
in the English regions and Wales’, Applied Economics, 32(5), April, pp. 559 – 571. 
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10) Increases in the unemployment rate, lowers the happiness of everyone, not just the 
unemployed.  The fear of becoming unemployed in the future lowers a person’s 
subjective wellbeing.37  
 
We deal in more detail with a number of these issues below.  In particular we look at the 
health and well being of the unemployed and how increases in the aggregate 
unemployment rate lowers national wellbeing.  First, though, we examine the 
characteristics of the unemployed and how little they have changed over time. 
 
6.  The Impact of Unemployment on Health and Well-Being in the UK 
We now present econometric evidence of our own on the consequences of unemployment 
on health and well being in the UK.   
 
a) Mental health 
It is notable that the unemployed are especially likely to report having a mental illness, 
although it should be said that the direction of causation is unclear.  For example, in the 
Labour Force Surveys from February-September 2008 2.74% of the unemployed reported 
their most important health problem, if they had one, was depression or bad nerves 
compared with 0.73% of the employed.   
 
There is a growing body of literature that suggests that the unemployed are especially 
unhappy.38 The evidence from around the world is that unemployment hasn't increased 
because the unemployed are lazy and have chosen not to work because benefits are too 
high.  The reserve army of the unemployed is a conscript army rather than a volunteer 
army.  Table 8 uses data from two Eurobarometer Surveys to model mental health and 
overall wellbeing across the European Union.  In each case an ordered logit is estimated 
for life satisfaction, happiness, being depressed and feeling 'down in the dumps'.  
Controls are included for age, gender, schooling, country, marital status and labour 
market status.  In the first two columns the unemployed are less happy.  In the final two 
columns they are especially likely to be 'down in the dumps' and downhearted and 
depressed'.  We also included an interaction term between the UK dummy and the 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
37 Di Tella R., MacCulloch R.J. and A.J. Oswald (2001), 'Preferences over inflation and unemployment: 
evidence from surveys of happiness', American Economic Review, 91, pp. 335-341. Di Tella R., 
MacCulloch R.J. and A.J. Oswald (2003),  'The macroeconomics of happiness', Review of Economics and 
Statistics, 85, 809-827.  D. G. Blanchflower (2007), 'Is unemployment more costly than inflation?', NBER 
Working Paper W13505, October. D.G. Blanchflower, David (1991), 'Fear, unemployment and pay 
flexibility', Economic Journal, 101, pp. 483-496. A. Knabe and S. Rätzel (2008), 'Scarring or scaring? The 
psychological impact of past and future unemployment', Otto-von-Guericke-University Magdeburg, 
February 21. 
38 See, for example, A. Clark and A. J. Oswald (1994), 'Unhappiness and unemployment', Economic 
Journal, May, 104(424), pp. 648-659; L. Winkelmann and R. Winkelmann (1998), 'Why are the 
unemployed so unhappy?  Evidence from panel data', Economica, 65(257), pp. 1-15 and D.G. 
Blanchflower and A.J. Oswald (2004), 'Well-being over time in Britain and the United States', Journal of 
Public Economics, Volume 88, Issues 7-8, July, pp. 1359-1386. 
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unemployment dummy which was insignificant in columns 2 and 4, weakly significant in 
column 1 (t=1.61) and significant in column 3 (t=1.99) suggesting that the unemployed in 
the UK are significantly more 'down in the dumps' than in other countries.  Losing a job 
makes people unhappy, depressed and 'down in the dumps'. 
 
b) Job satisfaction and the fear of job loss 
Workers have lower levels of job satisfaction if they fear they are about to lose their jobs.  
Table 9 estimates a series of job satisfaction equations, across European countries using 
data from the European Working Conditions Survey of 2005 across 31 countries. 
Respondents were asked - Q36 On the whole, are you very satisfied, satisfied, not very 
satisfied or not at all satisfied with working conditions in your main paid job? Answers 
were coded as follows 4 - Very satisfied; 3 - Satisfied; 2 - Not very satisfied; 1 - Not at all 
satisfied. This is the dependent variable in Table 9. Workers were also asked (Q37a) 
'How much do you agree or disagree with the following statements describing some 
aspects of your job? - I might lose my job in the next 6 months – Strongly agree; Agree; 
Neither agree nor disagree; Disagree; Strongly disagree?''.  Separate controls are 
included for each of these answers.  Satisfaction is higher among the old, females, the 
self-employed without employees, whites and workers in small firms.  Most importantly 
for our purposes the greater the degree of perceived job insecurity, the less satisfied the 
worker was.  The significant and negative coefficients on the three UK*lose job 
interaction terms suggest these effects were especially pronounced in the UK.  So 
increased job insecurity lowers workers' satisfaction levels. 
 
c) Impacts of rising unemployment rates on those who are not unemployed 
When unemployment rises, happiness of both workers and non-workers falls. 
Unemployment affects not only the mental wellbeing of those concerned, but also that of 
their families, colleagues, neighbours and others who are in direct or indirect contact with 
them. Jones and Fletcher (1993), for example, provide evidence that the occupational 
stress and distress from unemployment can be transmitted between partners 39  
 
There is a body of literature that suggests individual wellbeing is related also to 
aggregate macroeconomic variables such as the unemployment rate, inflation, and the 
interest rate.40  This literature suggests that a one percentage point increase in 
unemployment reduces overall happiness twice as much as an equivalent one percentage 
point increase in inflation - the so-called misery index.  Moreover, increases in aggregate 
unemployment seems to indirectly reduce the wellbeing of not just the unemployed but 
also that of the employed and those out of the labour force such as students, the retired 
and those looking after the home.    
 
                                                 
39 F. Jones and B. Fletcher (1993): ‘An empirical study of occupational stress transmission in working 
couples’, Human Relations, 46, 881-903. 
 
40 R. Di Tella, R, MacCulloch, and A. Oswald (2001): 'Preferences over inflation and unemployment: 
evidence from surveys of happiness’, American Economic Review, 91, pp. 335-341 and D.G. Blanchflower 
(2007),  'Is unemployment more costly than inflation?', NBER Working Paper No. 13505. 
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Table 10 uses data from a cross country panel estimates the impact of the country level 
unemployment rate as well as the inflation rate on reported life satisfaction using micro 
data at the level of the individual from the 1973-2006 Eurobarometers for 19 European 
countries.  Standard errors are clustered at the country*year level. Life satisfaction is 
reported in four steps as in Table 8, with the unweighted proportions for the UK in 
parentheses - very satisfied (32%); fairly satisfied (54%) not very satisfied (10%) and not 
at all satisfied (3%). Column 1 is taken from Blanchflower (2007) and suggests that the 
unemployed are less happy but also a higher unemployment rate and a higher inflation 
rate lowers happiness.41  Column 2 includes an interaction term between being 
unemployed and the unemployment rate suggesting that a higher unemployment rate 
lowers the happiness of the unemployed more than other groups.  This is confirmed in 
columns 3-5 where the coefficient on the unemployment rate is greater for the 
unemployed (column 3) than it is for either the employed or those out-of-the-labour-force 
(OLF).  This is consistent with the findings of Di Tella et al (2001) who also find that 
increases in the national unemployment rate have much larger effects on the happiness of 
the unemployed than they do for the employed using the Eurobarometer life satisfaction 
data for twelve EU countries from 1975-1992.42  This result, however, contrasts with the 
findings of Clark (2003) using BHPS panel data for the UK and Clark et al (2008) using 
data from the German Socio-Economic Panel who find that the well-being of the 
unemployed is less affected by unemployment if they live in a region with a high 
unemployment rate, thus narrowing the well-being gap between the employed and 
unemployed in such regions.43    
 
As a check on this result we examined the data from the General Social Survey for the 
US for 1972-1998 used in Blanchflower and Oswald (2004).  We re-estimated the 
ordered logit model reported in column 1 of Table 4 where the dependent variable was 
how happy you are (not very happy; quite happy and very happy).  Controls were a time 
trend; labor market status (8); marital status (8); race dummies (2); years of education; 
age and its square and gender. We added a full set of (45) state dummies and the log of 
                                                 
41 Blanchflower (2007) uses the data in column 1 of Table 8 to estimate a misery index of 1.62, which is 
the marginal rate of substitution between inflation and unemployment.  The entire well-being cost of a 1 
percentage-point increase in the unemployment rate is therefore given by the sum of two components - the 
unemployment rate (-.011) and the loss of wellbeing of the unemployed themselves (-.363*.01).  
Combining the two, we have .0110 + .0036= .0146 as society’s overall wellbeing cost of a one percentage 
point rise in the unemployment rate.  That is then divided by the coefficient on the inflation rate of .009. 
hence, (0.0146/0.0090) = 1.62, where 0.0146 is the marginal unemployment effect on well-being, and 
0.0090 is the marginal inflation effect on well-being.  Hence a 1 percentage point increase in 
unemployment lowers wellbeing by 1.62 times the impact of a one percentage point increase in inflation.  
People care more about unemployment than they do about inflation.    
 
42 R. Di Tella, R. MacCulloch and A.J. Oswald (2001), ‘The macroeconomics of happiness’, Review of 
Economics and Statistics, 85, 809-827. 
 
43 Clark, A.E. (2003): 'Unemployment as a social norm: psychological evidence from panel data', Journal of 
Labor Economics, 21, 323-351.  A.E. Clark, A. Knabe and S.Rätzel (2008), 'Boon or bane? Others’ 
unemployment, well-being and job insecurity', CESIFO working paper # 2501, December. 
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the state unemployment rate - there are 45 dummies here due to the coverage of the GSS.  
For simplicity OLS results are reported below.  We present three results.  First, for all 
respondents and here unemployment lowers happiness as does the state unemployment 
rate.  In column 2 we add an insignificant interaction term between the unemployment 
dummy and the state unemployment rate, which is insignificant, as it is in the final 
column, which is restricted to the workforce.    
 
       All   All          Workforce 
Unemployed dummy -.25 (12.9) -.22 (2.0) -.23 (2.1)  
Log of state unemployment -.04 (3.8) -.05 (3.8) -.05 (2.9) 
Unemployed* log state U  -.02 (0.3) -.02 (0.3) 
 N 35,930 35,930 23,066 
 
Interestingly Luechinger et al (2008) also used the GSS data to show that the sensitivity 
of subjective well-being to fluctuations in unemployment rates is much lower among 
employees in the public sector than in the private. They found a similar result using 
individual panel data for Germany from the GSOEP 1984–2004 and repeated cross-
sectional data for thirteen European countries from the Eurobarometers 1989–1994.  The 
fear of unemployment is, as expected, greater for workers in the private sector than in the 
public sector. This, the authors argue, suggests that "increased economic insecurity 
constitutes an important welfare loss associated with high general unemployment".44 
 
We now turn to examine the youth labour market that, as we noted above, is especially 
impacted in downturns. 
 
7.  What are the Characteristics of the New Unemployed? 
Another key comparison with past recessions is how the incidence of unemployment is 
distributed across the population. Historically, the unemployed have been concentrated in 
particular regions or industries; it has fallen most heavily on particular groups in society 
such as the young, the old, those with a non-white ethnic background and those whose 
partner was not working. Will these patterns be repeated in this recession? Clearly, it is 
relatively early to draw strong conclusions about the course of a recession that is in its 
ninth month. However, some trends are emerging in the claimant count unemployment 
data that are already worthy of comment.  
 
Because recessions influence the components of demand differently, their effects of are 
rarely uniform across industrial sectors.  Thus, if investment falls more rapidly than other 
components of demand, the construction and investment goods industries are likely to be 
more affected than other sectors.  Since industries are not uniformly distributed across the 
country, particular regions and localities will experience a more rapid rise in 
unemployment than elsewhere. In this section, we consider this issue at the regional, 
                                                 
44 S. Luechinger, S. Meier and A. Stutzer (2008), 'Why does unemployment hurt the employed? Evidence 
from the life satisfaction gap between the public and the private sector?', IZA DP No. 3385, March. 
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travel-to-work area and city level.  We also examine the incidence of unemployment 
categorized by age, ethnicity and household composition. 
 
a) Regions 
The large increases in unemployment during the 1970s and 1980s were focused on the 
north of England, Scotland and Wales. The recession of the early 1990s followed a very 
different pattern and, thus far, the same is true of the present downturn.  Figure 11 shows 
the percentage increase in claimant count unemployment for 8 months from the 
beginning of the recession which commenced in April 1991 plotted against the 
percentage increase in unemployment over the first 8 months of the present recession 
(Apr-Nov 2008). It shows that, with the exception of London, the growth in 
unemployment at the start of the last two recessions has been concentrated in the South of 
England. This may reflect the relatively greater size of the housing asset bubble in the 
south. Interestingly, Northern Ireland experienced much more rapid growth in the value 
of its housing during 2005 and 2006 than it did during the housing boom of the late 1980s 
and its unemployment has risen particularly sharply during 2008 compared with 1991.45 
 
The relationship between the increase in unemployment in 1991 and that in 2008 is 
positive and significant, perhaps suggesting that there is some common causal pattern 
between both recessions. The most likely culprit, present in both recessions, is a sudden 
reversal in house prices, brought about by an unsustainable bubble in these prices. 
 
At a more disaggregated level, the positive relationship between increases in 
unemployment during the early 1990s and 2008 is still evident. Figure 12 shows a scatter 
of percentage increases in claimant count unemployment during the first 8 months of the 
1991 and 2008 recessions for all British travel-to-work areas (TTWAs). Again, there is a 
strongly positive relationship (t = 8.0), but the increase in 1991 only explains 18 per cent 
of the variation in TTWA unemployment in 2008. Hence, while both recessions may both 
partly be explained by the asset price bubble, there are clearly other causal factors which 
the recessions do not share. 
 
As one would expect, given the regional data, the percentage increase in unemployment 
in 2008 was greater in the towns and cities in the south that have previously been 
associated with rapid growth and development. Thus, Swindon, Reading, Exeter and 
Bristol have experienced more rapid increases in unemployment than northern towns 
such as Leeds, Manchester and Liverpool. This raises interesting questions about the 
extent to which a city-based growth strategy can be undermined by excess pressure in the 
local housing market. 
 
                                                 
45 Though one should note that there is a considerable debate about whether there have been bubbles in UK 
house prices in the sense of house prices significantly deviating from those prices dictated by the 
fundamentals of the housing market see  Cameron, G., Muellbauer, J., and Murphy, A. (2006), 'Was there 
A British house price bubble? Evidence from a regional panel’,  University of Oxford, Department of 
Economics Working Paper No 276 
 
 25
b) Age, schooling, race and gender 
Of interest also is who are the unemployed and how have their characteristics changed 
over time  Micro-data at the level of the individual are used in this section drawn from 
separate Labour Force Surveys for 1984, 1993 and 2006, 2007 and 2008 up to 
September.  The first LFS in the UK was conducted in 1973, under a Regulation derived 
from the Treaty of Rome. The survey was carried out every two years from 1973 to 1983 
in the spring quarter. Between 1984 and 1991 the survey was carried out in the quarter 
between March and May, in Great Britain and Northern Ireland. From the spring of 1992 
sample sizes were increased as the survey was taken in all calendar months.  Each 
quarter’s LFS sample of 57,000 UK households is made up of five "waves", each of 
approximately 11,000 private households. Each wave is interviewed in five successive 
quarters, such that in any one quarter, one wave will be receiving their first interview, one 
wave their second, and so on, with one wave receiving their fifth and final interview. 
Thus there is an 80% overlap in the samples for each successive quarter.  Consequently 
the sample size in 1984 is considerably smaller (n=67,000) than it is in 1993 
(n=284,000); 2006 (n=229,000); 2007 (226,000) or 2008 (n=164,000) where data are 
only available until September. 
 
Initially we focus on the most current unemployment rates.  Below are the weighted rates 
(%) by sub-group for the period April-September 2008.  Youth rates (18-24) are 
generally more than double the overall rates. 
 
                              All ages   18-24 yrs              All ages     18-24 yrs            
Overall 5.8 13.4 Rest of North  6.3 13.4 
Male 6.2 15.6 South Yorkshire  8.2 19.3 
Female 5.2 11.0 West Yorkshire  6.8 15.2 
White 5.2 12.5 Rest Yorks/Humber 3.8 7.7 
Black 13.3 26.3 East Midlands  5.8 13.6 
Asian 9.7 21.3 East Anglia  4.7 11.6 
No qualifications 11.6 28.9 Inner London  8.0 19.0 
Apprenticeship 3.2 6.2 Outer London  6.4 15.6 
O-level 7.1 15.1 Rest of South East  4.4 11.0 
ONC/OND 5.3 15.4 South West  4.0 8.2 
A-level 5.9 10.7 West Midlands  8.7 18.4 
HNC/HND 2.6 8.7 Rest West Midlands  4.5 10.3 
Degree 3.4 11.3 Greater Manchester  7.6 16.5 
 First 2.9 6.8 Merseyside  8.9 20.7 
 IIi 3.7 8.7 Rest of North West  5.0 12.8 
 IIii 3.5 11.3 Wales  5.8 12.0 
 III 3.5 14.6 Strathclyde  5.4 11.7 
 Pass 3.4  17.5 Rest of Scotland  4.0 10.0 
Higher degree 2.4 9.3 Northern Ireland  4.3 11.8 
Tyne & Wear  7.9 16.2  
 
It is apparent that unemployment rates decline with age, are higher among men, 
minorities and the least educated.  Unemployment rates for 18-24 year olds are lower the 
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higher the class of degree obtained and especially so for those with a first.  
Unemployment is especially prevalent among those aged 18-24 who do not have any 
qualifications.  Youth unemployment rates are highest in the regions that have the highest 
overall rates of unemployment (Merseyside, South Yorkshire and Inner London) and vice 
versa.  The distribution of highest education qualifications in 2008 is reported below.   
 
           Employed        Unemployed 
Degree or equivalent  24       14  
Other higher ed. 10        4  
A level  24       19  
GCSE grades A-C 22       28  
Other qualifications  13       17  
No qualifications  8       17  
 
The employed are more highly educated but what stands out is just over a third of the 
unemployed have A-levels or higher.  This contrasts sharply with 1984 when, based on 
our examination of the LFS, at that time more than half of the unemployed had no 
qualifications while only 2% of the unemployed had a degree or higher degree.   
 
c) Occupation 
The current downturn is not just a blue-collar recession.  This is confirmed when one 
looks at the occupation distributions.  Below we report the distributions (%) of the 
current occupations of the employed and the last occupation of the unemployed in 2008.  
Note that one third of the unemployed (31.8%) had not had an occupation in the 
preceding eight years, and these are excluded from the distribution.  We are struck by the 
similarity of the distributions rather than by their differences. 
 
                                   Current Workers      Unemployed 
Managers and senior officials         16            11  
Professional occupations         13             9  
Associate professional and technical         15             9  
Administrative and secretarial         11            13 
Skilled trades occupations         11             9  
Personal service occupations          8             10  
Sales and customer service occupation          8            11  
Process, plant and machine operatives          7             9  
Elementary occupations         12            20 
 
d) Industry 
If we examine the most recent data on the reduction in workforce jobs, it is apparent that 
there has been a decline in the numbers employed in Finance, Business and Services and 
Distribution, Hotels and Restaurants.  A puzzle in the data is the fact that there has been 
no contraction in the numbers working in construction.  This may in part be explained by 
the fact that approximately 40% of the most recent increase in unemployment is from the 
self-employed who disproportionately work in construction.  In the LFS the unemployed 
report their last industry and the distributions are below, for those who have ever worked 
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(%) alongside the employed for 2008.  The puzzle is also there in the unemployment data 
because the construction industry proportion seems low. The important role played by 
migrants in this sector and the extent to which they are adequately sampled in the LFS 
may also contribute to an explanation. 
 
 Employed       Unemployed 
Agriculture, hunting & forestry       1.45   0.93 
Fishing       0.05   0.02 
Mining, quarrying       0.44   0.31 
Manufacturing      12.22  15.51 
Electricity gas & water supply       0.70   0.42 
Construction       8.02   9.69 
Wholesale, retail & motor trade      14.66  19.75 
Hotels & restaurants       4.24   8.96 
Transport, storage & communication       6.68   7.61 
Financial intermediation       4.11   2.76 
Real estate, renting etc      11.81  10.05 
Public administration & defence       7.27   3.72 
Education       9.44   4.88 
Health & social work      12.80   8.47 
Other community, social & personal       5.56   6.24 
Private households with employed persons     0.49   0.46 
Extra-territorial organisations        0.04   0.03 
Workplace outside UK       0.02   0.20 
 
e) Time series changes in characteristics 
A comparison of how unemployment rates have changed over time, are reported below in 
the first row using ONS data (see also Figure 1).  The remaining rows report on the 
changing characteristics based on the (unweighted) means from our LFS data files.  The 
earlier two years of 1984 and 1993 were chosen, as these were the high points of 
unemployment in earlier cycles and thus the depth of the two prior recessions and hence 
provide a useful basis for comparison.46    
 
            1984            1993  2006  2007            2008 
Overall 11.8 10.4 5.4 5.3 5.8 
 
Degree 4.2 4.5 3.1 2.5 2.9 
O-level 9.4 9.8 5.9 6.3 6.5 
                                                 
46 ILO unemployment rates (%) from the ONS were as follows  
1971 4.1 1977 5.6 1983 11.5 1989 7.2 1995 8.6 2001 5.1   2007  5.3 
1972 4.3 1978 5.5 1984 11.8 1990 7.1 1996 8.1 2002 5.2   2008Q3 5.8 
1973 3.7 1979 5.4 1985 11.4 1991 8.9 1997 6.9 2003 5.1 2008 Nov 6.1 
1974 3.7 1980 6.8 1986 11.3 1992 9.9 1998 6.3 2004 4.8    
1975 4.5 1981 9.6 1987 10.4 1993 10.4 1999 6.0 2005 4.9 
1976 5.4 1982 10.7 1988 8.6 1994 9.5 2000 5.4 2006 5.4 
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No qualifications 13.9 14.6 9.8 10.2 10.6 
16-17 21.3 24.0 24.2 26.4 25.5 
18-24 18.0 17.6 12.2 12.1 12.9 
Black 20.8 27.2 13.3 12.2 12.5 
Asian 19.3 20.2 10.1 9.6 9.8 
Black<25 yrs of age 31.5 44.9 33.0 33.7 33.4 
 
The main points that stand out are that unemployment is higher among the less educated, 
the young and blacks and especially young blacks.  That pattern is consistent in each of 
the years.  Unemployment starts to rise for all groups in 2008.   Unemployment for blacks 
was considerably worse in 1984 and 1993.  Somewhat surprisingly the unemployment 
rate of young blacks in 2008 is higher than in 1998.  
 
e) Econometric estimates of the probability of being unemployed 
Table 6 uses the LFS data from these five sample years to model econometrically the 
probability of an individual in the labour force being unemployed, so the employed are 
set to zero and one if unemployed.  Anyone who is OLF is excluded so the sample is 
restricted to the workforce. Dprobits are estimated using STATA.47  Of particular interest 
is the age group 18-24 so we present separate estimates in each case for all ages and 
separately for these young people.   
 
Columns 1 and 2 of Table 6 are for 1984 and columns 3 and 4 for 1993.  In each case an 
overall equation is presented along with one for 18-24 year olds only.  The estimates for 
the two years look very similar, and confirm our findings from the means above that 
unemployment is higher among men, the least educated, among minorities and in the 
North of England and Merseyside.  Race effects are especially pronounced among the 
young.  Conditional on other characteristics, the probability of unemployment is lowest in 
the South East. 
 
Table 7 performs a similar exercise for 2006-2008.   These equations also include month 
dummies and three controls for disability.  Those who are disabled according to the 
Disability Discrimination Act (DDA) with a work limitation are especially likely to be 
unemployed.  It is striking how similar the equations look compared to those for 1984 
and 1993.  Once again unemployment is highest among the young, women, whites and 
the least educated, and the situation is worsening.  The size of the coefficients is 
increasing over time: the data for 2008 are becoming more like the data for 1984 and 
1993.  The size of the coefficient on the 16-17 dummy in 2008 is larger than in either 
1984 or 1993 at the depth of the two prior recessions.  That for 18-24 is smaller but rising 
and that is the case for most other variables including those on race, gender ad education.   
 
                                                 
47 The STATA procedure dprobit fits maximum-likelihood probit models and is an alternative to probit. 
Rather than reporting the coefficients, dprobit reports the marginal effect, that is the change in the 
probability for an infinitesimal change in each independent, continuous variable and, by default, reports the 
discrete change in the probability for dummy variables.   
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It is notable that the regional pattern of coefficients in 2008, are similar to the prior 
recessions.  The ranking, where the highest rate ranks first and the one with the lowest 
ranks 17th, is as follows.  Here we re-estimated the data for 2008 merging Inner and Outer 
London to form 'London' and Strathclyde and the Rest of Scotland to form 'Scotland'.  
 
         1984                1993                2008 
East Anglia 16 15 13 
East Midlands 13 17 10 
Greater Manchester 8 7 5 
London 15 5 7 
Merseyside 1 1 1` 
North/Tyne & Wear 2 2 3 
Rest North West 10 14 12 
Rest of North 5 6 6 
Rest South East 17 16 15 
Rest West Midlands 9 13 14 
Rest Yorks & Humber 11 10 17 
South West 14 12 16 
South Yorkshire 4 3 2 
Scotland 3 8 11 
Wales 6 9 8 
West Midlands 7 4 4 
West Yorkshire 12 11 9 
 
It is apparent that the regions with the lowest rates in all three years are the Rest of the 
South East, East Anglia and the South West.  Those with the highest are Merseyside the 
Northern region.  The most notable difference is the 2008 recession is hitting London 
with its dependence on the financial sector, as it did in 1993.  The biggest difference is 
that it is relatively muted in Scotland. 
 
8.  The Youth Labour Market 
We now move on to consider the characteristics of the youth labour market. We first 
document the changes that have occurred in the UK over recent years, and in particular 
the growth in the unemployment rate of the young and the substantial rise in the size of 
the cohort.  We then place these changes in international context, and show in particular 
how the ratio of youth to adult rates is very high in the UK compared to most other 
countries, developed and developing, in the world.  Third, we show that youth labour 
markets are highly cyclically volatile. Fourth, we examine the extent to which industrial 
change impact young people's labour market prospects. Fifth, we find that youths do not 
appear to have priced themselves out of jobs.  Finally, we present evidence that 
unemployment while young creates permanent scars. 
 
a) The nature of the youth labour market problem in the UK 
It is noteworthy that the majority of measured youth unemployment in the UK primarily 
relates to 18-24 year olds (the young) rather than to 16-17 year olds (the very young).  
For example, in 2008 Q3 there were 184,000 unemployed 16 and 17 year olds compared 
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with 597,000 18-24 year olds.  There were 331,000 claimants who were 18-24 but none 
who were 16-17 as they are not eligible to claim unemployment benefits.  The 
representation of youngsters under the age of twenty five among the unemployed is much 
greater than their representation in the overall population.48   
 
It should also be pointed out that 18-24 year old unemployment has constituted a rising 
share of overall unemployment since the turn of the millennium.  As can be seen below 
despite a declining overall unemployment rate and a declining rate for the young between 
1993 and 2004 their unemployment rate has risen since then.  Moreover, their share of 
unemployment has risen steadily from 21.7% in 1999 to 29.2% in 2008 Q3.   
 
                   Unemployment rate       18-24 unemployment rate        18-24 as % overall 
1993  10.4 17.5 25.0 
1994 9.5 16.3 23.9 
1995 8.6 15.0 23.1 
1996 8.1 14.3 22.7 
1997 6.9 12.9 22.3 
1998 6.3 12.0 22.8 
1999 6.0 11.2 21.7 
2000 5.4 10.6 22.4 
2001 5.1 10.4 23.9 
2002 5.2 10.5 23.8 
2003 5.1 10.6 24.8 
2004 4.8 10.4 26.2 
2005 4.9 11.0 27.8 
2006 5.4 12.2 27.7 
2007 5.3 12.3 28.3 
2008 Q3 5.8 13.7 29.2 
2008 Nov 6.1 14.5 31.9 
 
A particular concern is also that youth unemployment rates are particularly high for racial 
minorities.  As we noted above, black unemployment rates ages 18-24 were 26.3% and 
for Asians were 21.3%.  The rate for those without qualifications in the 2008 LFS was 
also high at 28.9% and 47.4% for young blacks, 30.0% for young whites and 38.3% 
Asians respectively, without qualifications.  We have special concerns regarding the 
employment prospects of these young people without qualifications- the disadvantaged 
young - going forward. 
 
Part of the explanation for the rise in youth unemployment in the UK has been the recent 
rise in the size of the youth cohort.  In the latest labour market release by the ONS, 
unemployment in the Aug-Oct quarter of 2008 increased by 137,000 compared with the 
                                                 
48 In 2007 15-24 year olds constituted 13.37% of the population and 20.15% of the population of working 
age (15-64M/59F).  See Table 1.4 Population Trends, No 134, Winter 2008. 
http://www.statistics.gov.uk/StatBase/Product.asp?vlnk=6303  
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previous quarter; of this 55,000 were 18-24 year olds (40%).49  In the same release, 
claimant unemployment increased by 75,700 on the month of which 22,100 (29%) were 
18-24 year olds.  This has arisen in part because of the increase in the size of the youth 
cohort.  This is illustrated below:  
 
               Total UK population    #16-24 year olds              16-24 as % total 
 ('000s)        ('000s)             
1981 56,357 8,079 14.3% 
1986 56,684 8,332 14.7% 
1991 57,439 7,491 13.0% 
1996 58,164 6,495 11.2% 
2000 58,886 6,383 10.8% 
2001 59,113 6,504 11.0% 
2002 59,323 6,632 11.2% 
2003 59,557 6,785 11.4% 
2004 59,846 6,960 11.6% 
2005 60,238 7,099 11.8% 
2006 60,587 7,221 11.9% 
2007 60,975 7,368 12.1% 
 
Source: Population Trends, 134, Winter 2008, Table 1.4. 
 
From 1980 to 2000 the absolute and relative size of the youth cohort shrank.  However, 
since 2000 the size of the youth cohort - the children of the baby boomers - has grown 
steadily, from 6.4 million (10.8% of the population) in 2000 to 7.4 million (12.1%) in 
2007.  The growth of the 16-24 cohort has thus been faster than the overall growth in the 
population. The number of 16-24 year olds in 2007 is still around seven hundred 
thousand less than the number in 1981 (8.1 million).  However, the size of that cohort 
will decline quite rapidly.  The following numbers are taken from Key Population and 
Vital Statistics, 2006 and they show the numbers of children by single year of age (in 
thousands) in mid 2006.   
 
Age in 2006    Cohort size (‘000s)     Age in 2006          Cohort size (‘000s)         
0 732  13  759         
1 716  14  785        
2 705  15  800        
3 681  16  791        
4 663  17  791         
5 664  18  809   
6 680  19  805   
7 700  20   810  
8 713  21    825  
9 732  22    808  
                                                 
49 Labour Market Statistics, First Release, ONS, December 2008, Tables 9(1) and 11(1). 
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10 728  23    793 
11 732  24    788 
12 749  
 
The growth of the age 16-24 cohort is a temporary phenomenon.  It will start to decline in 
absolute and relative size from 2009 onwards as the larger older cohorts drop out and the 
younger smaller ones are added.  For example, in 2009 there are approximately 825,000 
24 year olds (age 21 in 2006) who will drop out and will be replaced by 749,000 fifteen 
year olds (aged 12 in 2006) so the cohort will shrink by around 75,000.  Analogously, it 
will drop by a similar number the next year. 
 
Of particular concern is the high proportion of young people in the UK who are either not 
in education employment or training (NEET) or not in education and training (NET). In 
2008 Q3 there were 87,000 16 year olds, 216,000 17 year olds and 292,000 individuals 
classified as NEET (http://www.dcsf.gov.uk/rsgateway/DB/STA/t000751/index.shtml).  Low-skilled 
youth who become NEET find it more difficult to re-engage in employment and learning 
than 16-24-year olds on average and there is evidence that they may become trapped in 
NEET.   Godfrey et al (2002) estimated the costs of being NEET for the Department for 
Education and Skills.50 They considered social costs as well as public finance costs over 
the current, medium and long-term. These included estimates of the costs of educational 
underachievement, unemployment, inactivity, crime and health. The authors were not 
able to estimates of the costs of the lowering of the skills base and hence their findings 
may underestimate the full costs. Their major finding was that the 157,000 NEETs aged 
16-18 present in the UK population in 1999 would accrue additional lifetime costs of 
around £7bn (2001 prices) in resource terms and £8.1bn in additional public spending. 
The per capita equivalents are £45,000 in resource costs and £52,000 in public finance 
costs.   
 
b) International comparisons 
Detailed comparisons of changes in unemployment rates, employment/population rates 
and participation rates for 15-24 year olds by OECD country are reported in Appendix 
Tables B and C.  In contrast to the finding that youth unemployment had increased in the 
UK, the ILO (2008) noted that there has been a declining trend in youth unemployment 
around the world.51  The world unemployment rate of youth ages 15-24 rose from 10.9% 
in 1999 to a peak in 2004 of 12.6% and has declined since then (Table 11).  In 2007 the 
youth unemployment rate stood at 11.9%.  The ILO noted that the youth rate was nearly 
three times the adult rate but 2.4 times in the developed world.  We added data for the 
UK in the final row of the table.  It is apparent that, in contrast to the rest of the world, 
the trend in youth unemployment has been rising in the UK, as has the ratio of youth-to-
                                                 
50 Godfrey, C., Hutton, S., Bradshaw, J., Coles, B., Craig, G. and Johnson, J., (2002), Estimating the Cost 
of Being 'Not in Education, Employment or Training' at Age 16-18, Research Report 346, Department for 
Education and Skills. 
 
51 ILO (2008), 'Global employment trends for youth', October, ILO Geneva.  
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adult rates.  Worryingly in the latest data for 2008 Q3 we calculate that the youth 
unemployment rate for 16-24 year olds was 16.8% and the ratio of youth-adult rates had 
risen further from 3.9 in 2007 to 4.2.  
 
The United Nations (2007) in their Annex Table 8, which is presented as Appendix Table 
D, confirms the finding of high youth unemployment rates and high youth-to-adult rates 
in the UK.52  The ratio of youth to adult unemployment rates in the UK they estimated at 
3.6 in 2005, which, in Europe was only exceeded by Malta (3.7), Italy (3.9), Sweden 
(3.8) and Iceland (4.5) and joint sixteenth with Costa Rica and Haiti out of 117 countries.  
Outside Europe, New Zealand was the only OECD country with a higher ratio (3.8). The 
share of unemployed youth in total unemployment, the United Nations noted, is also high 
at 38.6% and is exceeded only by Iceland and Malta in Europe.  
 
It is also notable that the proportion of the young who are in full-time education has 
increased over time.  This has increased from 26% in 1993 to 38% in 2007.  It is apparent 
though that the proportion is still well below that of many other countries.  It is also 
apparent that working while in school is becoming a more important part of school-to-
work transition than the traditional model of school, then work. Data available from the 
OECD suggests that the proportion of the young who are in school is considerably higher 
in, for example, Belgium (60%); Finland (56%); France (61%), Italy (57%); Luxembourg 
(69%) and Sweden (57%).  One response to rising unemployment on the part of youth 
has been to return to full-time education (Blanchflower and Freeman, 2000, Rice, 
1999).53   
 
One effect of the increased participation in further education is that the 16-24 cohort are 
now much better qualified than they were during the last recession. Thus, for example, in 
1993, 5.8 per cent of 16-24 year olds were graduates, while in 2008 that share had risen 
to 13.2 per cent. Interestingly, the improvement in qualifications is more concentrated 
among females than males. By 2008, the proportion of females aged 18-24 with no 
qualifications had fallen to 4.6 per cent, but for males was still over 7 per cent. Reflecting 
the generally higher skills profile among females, it is also worth noting that mean hourly 
wages for females are higher than those for males among this age group, though not 
significantly so (Source: LFS). 
 
The OECD (2008b) recently also noted that, even before the slowing of the UK labour 
market in the spring of 2008, a variety of indicators of youth performance between 2005 
and 2007 do paint a more mixed picture (Table 11).54  On the one hand, they noted that 
the youth employment rate is 12 percentage points higher than in the OECD on average 
                                                 
52 United Nations (2007), 'The world youth report 2007—young people’s transition to adulthood: progress 
and challenges', United Nations (http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/unyin/documents/wyr07_complete.pdf). 
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and long-term unemployment has decreased by over 7 percentage points over the past 
decade.  The young in the UK are less likely to be in temporary work but more likely to 
be part-time than in the OECD as a whole. Dropout rates continue to be below the OECD 
average. Low-paid employment is still common among youth but its persistence has 
halved since the early 1990s. On the other hand, a number of issues related to the labour 
market performance of youth the OECD note have emerged recently.   
 
c) Youth labour markets are highly cyclically volatile 
There is a considerable body of evidence suggesting that the young, the least educated 
and especially minorities are hardest in a recession.55 Youth unemployment rates 
continue to be more sensitive to business-cycle conditions than the adult unemployment 
rate, as many studies have shown (OECD, 2008).56  Young unskilled men from minority 
groups are thus particularly hard hit.  This is true around the world.  
 
Clark and Summers (1982), in their classic study of the dynamics of youth joblessness 
argue that the problem of teenage unemployment arises from a shortage of jobs. 
"Aggregate demand has a potent impact on the job prospects and market experience of 
teenagers" (1982, p.230).57  Freeman and Wise (1982), for example, found in their study 
of youth joblessness in the 1970s that it was concentrated, by and large, among a small 
group who lacked work for extended periods of time.58 Over half of the male teenage 
unemployment they examined was among those who were out of work for over six 
months, a group constituting less than 10% of the youth labor force and only 7% of the 
youth population. The youths who make up the relatively small group that was 
chronically without work Freeman and Wise reported had distinct characteristics. They 
were disproportionately black; disproportionately high school dropouts, and 
disproportionately residents of poverty areas.  
 
Blanchflower and Freeman (2000) identified one basic pattern in the job market for 
young workers: the disproportionately large response of youth employment or 
unemployment to changes in overall unemployment.59  They argued that the sensitivity of 
                                                 
55 D.G. Blanchflower and R.B. Freeman (editors), Youth Employment and Joblessness in Advanced 
Countries, University of Chicago Press and NBER, 2000 and Freeman, R. B. and D. A. Wise, (editors), The 
Youth Labor Market Problem: Its Nature, Causes, and Consequences, University of Chicago Press and 
NBER, 1982. 
 
56 OECD (2008a), ‘Off to a good start? Youth labour market transitions in OECD countries’, OECD 
Employment Outlook, 2008, pp. 25-77, Paris, France. 
 
57 K.B. Clark and L.H. Summers (1982) 'The dynamics of youth unemployment' in Freeman, R. B. and D. 
A. Wise, (editors), The Youth Labor Market Problem: Its Nature, Causes, and Consequences, University of 
Chicago Press and NBER.  
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59 D.G. Blanchflower and R.B. Freeman (2000). 
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youth employment and unemployment to the overall rate of unemployment dominate 
sizable demographic and structural changes favorable to youth in determining how 
youths fare in the job market.  This was also confirmed in Blanchflower and Freeman 
(1996) and Makeham (1980).60  Recently OECD (2008a) confirmed this conclusion 
"Youth unemployment rates are more sensitive to business-cycle conditions than the 
adult unemployment rate and this high-sensitivity tends to decline progressively with 
age".61 
 
There is also evidence that young people do especially well in booms.  Freeman and 
Rodgers (1999) who analyzed the 1990s boom in the United States and found that it 
substantially improved the position of non-college educated young men, especially young 
African Americans who are the most disadvantaged and troubled group in the US.62  
Young men in tight labor markets experienced a substantial boost in both employment 
and earnings. Adult men had no gains and their earnings barely changed even in areas 
where unemployment rates were below 4%. Youths did particularly well in areas that 
started the boom at lower jobless rates suggesting they would “benefit especially from 
consistent full employment” (Freeman and Rodgers, 1999, p.2).  As unemployment 
amongst the young goes down and the attractiveness of work increases, because there are 
more jobs and better paying jobs out there and it becomes a virtuous cycle. Freeman and 
Rodgers found evidence that once that occurred in the US the crime rate dropped. 
Increase aggregate demand and youths, especially disadvantaged youths, seem to do best  
 
d) Are youths pricing themselves out of jobs? 
There has been considerable interest in the possibility that youth have priced themselves 
out of jobs.  Wells (1983) examined the relative pay and employment of young people for 
the period 1952-1979. During the earlier period the pay of boys to men increased from 
42.0 in 1952 to 46.9 in 1969 and for girls to men it fell from 34.0 to 32.4.  However, 
during the period 1969-1981 the boys to men ratio rose from 46.9 to 56.2 while the girls 
to men ratio increased from 32.5 to 40.4.  Econometric analysis confirmed the finding 
found that the pay and employment of young people under the age of 18 for the period 
1969-81 "appears to have been reduced by increases in their relative earnings relative to 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
60 D.G. Blanchflower and R.B. Freeman  (1996), 'Growing into Work: Youth and the Labour Market over 
the 1980s and 1990s', OECD Employment Outlook, OECD, Paris and P. Makeham (1980), 'Youth 
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61 OECD (2008a), 'Off to a good start? Youth labour market transitions in OECD countries', OECD 
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the average earnings of adults....No such effect could be found for the period 1952-1969"  
(p.1).63   
 
Subsequently the relative earnings of youth have declined steadily. OECD (1986) found 
that from the 1970s through the early 1980s the earnings of youth fell relative to the 
earnings of adults in several countries.64  The finding that youths were overpriced relative 
to adults has not been replicated in subsequent periods, as youth relative wages have 
fallen steadily.  Blanchflower and Freeman (2000) examined the relative earnings of 
youths aged 16-19 and 20-24 to those of adults in 11 OECD countries (Australia; Canada; 
Denmark; France; Germany; Italy; Japan; Norway; Sweden; the United Kingdom and the 
United States) and found that there were declines in the relative earnings of the young 
throughout the 1990s in each of these countries except Sweden, despite the fact that the 
size of the youth cohort was shrinking.  O'Higgins (1997) also concluded that there was 
no close relationship between the relative wages of youth and their unemployment rates. 
"Indeed, the impression is that, more often than not, unemployment and relative wage 
rates appear to be moving in opposite directions to each other".65   
 
The finding that the relative pay of the young has continued to decline over the last 
decade or so is confirmed below using data from Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings 
(ASHE) - previously the New Earnings Survey (NES). Gross hourly earnings of 18-21 
year olds are compared to overall earnings and adults age 40-49 for the period 1997-
2008.  It is clear that the relative earnings of the young have fallen steadily since 1997 
when the youth share of total unemployment started to rise. 
 
                           18-21/total           18-21/40-49 years 
2008 51.8% 45.8% 
2007 52.5% 46.6% 
2006 51.3% 45.3% 
2005 51.1% 45.0% 
2004 52.0% 46.2% 
2003 52.6% 46.2% 
2002 52.8% 47.6% 
2001 53.7% 48.4% 
2000 53.7% 47.8% 
1999 55.6% 49.6% 
1998 54.6% 48.5% 
1997 54.9% 48.6% 
 
Source: ASHE. 
                                                 
63 W. Wells (1983), 'The relative pay and employment of young people', Department of Employment 
Occasional Paper # 42. 
 
64 OECD (1986), OECD Employment Outlook, OECD, Paris, France. 
 
65 N. O'Higgins (1997), 'The challenge of youth unemployment',  Employment and labour market policies 
branch action programme on youth unemployment ', ILO, Geneva. 
 37
http://www.statistics.gov.uk/StatBase/Product.asp?vlnk=13101&Pos=1&ColRank=1&Rank=208 
 
OECD (2008a) presented evidence on youth (20-24) earnings relative to adult earnings 
across countries.  The evidence is presented below and suggests that a) this ratio in the 
UK has fallen over time and b) now is below the OECD average but was above it in 
1996.   
 
     2006      1996 
Australia .73 .74 
Canada .64 .62 
Denmark .65 .72 
Finland .68 .70 
Germany .61 .62 
Ireland .67 .61 
Japan .60 .62 
New Zealand .75 .75 
Sweden .68 .73 
UK .60 .68 
USA .57 .58 
OECD .64 .67 
 
Interestingly, such evidence there is that the high relative wages of the young being 
responsible for pricing them out of the jobs comes only from the 1970s.  Interestingly, 
that is the period of most rapid increase in union activity.  Union membership peaked in 
the 1970s with union density – the proportion of workers who are members of trade 
unions - at a little over 50% (Lindsay, 2003).  Since that time union membership numbers 
and density rates have fallen.  In 2007 union density had fallen to 25% and 15.9% among 
private sector British employees.  Unions generally operate rates for the job, which would 
have the effect of raising the relative wage of the young, and hence making them 
relatively less attractive, and then lowering their employment.  Union membership rates 
among the young in the UK are especially low.  Blanchflower (2007) shows, using data 
from the Labour Force Survey that union density rates for 16-19 year olds in 2004 were 
4.3%.   In 2007 the union density rates for 16-24 year olds was 9.8% (Mercer and Notley, 
2008, Table 25).66  It does not appear that youths are pricing themselves out of work 
currently, unless their relative productivity is falling especially sharply, but we have no 
evidence to suggest that this is the case. 
 
A further possibility is that the introduction of the National Minimum Wage, which was 
introduced in 1997, might have reduced employment of the young.  There is little or no 
                                                 
66 C. Lindsay (2003), ‘A century of labour market change: 1900-2000’, Labour Market Trends, March, pp. 
133-144.  S. Mercer and R. Notley (2008), Trade Union Membership, 2007, July., Department of Business, 
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(2007), ‘International patterns of union membership', British Journal of Industrial Relations, March, 45(1), 
pp. 1-28. 
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evidence to sustain that claim either.67  There is a little evidence to suggest that the influx 
of workers, who were generally working in less skilled jobs, from the ten Accession 
countries did have some negative impact in the period since 2004 on the employment of 
the least skilled young people.68  But these effects are usually insignificant or when 
significant, quite small. 
 
e) How is industrial change impacting young people's labour market prospects? 
Another difficulty which will adversely affect young people’s labour market prospects is 
the changing structure of labour demand in the UK, which reflects the substantial changes 
in industrial structure that have occurred in the last three decades. Autor, Levy and 
Murnane argue that industrial change in the USA has led to a significant change in the 
demand for skills.69  Rather than increased demand being entirely focused on high-skilled 
jobs, there has also been an increase in demand for jobs with a low skill content. In 
contrast, mainly as a result of changes in technology, the demand for skilled manual 
workers who perform routine functions and who would previously have occupied the 
middle of the earnings distribution, has declined dramatically. Goos and Manning(2003) 
produce evidence which supports this hypothesis for the UK.70  They use information 
from the Labour Force Survey for the period 1979-1999 and define “lousy” jobs as those 
occupation/industry combinations where median earnings are relatively low and “lovely” 
jobs as those where median earnings are relatively high. They then argue that both these 
types of jobs typically involve tasks that are not routine and therefore cannot be easily 
substituted by technology. Examples of “lousy” jobs might be care workers or gardeners, 
while lawyers or cell biologists could be said to work in “lovely” jobs. They then show 
that such non-routine jobs have exhibited the most rapid employment growth from 1979-
1999, with the most rapidly growing occupations being care workers, software engineers 
and management consultants. 
                                                 
67 Metcalf, D. (2008), 'Why has the British National Minimum Wage had little or no impact on 
employment?', Journal of Industrial Relations, 50 (3), June.  R. Dickens and M. Draca (2005), 'The 
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To see if this process continued when the UK labour market was experiencing significant 
growth, we repeated the Goos and Manning exercise for the period 2002 to 2008, again 
using LFS data. The occupational classification used in the LFS is consistent over this 
period. We subdivided the 2464 occupations/industry combinations for which we had 
earnings data into deciles based on their median earnings in 2002. We then calculated 
employment in 2002 and 2008 in each of these categories and aggregated these for each 
of our earnings deciles. Finally, we calculated growth rates by decile using the 2002 and 
2008 employment levels.  We also calculated the proportion of 16-24 year olds employed 
in the same occupation/industry combinations and again aggregated these across the 
income deciles to show how far they are concentrated in “lovely” or “lousy” jobs. Figure 
13 shows the results. 
 
Most of the growth in employment between 2002 and 2008 was concentrated in jobs that 
would be classified as “good”, because of the relatively high wages that they pay. 
Positive employment growth was recorded from the 7th to the 10th decile. Consistent with 
the Autor, Levy and Murnane argument, there was a significant decline in employment in 
those jobs around the centre of the earnings distribution. At the bottom end the picture is 
more mixed.  A small decline in the first decile is more than offset by a large rise in 
employment among those in the second decile of occupation/industry combinations. The 
net effect is a modest increase in employment for those whose skills place them at the 
lower end of the earnings distribution. Thus, although, we cannot demonstrate a causal 
link between the decline in those occupations, where technical change has reduced 
employment opportunities, our evidence is consistent with both Autor and Manning. 
 
Younger people (those aged 16-24) are predominantly associated with jobs at the lower 
end of this distribution. Figure 13 shows that over 20 per cent of those employed in jobs 
located in the lowest earnings decile are aged 16-24, while only 2.2 per cent are 
employed in the top ten percent of occupations. Together, these results illustrate a key 
difficulty for the current youth labour market. Most young people enter the labour market 
in fairly low-paying occupations, in which there has been a modest growth in 
employment. They may aspire to enhance their earnings by moving into better paying 
jobs. However, the “bridge” between lower-quality and better-quality jobs is disappearing 
in the sense that employment is falling among those jobs paying around the overall 
median wage. Hence the opportunities for transition are reduced. Finally, it is argued that 
in this new technological age the young do not possess the skills that firms need. There is 
less demand than in the past for unskilled jobs, particularly because of new technology 
and this hits the young especially hard.71 Thus, the young will face an increasingly 
polarised labour market. This finding has clear implications for the design of labour 
market interventions.  
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f) Youth unemployment creates permanent scars rather than temporary blemishes 
In an important early contribution Ellwood (1982) examined the persistence and long-
term impacts of early labor force experiences. The paper reports a rise in employment 
rates for a cohort of young men as they age, but points out that those persons with poor 
employment records early have comparatively poor records later.  The paper found that 
the effects of a period without work do not end with that spell.  A teenager who spends 
time out of work in one year will probably spend less time working in the next than he 
would have had he worked the entire year.  Furthermore, the lost work experience 
Ellwood concluded were reflected in considerably lower wages. The reduced 
employment effects Ellwood examined appeared to die off very quickly.  What appeared 
to persist were effects of lost work experience on wages.  More recently Mroz and 
Savage (2006) reached a similar conclusion using data from the NLSY for the US and 
also found evidence of long-lived blemishes from unemployment.  A six month spell of 
unemployment at age 22 would result in an 8 per cent lower wage at 23 and even at ages 
30 and 31 wages were 2-3 per cent lower than they otherwise would have been.  Kletzer 
and Fairlie (1999) also using data for the US estimate that for young unemployed workers 
the costs of job loss in terms of annual earnings are 8.4% and 13.0%, for boys and girls, 
respectively.72   
 
Gregg and Tominey (2005) found using data from the NCDS for the UK that there was a 
significant wage penalty of youth unemployment even after controlling for education, 
region and a wealth of family and personal characteristics.  Their results suggested a scar 
from youth unemployment of 13-21% age 41 although this penalty was lower at 9-11% if 
individuals avoid repeat exposure.73 Gregg (2001) also used NCDS data to show that 
unemployment experience up to the age of 23 drives unemployment in subsequent 
years.74  
 
Arulampalam (2001) found that joblessness leaves permanent scars on people and 
reduces the probability of employment and future earnings and increases the risk of 
future unemployment. She found that a spell of unemployment carries a wage penalty of 
6% on re-entry in Britain, and after three years, they are earning 14% less compared to 
what they would have received absent unemployment. Arulampalam et al (2000) also 
found evidence of unemployment persistence, especially for young men.  Narendranathan 
and Elias (1993) also find evidence of state dependence and report that ‘the odds of 
becoming unemployed are 2.3 times higher for youths who were unemployed last year 
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than for youths who were not unemployed’ (p.183). Arulampalam et al. (2001) also 
report that the best predictor of an individual's future risk of unemployment is his past 
history of unemployment.  They find that unemployment has a scarring effect for both 
future unemployment and future earnings.  In addition Burgess et al. (1999) find that 
unemployment while young raises the probability of subsequent unemployment, but the 
size of any effect varies by skill level.75 
 
We now turn to examine recent evidence on youth unemployment in the UK.  We find 
evidence that spells of youth unemployment have harmful impacts on a number of 
outcomes - happiness, job satisfaction, wages and health - many years later. 
 
In order to explore the impact of unemployment while young on subsequent outcomes we 
examined data from the 1958 birth cohort, the National Child Development Study 
(NCDS).  The NCDS has followed a cohort of people who were born in one week - the 
3rd to the 9th March 1958.  The National Child Development Study (NCDS) is a 
continuing longitudinal study that seeks to follow the lives of all those living in Great 
Britain who were born in one particular week in 1958.  The NCDS has its origins in the 
Perinatal Mortality Survey (PMS). This study was sponsored by the National Birthday 
Trust Fund and designed to examine the social and obstetric factors associated with 
stillbirth and death in early infancy among the 17,000 children born in England, Scotland 
and Wales in that one week.   
 
To date there have been seven attempts to trace all members of the birth cohort in order 
to monitor their physical, educational and social development. The first three sweeps 
were carried out by the National Children's Bureau, in 1965, when respondents were aged 
7, in 1969 (NCDS1), aged 11 (NCDS2), in 1974, aged 16 (NCDS3). The fourth sweep, 
NCDS4, was conducted in 1981, when respondents were aged 23. The fifth sweep was 
carried out in 1991, when respondents were aged 33 (NCDS5). For the sixth wave, 
conducted in 1999-2000, when respondents were aged 41-42 (NCDS6), fieldwork was 
combined with the 1999-2000 wave of the 1970 Birth Cohort Study (BCS70).  The 
seventh sweep of NCDS was conducted in 2004-2005, when respondents were aged 46-
47 years (NCDS7).  It was conducted by telephone, and aimed to update the information 
gathered at NCDS6 in 1999-2000.  
 
                                                 
75 W. Arulampalam (2001), 'Is unemployment really scarring? Effects of unemployment experiences on 
wages', Economic Journal, (111), November, pp: F585-F606. W. Narendranathan and P. Elias (1993), 
‘Influences of past history on the incidence of youth unemployment: empirical findings for the UK’, 
Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, 55, pp. 161-185. W. Arulampalam, A. Booth and M. Taylor 
(2000), ‘Unemployment persistence’, Oxford Economic Papers, 52, pp. 24-50.  S. Burgess, C. Propper, H. 
Rees and A. Shearer (2003), 'The class of 1981: the effects of early career unemployment on subsequent 
unemployment experiences, Labour Economics, 10(3), June, pp. 291-309. For a useful summary of the 
school to work transition see S. Bradley and Nguyen, A.N. (2004), 'The school-to-work transition'. In: G. 
Johnes and J. Johnes (Eds.), International Handbook on the Economics of Education. Edward Elgar, 
Cheltenham, Glos. 
 
 42
We have information available to us at age 23 in 1981 on 12537 respondents whether a) 
the respondent had ever been unemployed since the age of 16.  Unemployment rates in 
the UK had risen from 5.4% in 1979 to 6.8% in 1980 and 9.6% in 1981, when the UK 
had moved into recession.  Unemployment would eventually peak at 11.4% in the spring 
of 1984.  In the sample, 44% reported that at some time in their working lives they had 
been unemployed.  The question is whether unemployment when young impacts 
outcomes later in life and whether the effect an unemployment spell when young is 
greater than when older.   
 
Here we examine four outcomes in 2004/5 when the respondents were aged 46-47 years 
a) life satisfaction b) self-reported health status and two for workers only c) job 
satisfaction and d) (log of) gross weekly wages in 2004/5 in NCDS7.  We also make use 
of data on whether the respondent was unemployed at age 33 in NCDS5 in 1991.  The 
issue is whether a period of unemployment when young has lasting effects; it turns out 
that it does.  We also include a unique set of controls identifying father's social class 
when the respondent was born (and reported in the PMS 1958) as well as ‘11-plus’, 
verbal and non-verbal test scores reported at age 11 in NCDS2 in 1969 - tests at the local 
level called 11-plus were given a that time to determine entry to grammar school.  We are 
also able to include an indicator variable on health at age 23 measured by the malaise 
score (indicating a tendency towards depression), which is highly significant.76  In 
addition we can include controls for marital status (5), highest qualification (7), region 
(8) labour force status (11) home ownership (5), registered disability and gender.  In the 
job satisfaction equations we only include three labour force status dummies, exclude the 
marital status and home ownership dummies and include 58 industry dummies.  In the 
wage equation the sample is limited to employees and hence only has a part-time 
employee dummy.  The answer is that youth unemployment continues to hurt two 
decades later on all four 'middle-age' variables in contrast to unemployment when in 
one’s early thirties.  As we will see, there are permanent scars from youth unemployment. 
 
Results are reported in Table 12.  We look at the four outcomes in turn. 
 
i) Life satisfaction.  Respondents in NCDS7 were asked "On a scale from 0 to 10, where 
‘0’ means that you are completely dissatisfied and ‘10’ means that you are completely 
satisfied, what number corresponds with how satisfied or dissatisfied you are with the 
way life has turned out so far?"  The mean life satisfaction score was 7.57 and 7.71 if the 
respondent had not been unemployed at age 23 or before and 7.42 if they had.  Column 1 
reports the results of estimating an ordered logit.  Most of the results are standard; life 
satisfaction is higher for married people, the educated, workers, especially those who 
work full-time, those from higher social classes home owners and those who are not 
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disabled or sick or depressed (a low malaise score).  Those currently unemployed are less 
happy; there are enduring effects from spells of unemployment while young, which 
continues to lower happiness more than two decades later.   Clark et al (2001) also found, 
using panel data for Germany from the GSOEP that past unemployment lowers life 
satisfaction.77   
 
In column 1 it is apparent that, as is consistently found in all happiness equations, the 
current unemployed are less happy.  Also, if the individual had experienced any spell of 
unemployment before the age of twenty three, this lowers happiness over twenty years 
later at age 46.  In contrast, a spell of unemployment at age 33 has no effect on current 
happiness.  In column 2 it is notable from the significance of the interaction term between 
having had a spell of unemployment up to and including age 23 and present 
unemployment in column 2, that the impact of past unemployment on wellbeing is 
greatest for those currently unemployed.   This contrasts with the findings of Clark et al 
who found that “the negative well being effect of current unemployment is weaker for 
those who have been unemployed more often in the past” (2001, p. 221).  The main 
difference though is that their measure of past unemployment relates to the proportion of 
the preceding three years that had been spent in unemployment, whereas in Table 9 it 
refers it an unemployment spell over twenty years earlier.  
 
ii) Health status.  Respondents in NCDS7 were asked ''Please think back over the last 12 
months about how your health has been. Compared to people of your own age, would you 
say that your health has on the whole been' - 1=excellent; 2=good; 3=fair; 4=poor or 
5= very poor?". Of those who had been unemployed in NCDS4 27.8% said they were in 
excellent health compared with 34.3% of those who had not been unemployed.   Column 
3 of Table 13 estimates an ordered logit with self-reported health as the dependent 
variable.  Once again the youth unemployment variable enters significantly and negative, 
whereas being unemployed at age 33 did not have a significant impact on health.  The 
Malaise score is strongly negative also.  Social status of father at birth matters for health 
nearly fifty years later.  The currently unemployed are not less healthy than full-time 
employees.  
 
iii) Job satisfaction.  Workers were asked for their degree of satisfaction with their 
current job.  Possible answers were “very dissatisfied; somewhat dissatisfied; neither; 
somewhat satisfied and very satisfied”.  Column 3 reports the results of estimating an 
ordered logit.  Youth unemployment lowered job satisfaction whereas middle-age 
unemployment did not. 
 
iv) Log of gross weekly wages. Column 5 of the table estimates a log wage equation.  
Past unemployment is also significantly negative.  Those with more education earn more, 
as would be expected.  High IQ score at 11 continues to raise wages two decades later. 
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People are impacted adversely, in terms of reduced wellbeing by increases in 
unemployment.  The unemployed themselves lose their jobs but there is a much wider 
loss of wellbeing. High national unemployment lowers wellbeing especially of the 
unemployed.  It turns out that spells of unemployment are especially harmful to the 
individual - and to society - when young people become unemployed.  A spell of 
unemployment when young continues to have a harmful impact in later life.  Youth 
unemployment is harmful and needs to be avoided. 
 
Youth unemployment is especially harmful. As we noted above there is scant evidence to 
suggest that increases in unemployment are attributable to the introduction of the 
minimum wage or to the presence of temporary workers from Eastern Europe or that the 
young have priced themselves out of work.  The onset of recession, at a time when the 
size of the youth cohort has temporarily increased, has made matters considerably worse 
as youths are especially vulnerable to movements in the business cycle.  Now is the time 
to act.  But what should we do?  This is what we turn to consider now. 
 
9.  Policies to Contain the Increase in Unemployment 
We have indicated that a significant rise in unemployment is likely during 2009 at least.  
This will have a large number of individual and social costs. Young workers are 
especially vulnerable to a rise in unemployment. So what kinds of policies might be 
worth considering in order to offset these costs?  There is a substantial body of literature 
that analyses the effectiveness of labour market policies. Compared with almost any other 
type of economic policy, labour market policies have been subject to more rigorous 
scientific scrutiny. Nevertheless, care must be taken in generalizing from such studies. 
Their results may be specific to particular groups within the population; the long-run 
results may differ from the short-run; differences in institutional structures may reduce 
the applicability of studies to another country and the evaluations themselves rarely take 
account of the full general equilibrium consequences of policy intervention. 
 
The OECD has taken a keen interest in these studies. It divides labour market policies 
into two types. “Passive” policies involve automatic cash payments to the unemployed or 
early retirement pensions paid for labour market purposes. “Active” policies, which 
largely evolved in response to the high levels of unemployment experienced in developed 
countries during the 1980s, effectively comprise labour market interventions that are 
aimed at reducing unemployment and/or inactivity. Collectively, they are described as 
“Active Labour Market Programmes” (ALMPs). 
 
In 2000, the average OECD country spent 2 per cent of its GDP on labour market 
policies.  Eurostat data on total spending on labour market policies in 2005 (see Figure 
14) indicates wide differences in the resources allocated to labour market policies across 
Europe. The Scandinavian countries, France, Germany and the Netherlands spent more 
than three times as much as the UK on labour market policies, measured as a share of 
GDP.  
 
Nevertheless, although its overall spending is low, the UK allocates a relatively high 
proportion of its overall labour market spending to ALMPs. This partly reflects 
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comparatively low levels of unemployment insurance in the UK, but also a view among 
policymakers that ALMP spending is at least partially effective. Policy evaluations, both 
domestic and international, have led to changes in the structure and emphasis of UK 
ALMPs. Thus, although many evaluations have been negative, the appropriate response 
may be redesign of policy rather than abandonment. This process of evaluation and 
redesign partly explains the evolution of ALMPs since their introduction in the early 
1980s 
 
Meager (2008) reviews the evaluation of ALMPs, particularly with respect to training 
policy. 78  He classifies policies into those aimed at either the demand or the supply side 
of the labour market.  On the supply side, he identifies five main types of ALMP: 
 
1. training schemes, 
2. information and job broking activities, 
3. information, advice and guidance, 
4. sanctions and incentives, 
5. subsidies to support entry into self-employment. 
 
While on the demand side, he highlights two further types:  
 
1. subsidies to employers to hire job-seekers, 
2. job creation schemes.  
 
Grubb and Martin (2001) define “special measures” as public training programmes, wage 
subsidy measures and public sector job creation.79 They argue that, “almost all 
evaluations show that special measures are not effective for disadvantaged youths”. 
Similarly, Heckman et al (1999), argue that, “neither the experimental or non-
experimental literatures provide much evidence that employment and training programs 
improve US youths’ labour market prospects” (p.2068).80  In the UK large scale 
programs, such as YOP and YTS, which provided large-scale subsidized employment 
were largely ineffectual. For example Dolton et al (1994) found that YTS actually 
lowered the probability of subsequent employment. Some studies such as O’Higgins 
(1994) have found more positive effects on employment but no significant employment 
effects for the disabled and ethnic minorities.  Studies such as Green et al (1996), which 
have looked at the effect of YTS on earnings, have generally found a negative effect.81 
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The experimental impact studies of schemes operating under the Job Training programs 
in the USA, which were funded by the US Department of Labor at a cost of 
approximately $30 million, showed that the schemes had either no impact at all – or even 
more worryingly, they scarred participants. The experiment found negative and 
statistically significant impacts on the earnings of male youth in the 18 months after 
random assignment and negligible impacts on the earnings of female youth (Bloom et al, 
1993). Work by Heckman and Smith (1999a, 1999b) re-examined these results.82 They 
found that the estimates of the returns to training were sensitive to a) the set of training 
centers included in the evaluation b) how outliers in the earnings data are handled c) the 
construction of the earnings data d) control group substitution d) treatment group 
dropping out. Even after these adjustments they conclude that their results for youth “fit 
comfortably into the pattern of several decades of research that finds very limited 
earnings effects for the types of services offered by JTPA”. There was some evidence of 
positive returns to adults and especially adult females. In response to these findings 
Congress cut funding for the youth component of JTPA from $540 million in 1994 to 
only $110 million in 1995, a cut of over 80%. 
 
Grubb (1999) also reviews US education and training programs for disadvantaged youths. 
The ones that were successful embodied some combination of the following 
characteristics: 83 
 
i) close links with the local labour market, targeting jobs with relatively high wages, 
strong employment growth and opportunities for advancement; 
 
ii) a mix of academic education, occupational skills and on-the-job training; 
                                                                                                                                                 
81 Blanchflower, D.G., R. Jackman and G. Saint-Paul (1995), Some Reflections on Swedish Labor Market 
Policy, Swedish Government official Reports #39, Ministry of Labor, Stockholm, Sweden. Dolton, P., G. 
Makepeace and J. Treble (1994), ‘The Youth Training Scheme and the school-to-work transition’, Oxford 
Economic Papers, 46, pp. 629-657.  N. O’Higgins (1994), ‘YTS, employment and sample selection bias, 
Oxford Economic Papers, 46, pp. 605-628. F. Green, M. Hoskings and S. Montgomery, (1996), ‘The 
effects of company training, further education and the Youth Training Scheme on the earnings of young 
employees’, Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, 58, pp. 469-488. Main B.G. and M.A. Shelley 
(1990), ‘The effectiveness of the Youth Training Scheme as a manpower policy, Economica, 57, pp. 485-
514.  Begg, I.G., A.P. Blake, and B.M. Deakin (1991), ‘YTS and the labour market’, British Journal of 
Industrial Relations, 29, pp.223-236. 
 
82 Bloom, H., L. Orr, G. Cave, S. Bell, and F. Doolittle (1993), The National JTPA Study: Title IIA 
impacts on Earnings and Employment, Bethesda, MD, Abt Associates. Heckman, J.J. and J.A. Smith 
(1999a), ‘The pre-programme earnings dip and the determinants of participation in a social programme. 
Implications for simple evaluation strategies’, Economic Journal, July, 109, pp. 313-348.  Heckman, J.J. 
and J.A. Smith (1999b), ‘The sensitivity of experimental impact estimates: evidence from the National 
JTPA Study’ in Youth Employment and Joblessness in Advanced Countries, edited by David G. 
Blanchflower and Richard B. Freeman, University of Chicago Press and NBER, Chicago, Illinois. 
 
83 Grubb, W.N. (1999), ‘Lessons from education and training for youth: five precepts, in preparing youth 
for the 21st Century: the transition from education to the labour market’, OECD, Paris. 
 
 47
 
iii) opportunities to enter further education, to further develop skills and competencies; 
 
iv) support services, focused on the needs of clients and their families; and 
 
v) the programme is constantly upgraded by learning from past experience. 
 
Nevertheless, successful programmes for the disadvantaged young are rare.  Grubb and 
Martin (2001) conclude that, “one of the most disappointing conclusions from the 
evaluation literature is that almost all evaluations show that special measures are not effective 
for disadvantaged youths.”  This conclusion holds across the kinds of scheme we have 
already discussed and also includes wage subsidy and public sector job creation 
programmes. 
 
Thus, early evaluations of the effectiveness of training interventions have been generally 
negative. While Auspos et al. (1999) concludes that European programs have not 
produced earnings gains for participants, they do argue that smaller targeted schemes 
aimed at disadvantaged groups are more effective in raising employment than broad-
based training programmes, particularly when used in conjunction with job search 
interventions. 84 Successful programmes tend to be costly and may be difficult to expand 
broadly. And some groups may benefit from universal training measures: Bergemann, 
and van den Berg (2006)85 argue that training programmes are more effective for women 
than men in Europe. This is consistent with the results of Heckman and Smith (1999a, 
1999b). It may partly reflect lower female participation rates and the relative benefits of 
training may diminish as female participation rates approach those of males. 
Nevertheless, the evidence seems to suggest that subsidised training is likely to be more 
effective in a wider range of settings for unemployed women than youths.  
 
For many years Sweden was viewed as having solved the problem of joblessness and 
economic inequality. During the 1970s and 1980s young workers fared reasonably 
despite sharply increasing youth relative wages. But the recession of the early 1990s 
proved that Sweden was not immune to substantial unemployment, nor to a major youth 
joblessness problem. In the 1990s youth unemployment has risen sharply, and the state 
has expanded youth participation in active labor market programs. This has reduced 
employment somewhat without solving the joblessness problem. Indeed, the increase in 
unemployment has been roughly proportional by age and education, implying that these 
programs have not altered the relative distribution of unemployment.  The proportional 
growth of joblessness suggests that aggregate factors were more important in Sweden’s 
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joblessness than disaggregate shifts in demand for labour among different skill groups.86 
Calmfors et al. summarize the Swedish experience in very negative terms.87 They argue 
that:  
 
‘(i) there is hardly any evidence for a positive effect on matching efficiency;  
 
(ii) there are some indications of positive effects on labour force participation;  
 
(iii) subsidized employment seems to cause displacement of regular employment, 
whereas this appears not to be the case for labour market training;  
 
(iv) it is unclear whether or not ALMPs raise aggregate wage pressure in the 
economy 
 
(v) in the 1990s, training programmes seem not to have enhanced the employment 
probabilities of participants, whereas some forms of subsidized employment seem 
to have had such effects; and  
 
(vi) youth programmes seem to have caused substantial displacement effects at 
the same time as the gains for participants appear uncertain.’ (p 1) 
 
Non-experimental evaluations of US programs for the young are consistent with the 
results in the experimental literature. The estimated impacts usually are close to zero or 
even negative again. The wage outcomes for adult women are generally significant and 
large: for men they are often smaller and less consistently positive.88  The outcomes of 
other programs such as the Summer Training and Education Program (STEP) are 
disappointing.  Analysis of the General Equivalence Diploma (GED), which is of interest 
in its own right because a major goal of many government training programs is 
certification of participants at high school GED levels, suggests that except for a tiny 
upper tail GED certified high school graduates earn roughly the same as high school 
dropouts.89  In line with Auspos et al., there is some evidence that more narrowly 
focused, smaller, but much more expensive schemes such as Job Corps, have generated 
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significant and quite high positive returns.90. This is a residential scheme in the USA in 
which youth are removed from their neighbourhoods to a separate camp, and which costs 
$20,000 or so per participant.   Interestingly, the main source of the benefits depends 
heavily on reductions in murder arrests which are very small in number but have a very 
high value assigned to them.91  The Jobstart program, which was essentially Job Corps 
without the residential training programs, had no effect in Manpower Demonstration 
Research Corporation’s (MDRC) experimental evaluation   (Cave and Doolittle, 1991). 
Impacts on the earnings of dropouts in the National Supported Work Demonstration 
(even more expensive) were negligible (Hollister, et al, 1984).  The CETA estimates for 
youth reported in Bassi (1984) are negative for males and small for females.92  
 
Similarly in Europe there seems to be little evidence that active labor market policies 
have had a positive impact on participants’ wages. There is stronger evidence that they 
have had positive employment effects but there is no consensus on the question. Even if 
there were, it is unclear the extent to which any of the newly created jobs constitute net 
job creation or are offset by the displacement of non-participants (Heckman, LaLonde 
and Smith, 1999). “No cheap training problem has yet been found that can end the 
welfare problem” (Heckman, 1999). In 1996 when asked by the Economist how much 
training schemes in the US help their clientele Jim Heckman replied that ‘zero is not a 
bad number’ (Economist, 6th April, 1996).  
 
The program evaluation literature makes it clear how important it is, as with medical 
trials of the effectiveness of new interventions and drug treatments, to have a fully 
representative control group to allow for ‘what might have been’ (see Heckman and 
Smith, 1999a, 1999b). Unfortunately, experimental evaluations involving humans are 
often imperfect. Some of the negative results appear due to details of the evaluation 
procedure, and the way the evaluators handled dropouts from the program, differences 
among sites, treatment of outliers, construction of earnings variables, and other technical 
decisions which could readily have gone differently. In addition, the fact that some 
youths in the “control sample” seek training outside of the program means that 
comparisons of the control and experimental group gives a downward bias to estimates of 
the effect of training per se (Heckman and Smith, 1999a, 1999b).  
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Even if there is evidence of positive employment effects of the European training 
schemes, it is unclear whether these impacts generate output increases or are offset by 
deadweight, substitution or displacement effects (Heckman, LaLonde and Smith, 1999; 
O’Higgins, 1997).  Begg et al (1991) have estimated the total of the first two of these was 
of the order of 80%; if so then O’Higgins notes, “the positive employment effects 
observed are almost entirely attributable to an improvement in participants’ employment 
prospects at the expense of other mainly young people rather than through an 
improvement in the demand for young workers’ (1997, p.57).  Moreover, Auspos et al go 
on to caution that the contrast between the USA and Europe “should be treated with some 
caution because most US programmes have been evaluated by experimental methods 
which may be more stringent than the non-experimental methods used in Europe” (1999, 
p.81).  
 
The New Deal for Young People (NDYP) was established in the UK in 1998 aimed at 
people aged 18 to 24. To date, 2.05 million people have gained a job through this 
programme. All people aged 18-24 that have been on Job Seekers Allowance (JSA), 
equivalent to UI, for more than six months enter the “Gateway” in which they are given 
extensive advice on how to find employment. Participation is compulsory; every eligible 
individual who refuses to cooperate faces a loss of entitlement to benefits. If, after a 
further four months, they remain on JSA, they are offered one of four options:  (1) full-
time education for 12 months; (2) a six-month job with a voluntary sector employer; (3) a 
six month job on the environmental task force or (4) subsidized employment in the 
private sector, with at least one day a week of training. Of the four options, full-time 
education is consistently the most popular with participants. Although the job subsidy 
typically covers 40-50 per cent of wage costs, it has rarely been taken up by more than 25 
per cent of those on the programme.  Since the introduction of NDYP, a range of other 
mandatory and voluntary New Deal programmes have been established aimed at specific 
client groups.  Approximately three million two hundred thousand people had started on a 
New Deal programme up to August 2008.  According to the most recent estimates for 
August 2008 there are approximately 75,000 people on the NDYP; 60,000 on the New 
Deal 25+; 73,000 on the New Deal for Lone Parents and 4,000 on the Lone Deal for 
Partners. 
 
Blundell, et al (2001) performed an initial evaluation of the programme based on the 
contrast between those areas where the NDYP was initially piloted, the “Pathfinder” 
areas”, and those where implementation was delayed.93  Focusing on the outflows into 
employment, they showed that the programme raised the probability of entering 
employment by around 5 per cent in the short run.  Although the effects are relatively 
small, Van Reenen (2003) calculates that the marginal social benefit of the programme 
exceed its marginal social cost. Blundell et al (2004) also found that the impact of the 
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program significantly raised transitions to employment by about 5 percentage points.94 
The impact is robust to a wide variety of non-experimental estimators. However, they 
present some evidence that suggested that this effect may not be as large in the longer 
run.  Dorsett (2006) found that a period of intensive job search using the Gateway was 
more effective than other options. Dorsett also found positive outcomes for the 
subsidized employment route relative to the three other NDYP paths.  De Guiorgi (2005) 
found that the combination of job search assistance, training, wage subsidies, and job 
experience enhanced employability by about 4.6% and this effect lasted over different 
cohorts.  A particular concern is that Podivinsky and Mcvicar (2007) found that the 
NDYP has had differential impacts on the probability of unemployment exits in different 
local labor markets.  In areas of high unemployment, the treatment effect on exits to 
employment has been weaker than in low unemployment areas.   
 
However, some recent evaluations of the New Deal have been less negative. This may 
reflect a continuing process of evaluation and improvement in its detailed structure and 
delivery.  Such improvement may occur without any change in its structure at the macro 
level. Knight et al (2006), using the DWP longitudinal benefits dataset, find that the New 
Deal for Lone Parents (NDLP) increased the proportion of claimants leaving Income 
Support by 11 per cent after participating in the NDLP programme.95  Beale, Bloss and 
Thomas suggest that NDLP participants spent, on average, 64 fewer days on benefits than 
otherwise identical individuals who did not join the NDYP programme.96 Their results 
confirm that those following the employment option have the best outcomes from NDYP.   
Dorsett (2007) considers the impact of the Pathways to Work, which requires benefit 
claimants to attend work-focused interviews.97  Failure to comply with this requirement 
can result in benefits sanctions. Dorsett used a differences-in-differences procedure to 
examine the effects of the programme and found that the effect of Pathways to Work on 
employment evolved gradually and did not approach statistical significance for the first 
year.  However, the effect appears to have grown such that eighteen months after the 
initial enquiry a positive effect of about 7 percentage points but again this was not 
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significantly different from zero at conventional levels of significance (p-value of 5 
percentage points or higher).  By the time of the outcome interview, the effect was 
estimated to be 7.4 percentage points but with only a p-value of 9 per cent.   There was 
no evidence of any significant effects for men, those over 50 or anyone without 
dependent children.  It should be noted, however, that these more positive findings are 
based on data drawn from the relatively benign period of low unemployment between 
1996 and 2007 when unemployment rates averaged 5.6 per cent: they may not carry over 
to a recession when jobs are scarce.  In a recession when unemployment rates are much 
higher job placement rates from any ALMP are likely to plummet and the schemes are 
unlikely to provide adequate rates of return. 
 
Riccio et al. (2008) examine the effectiveness of the Employment Retention and 
Advancement (ERA) demonstration.98 The ERA programme ERA’s offered post-
employment advisory support and financial incentives to help low-income individuals 
sustain employment and move forward in the labour market. Administered by Job Centre 
Plus, it was introduced in six regions of the UK.  Focusing on lone parents, and using 
random assignment to the programme, Riccio et al. show that the programme results in 
the clients using more post-employment services and training, being more likely to work 
working full time, higher average earnings and reduced benefit takeup up to two years 
after entry into the programme. Less promising were the results from the New Deal 25+ 
customers making use of ERA, which is reported in Miller et al. (2008)99. Although 
consisting of the same elements - retention bonuses for employers, financial assistance 
for training while employed and access to emergency payments needed to stay in 
employment – randomized trials revealed only small positive effects on employment 
retention and reductions in benefit payments.  
 
Since the New Deal 25+ clients are largely male and the Lone Parent clients mainly 
female, the difference in the effectiveness of the programmes seems to reinforce the 
tentative view that ALMPs are more effective in enhancing labour market outcomes for 
females than males. This is reflected in a number of the studies we have referenced. If 
correct, it may reflect differences in the male and female labour markets, in the relative 
gender-effectiveness of the design of the ALMPs or in the relative commitment of males 
and females to the programmes. This is a tentative speculation, but, if correct, suggests 
again the difficulties which young unqualified males may encounter during this recession. 
 
Our main conclusions on ALMPS are as follows 
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• In the 1980s and 1990s, they were mostly ineffective 
 
• Some programmes have improved learning from the detailed evaluations that 
have been carried out.  These mostly show that targeting particular groups, 
devoting substantial resources per client and keeping the focus close to the jobs 
market are common characteristics of policies that appear to enhance the 
probability of finding employment. 
 
• Many of the more rigorous studies of ALMP effectiveness show more favourable 
outcomes for females than males. 
 
• The positive results were all observed during a period when the labour market 
was doing well - problems of deadweight loss - will increase when there is excess 
supply of labour. 
 
• Scaling up the programmes that have been shown to work well (at least during a 
boom) would be very expensive in a recession. 
 
• Therefore, ALMPs will have to be supported by other labour market policies to 
significantly offset the increase in unemployment that is now likely. 
 
10. Conclusions and Policy Recommendations 
Unemployment is rising fast: it will likely rise at an average of 100,000 a month for most 
of 2009 and will not peak until 2010.   To counter this, the Bank of England has 
introduced a large monetary stimulus to the UK economy through cuts in interest rates 
and substantial injections of liquidity. The UK government has also introduced a £20bn 
fiscal stimulus, through measures including cuts in VAT, accelerated capital spending 
and a new Small Business Finance Scheme. In terms of the labour market, three measures 
were proposed in the Pre-Budget Report. These were: 
 
• an additional £1.3 billion to continue delivering effective support for helping the 
unemployed find a new job. These funds will be directed to the Jobcentre Plus 
system which is administered by the Department for Work and Pensions; 
 
• a National Employment Partnership, bringing together Government and major 
employers to tackle rising unemployment; and 
 
• refocusing Train to Gain to provide support in pre-redundancy situations, 
expanding the Rapid Response Service to target small and large scale 
redundancies and extending Local Employment Partnerships to focus on the 
short-term unemployed. 
 
It is worth noting that at the time of the 2008 Pre-Budget Report, passive spending on the 
unemployed aged under 60 in 2009/10 was expected to comprise £3.3bn on Jobseeker’s 
Allowance and £6.7bn on Income Support. These estimates are predicated on an expected 
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increase of 48 per cent in JSA clients and a fall of 5 per cent in Income Support Clients 
between 2008-09 and 2010-11.  These implicit forecasts are perhaps based on a more 
optimistic view of UK labour market prospects than that which we envisage. 
 
Existing ALMP schemes including NDYP, New Deal 25+, New Deal 50+, New Deal for 
Lone Parents, New Deal for Disabled People, New Deal for Partners, and the New Deal 
for Musicians are scheduled to continue.100 As mentioned earlier, at current levels of 
support their net cost is relatively low both relative to other components of government 
spending and in comparison with other advanced countries. 
 
In January 2009, the UK government additionally pledged: 
 
• To provide £400m to give firms that recruit people unemployed for more than six 
months "golden hellos" of up to £2,500. The expected cost is £500m. 
 
• Measures to increase apprenticeships by 35,000 and a system of internships to 
ensure students unable to find employment still find training. 
 
Notwithstanding these measures, the ITEM club predicts that overall UK unemployment 
will reach 3.4 million in 2011, an increase of 1.6 million on its current level. And the 
European Union forecast is that the UK unemployment rate will reach 8.2 per cent in 
2009 – equivalent to around 2.5 million unemployed later this year.  Month-to-month 
increases in UK unemployment of 90,000 – 100,000 are consistent with both of these 
forecasts. So can these extremely adverse outcomes, with the negative individual and 
social implications that we have catalogued, be avoided? This will be a difficult task, 
given that, as we have described, evaluations of most of the ALMPs in recent decades 
have tended to provide at best lukewarm support.  The programmes that tend to work are 
tightly targeted, devote significant resources to enhancing clients’ human capital and 
operate close to the labour market. 
 
Our previous analysis does not suggest that there is a great need for regional 
differentiation of labour market interventions, at least given the early evolution of 
unemployment during this recession. However, consistent with the analysis of more 
successful ALMP measures, labour market interventions to reduce unemployment should 
have a base in the local labour market. However, we are not making the case for 
significant expansion of existing ALMP measures on a broad scale such as in YTS or 
YOP.  As already mentioned, the evidential basis for such a course of action is not strong, 
at least in terms of their effects on participants. Other effects are not well researched. 
Further, such evidence as is available suggests that any positive impacts on participants 
may be diluted when unemployment is high, e.g. Podivinsky and Mcvicar (2007). This 
adds to our caution in proposing substantive expansion of existing ALMPs in the UK.   
 
                                                 
100 For details of all these schemes, see: 
http://www.jobcentreplus.gov.uk/JCP/Customers/outofworkhelplookingforwork/Getting_job_ready/Progra
mmes_to_get_you_ready/New_Deal/ 
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We do, however, argue that there is a strong case for biasing intervention towards the 
young. We have made the case that the young (especially young males) are particularly 
adversely affected by recessions and also that unemployment can have a long lasting 
adverse effect on the life-experience of this group. It is also the case that short-term 
interventions to improve the skills and competencies of the young are quite consistent 
with longer-run government objectives. Thus, for example, the Leitch Report (2006) on 
skills recommended that, if Britain was to be in the upper quartile of OECD countries in 
respect of skills, it should by 2020: 
 
• achieve 95 percent levels of functional literacy and numeracy, 
• exceed 90 per cent of adults qualified to at least level 2, 
• boost the number of Modern Apprenticeships to 500,000 a year, 
• increase the number of adults qualified to Level 4 or above to 40 per cent. 
 
Below we present ten proposals for purposes of discussion.  We have not fully worked 
out the costs of the various proposals or their effects on the public finances.  The 
proposals are intended more as a shopping list of what could be done.   Unemployment is 
about to rise sharply and this is the time for a rapid policy response targeted to the 
problem at hand – stimulate the economy, create jobs and help the young.   
 
None of the responses are enough to deal with the jobs crisis that is coming.  Our 
intention is to start a national debate on what should be done. 
 
Proposal 1. The government should undertake a substantial fiscal stimulus focused on 
jobs, as soon as possible. 
 
One way of maintaining the demand for labour is to engage in a substantial Keynesian 
fiscal stimulus. This fiscal stimulus should be based on a major extension of 
infrastructure projects, be focused on job creation with particular emphasis on the young.  
As William Rees-Mogg argued recently "in a depression, too much and too early is safer 
than too little and too late".101 Nevertheless, its size will be conditioned by the 
government’s other spending commitments, including those in the financial sector, that 
have come in the wake of this recession.   
 
However, determining an appropriate metric for any fiscal stimulus is hard. In labour 
market terms, bigger is likely to be better in the sense of alleviating the short-term and 
long-term consequences of unemployment.  The Obama team recently presented its plans 
for a fiscal stimulus for the US economy focused on creating 3.7 million jobs.102 The plan 
calls for a fiscal stimulus of around $800 billion. As we write, it appears that the final 
plan agreed by both houses will be around this amount. According to the OECD, US 
                                                 
101 W. Rees-Mogg, 'Six vital lessons of the 1931 depression', The Times, December 29th, 2008. 
 
102 C. Romer and J. Bernstein (2009), 'The job impact of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Plan', 
January 10th. 
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Gross Domestic Product at current prices in 2006 was $13,132.9 billion, which amounts 
to around 6.1% of GDP.  The expected impact of this injection on US growth largely 
explains why IMF projections for the US economy in 2009 are less pessimistic than those 
for the UK. The stimulus would comprise: 
 
• substantial investments in infrastructure, education, health, and energy. 
 
• Temporary programs to protect the most vulnerable from the deep recession, 
including the following. 
 
• Increases in food stamps and expansions of unemployment insurance. 
 
• State fiscal relief designed to alleviate cuts in healthcare, education, and prevent 
increases in state and local taxes. 
 
• Business investment incentives. 
 
• A middle class tax cut along the lines of the Making Work Pay tax cut that 
President Obama proposed during the campaign. 
 
In a recent speech at the London School of Economics, Chairman of the Board of 
Governors of the US Federal Reserve Ben Bernanke supported this huge stimulus 
package but suggested that other steps must be taken to bolster the financial system, and 
to make any recovery stick.  "Fiscal policy can stimulate economic activity, but a sustained 
recovery will also require a comprehensive plan to stabilize the financial system and restore 
normal flows of credit".103  Martin Feldstein (2009) in a recent paper has also suggested that, 
in current circumstances in the US, it is appropriate to undertake a substantial Keynesian 
fiscal stimulus package as it “has become clear that the current downturn is different from 
previous recessions and that monetary policy would not be effective in bringing us back to 
full employment”.104  The nature of the current downturn is very similar in the UK and so are 
the arguments for a substantial fiscal stimulus here. 
 
If a similar package was introduced in the UK, with a GDP in 2006 of $1,997 billion US 
dollars this would translate to a fiscal stimulus of $122 billion, which at today's exchange 
rate of £1= $US1.40 would translate to a package of around £87 billion pounds.  Total 
employment in the US is five times higher than in the UK, so a 3.7 million job, stimulus 
package would translate to approximately 750,000 new jobs here. This number is a good 
starting point for discussion.  To put this in perspective, this increase in employment is 
just under half the increase in UK unemployment forecast by the ITEM club for 2011. 
 
                                                 
103 B.S. Bernanke (2009), 'The crisis and the policy response', Stamp Lecture, London School of 
Economics, January 13, 2009. 
 
104 M. Feldstein (2009), ‘Rethinking the role of fiscal policy’, NBER Working Paper #14684. 
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For the UK, the Work Foundation has proposed a much more modest stimulus including 
that would cost only 1 per cent of GDP (£15 billion).  It would comprise: 
 
• a one-off tax credit to the poorest households who are most likely to spend any 
additional income. 
 
• Public works programme: the government should bring forward as many 
construction projects as possible, focusing on those that are labour intensive 
including: social housing, hospitals, schools and transport. 
 
• Increased out-of-work benefits: a time-limited scheme to increase unemployment 
benefits to around 60 per cent of previous net earnings.  This would help alleviate 
the adverse consequences that unemployment may have on the housing market. 
 
• Support for the unemployed: expand the capacity of job search and support 
services (such as JobCentre Plus), tailored to the needs of local areas where 
possible. Quality must be maintained despite the numbers of unemployed people. 
 
• Short-time working: incentives should be offered through a publicly funded short-
time working scheme to encourage employers to retain human capital rather than 
dismiss workers. The scheme would be suspended once recovery is under way. 
 
• Regional aid: Devolve necessary funds and powers to encourage local authorities 
and Regional Development Agencies to invest in worklessness and skills schemes 
(or labour market policies) that respond to the particular challenges of the area; 
and to set up short-term schemes to help struggling. 
 
These all seem very sensible suggestions, but we would perhaps be less cautious about 
the size of the necessary injection than the Work Foundation. We would also wish to 
focus particularly on the young not only for the short-term and long-term labour market 
benefits that we have already discussed, but also for reasons of intergenerational equity. 
The tax burden imposed by the current expansionary measures will extend into the 
medium and long-term and will therefore largely be paid by recent and new entrants into 
the labour market.  Our first concern therefore is to invest in the human capital of the 
young. The UK has very low proportions of the young in post-compulsory schooling by 
international standards.  Raising the education levels of the young should form an 
important part of the solution to the problem of rising unemployment. 
 
Proposal 2.  Provide large cuts in income taxes and National Insurance Contributions 
aimed at the low paid and the young. For the unemployed, mortgage interest payments 
could also be paid by the government in the form of a loan, with the proviso that it 
would have to be paid back eventually. 
 
Large cuts in the basic rates of income taxes, increases in tax credits and/or in the levels 
of personal allowances would show up very quickly in people’s disposable income.   An 
alternative to tax allowances is to look at tax credits.  Cuts in employee’s national 
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insurance would have a similar effect, while cuts in employers national insurance 
contributions would boost cash flow in companies being severely squeezed by the credit 
crunch. We need to raise consumer confidence and get people spending again.   
 
With house prices continuing to fall increasing numbers of homeowners will find 
themselves in negative equity, particularly those on low incomes.  In the current climate 
it may well be appropriate for the government to loan the interest payments on the 
mortgage to the unemployed to be repaid at a later date at some nominal interest rate.  
This loan could be paid directly to the lenders to ensure it is actually paid and not used 
for other purposes.  Given the low level of interest rates the cost of doing so will be 
relatively low and such a proposal would relieve much distress and help to prevent 
foreclosures.   
 
There are also arguments to suggest that both the level and the duration of benefits be 
increased in a recession when unemployment is largely involuntary.  This lowers the 
impact of a loss of jobs that has occurred through little or no fault of the unemployed 
person.  
 
Proposal 3.  Increase the education leaving age to eighteen starting in June 1st 2009 or 
as soon thereafter as is feasible.   
 
In 2008 Q3 there were 700,000 young people under the age of 18 who were economically 
active, of whom, 184,000 were unemployed.  In an advanced society all of these 
youngsters should be in compulsory full-time education – at school, university or in jobs 
with significant elements of education and training such as apprenticeships.  The Lisbon 
target is that at least 85 per cent of 22 year olds should complete the equivalent of upper 
secondary school by 2010. The UK, currently achieves around 78 per cent, putting it 
significantly short of the target.  
 
It is unsurprising then that the OECD (1997) shows that UK performance in improving 
skills after the age of 15 is significantly worse than that of other countries. In Scotland, 
performance on international benchmarks such as the Trends in International Maths and 
Science Survey (TIMSS) test is also declining for ages below 15105.  Between the ages of 
16 and 25, the International Adult Literacy Survey showed UK skill levels to be 
significantly lower than those of other European countries such as Germany and 
Switzerland.106  Our own analysis of the Labour Force Survey showed that, while on 
average, the qualifications of those aged 18-24 increased between 1993 and 2008, the 
proportion of this age group with no qualifications has changed little. The Economic 
Affairs Committee of the House of Lords recently concluded that, “Many school leavers 
in the UK have not acquired the minimum level of functional numeracy and literacy and 
                                                 
105 For and analysis see http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Publications/2008/12/08150124/1 
 
106 OECD (1997), Literacy skills for the knowledge society: further results from the International Adult 
Literacy Survey, Table 1.6, Paris, France 
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social skills necessary to benefit from apprenticeship training. In our view, the 
improvement of levels of functional skills in mathematics and English is fundamental and 
should be given much higher priority by schools.”107  We agree.  Indeed, a general shift 
in the balance of school education towards science, technology, engineering and maths 
(STEM) subjects, where the returns to investment are higher, could also play a part in 
raising levels of productivity and competitiveness.   
 
Support for the benefits of raising compulsory school leaving laws, has been provided 
recently by Phil Oreopoulos (2009).108  He examined the impact of changes in the US of 
recent changes to state school-leaving laws increasing the school leaving age to 17 and 
18.  He found that more restrictive laws had significant benefits in that they reduced 
dropout rates, increased college enrollment, and improved career outcomes and socio-
economic outcomes more generally.  States that increased the school leaving age above 
16 saw average years of schooling for 20-29 year olds’ increase by about 0.13 years, and 
high school dropout rates fall by about 1.4 percentage points. Raising the age limit also 
increased postsecondary school attendance by about 1.5 percent, even though post-
secondary school is not compulsory.  Additional compulsory schooling significantly 
improved their early career outcomes by lowering the likelihood of being unemployed 
and increasing earnings, on average. These individuals were also less likely to fall below 
the poverty line and less likely to receive welfare. 
 
"Taken together with the consistent previous evidence, the overall results 
suggest raising the school leaving age above 16 offers significant gains to 
earnings and employment outcomes, on average, to students that otherwise 
would have left sooner." 
 
and later 
 
"Raising the school leaving age may offer an effective and affordable 
means to increase education attainment among the least educated and 
improve their subsequent employment circumstances and earnings 
potential". 
 
There is other evidence from the US suggesting that high school dropouts gain, on 
average, from staying on at school using data from historical changes in compulsory 
school laws.  Previous studies have found that individuals compelled to stay in school 
also experience large gains to adult social-economic outcomes. For the United States, 
Angrist and Krueger (1991) and Acemoglu and Angrist (2001) estimated (using very 
                                                 
107 House of Lords (2007), Apprenticeship: a key route to skill, Select Committee on Economic Affairs, 5th 
Report of Session 2006–07. 
 
108 Oreopoulos, P. (2009), 'Would more compulsory schooling help disadvantaged youth? Evidence from 
recent changes to school-leaving laws?', forthcoming in An Economic Perspective on the Problems of 
Disadvantaged Youth, edited by Jonathan Gruber, University of Chicago Press and NBER.   
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different methodologies) that annual adult earnings are about 10 percent higher for 
students compelled to stay a year longer in school.   
 
For the UK, Harmon and Walker (1995) found about 14 percent higher earnings from 
school compulsion.  Oreopoulos (2009) examined changes in minimum school leaving 
laws in England and Ireland to estimate lifetime gains to would-be dropouts from staying 
on.  Students compelled to take an extra year of school experience an average increase of 
12 percent in annual earnings.  He also finds significant lifetime rewards to wealth, 
health, and overall happiness from having to stay in school.  Lifetime wealth increases by 
about 10 percent with an extra year of compulsory schooling, an amount many times 
larger than the earnings forgone from staying the extra year. And for Canada, Oreopoulos 
(2006) found similar gains using provincial law changes between 1915 and 1970 for 
would-be dropouts compelled to stay in school.  Other studies have found that additional 
high school lowers the likelihood of committing crime (Lochner and Moretti, 2004), of 
dying young (Lleras-Muney, 2005), and lowers the chances of teen pregnancy (Black, 
Devereux, and Salvanes, 2005).109  Additional years of schooling raise happiness. 
 
The way to do this is to keep sixteen and seventeen year olds in school or further 
education colleges.  For those who wish to be in work such jobs would have to include at 
least two days a week in education or training at a college of further education.  This 
could clearly be a formal apprenticeship if desired. This reform will work best if all 
stakeholders are involved in its design – this could include employers, government and 
trade unions as well as the educational establishment 
 
A further possibility worth considering is to give students a monetary incentive to stay on 
at high school and obtain a qualification.  The Education Maintenance Allowance (EMA) 
offers large financial stipends to children from low-income families for every week of 
high school they stay beyond the minimum leaving age.  Students that receive the EMA 
could gain more over their lifetime than the cost of the EMA itself if the additional 
schooling generates reasonable returns.  Hence one possibility is to increase the leaving 
age while continuing to make EMA payments to families with low incomes. 
 
                                                 
109 Acemoglu, D. and J. Angrist (2001), 'How large are human capital externalities? evidence from 
compulsory schooling laws,' NBER Macro Annual, 2001, pp. 9-59. Angrist, J. D., and A. Krueger (1991), 
'Does compulsory school attendance affect schooling and earnings?,' Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 
106, No. 4, pp. 979, 1014, 1991. Black, S.E., P.J. Devereux, and K.G. Salvanes (2004), 'Fast times at 
Ridgemont High? The effect of compulsory schooling laws on teenage births,' NBER Working Paper 
#10911.  Oreopoulos, P. (2006), 'The compelling effects of compulsory schooling: evidence from Canada' 
Canadian Journal of Economics, 39(1), February 2006, pp. 22-52.  Oreopoulos, P. (2009), 'Do dropouts 
drop out too soon? Wealth, health, and happiness from compulsory schooling,' Journal of Public 
Economics, forthcoming.  Harmon, C. and I. Walker (1995), 'Estimates of the economic return to schooling 
for the United Kingdom,' American Economic Review, December, pp. 1278-86.  Lleras‐Muney, A. (2005), 
'The relationship between education and adult mortality  in  the United States,' Review of Economic 
Studies,  72(1), pp. 189‐221.    Lochner,  L.,  and E. Moretti  (2004),  'The effect of  education on  crime: 
evidence from prison inmates, arrests, and self‐reports,' American Economic Review, 94(1), pp. 155‐
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Suggestions by the education foundation Edge, which is an independent education 
foundation, focused to raising the status of practical and vocational learning seem 
sensible.110 
 
• Additional training and education places will have to be created, but they have to be 
the right ones. That means courses, which genuinely lead to jobs, careers and further 
learning not paper qualifications which have no lasting value. 
 
• More people teaching and training young people in the classroom, at college and in 
the workplace. The right solution will be to let people from industry become teachers, 
either part-time or full-time, with the minimum of fuss and red tape. 
 
• Young people need much better information, advice and guidance on the realities of 
the labour market. Many seem to think of education as primarily a consumption good, 
rather than mainly an investment good. To take this idea of enhancing information flows 
forward, we need a campaign inspired and led by young people themselves. Let them tell 
us what they want to know, and how they want to access information via the internet, 
social networking, face-to-face or by visits or other means. 
 
• We have to make it easier for employers to take on Apprentices, which is not going to 
happen just because the Government announces some extra funding. Edge argues that 
"We also need substantial investment in Group Apprenticeship Schemes, which take the 
burden of red tape and bureaucracy out of employers' hands. Without swift action, 
employers will think twice about employing young people in future the exact opposite of 
what we and the Government want". 
 
In private communication Philip Oreopoulos has suggested that ideally, any new policy 
to increase the school leaving age would include initiatives to make school more 
attractive (e.g. wider selection of courses, more co-op, etc.) while imposing the new law 
but leaving a small crack open for exceptions.  Examples of exceptions would be work 
based apprenticeships with college based training.  Ideally, Oreopoulos suggests, these 
laws should work in the background to establish the new norms, so that no one drops out 
before 18 because no one else does it.  It may take some initial enforcement to get to that 
situation though. There is obviously a delicate balancing act, he argues, between 
compelling students to stay until 18 without making it feel torturous on students/parents.  
Oreopoulos has also suggested to us that it should be required as part of the curriculum 
that every student goes through the post secondary school application process, even if 
they don't initially intend to go (perhaps as a graduation requirement).  Recent work in 
behavioral economics suggests this could be an effective (and cheap) way of getting 
students to go beyond high school.  Making it easier to apply and become eligible for 
student aid would probably have an effect (but whether one would want these students to 
go on depends on whether the returns to schooling are reasonably high for them - it seems 
they would be, at least on average).  This seems to make sense. 
                                                 
110 http://www.edge.co.uk/Pages/NewsDetail.aspx?ContainerID=599&ContainerName=News  
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To summarize: youth unemployment in the UK is high by international standards and 
getting worse.  The situation for the young was deteriorating well before the onset of 
recession in 2008.  Unlike most other countries in the world, youth unemployment started 
rising from 2004 as did the share of youth unemployment in total unemployment and the 
ratio of youth-to-adult rates continues to rise.  Something needs to be done about this 
problem and quickly. An immediate solution that is in the long-run interest of skills 
development and ultimately economic growth in Britain would be to raise the age at 
which the young cease receiving education.  It is better to have young people in education 
than in unemployment. 
 
Proposal 4. Provide further encouragement for those in the age range 18-24 to 
undertake further/higher education by increasing the number of places available  
 
Following the arguments of Goos and Manning, additional educational activity should be 
focused on skills and competencies that are not likely to be routinised as a result of 
technological change. This would require an expansion in the number and types of places 
offered in further and higher education.  This would inevitably require more teachers and 
lecturers and even professors, which leads us to our next point.  This would be in both 
higher and further education. Educational institutions might be asked to find ways of 
ensuring that the skills of the many baby-boomers that are due to retire from education 
are not lost. Temporary expansion of HE/FE provision might help ensure that this 
knowledge is passed on effectively. 
 
UCAS statistics for the period from 2003 to 2007 indicate that the number of UK 
domiciled applicants to HE rose from 410,000 for entry in 2004 to 454,000 for entry in 
2008 (see www.ucas.ac.uk/statistics).  The number of accepted applicants rose from 
334,000 to 365,000.  In other words, the 10.8% increase in applicants was not matched by 
the increase in acceptances (9.2%).  The excess demand of 100,000 from UK domiciled 
applicants probably underestimates significantly the potential demand for HE. 
Application rates from those with non managerial/non professional have not risen over 
this 4 year period, remaining at 46% of all those with known socio-economic 
backgrounds.  
 
Proposal 5. Provide further encouragement for those in the age range 18-24 to 
undertake further/higher education by providing financial inducements for them to do 
so.  
 
While the number of 18 year olds in the UK is set to fall over the next few years, 2009/10 
will be a critical period.  With approximately 800,000 people attaining age 18 in the UK, 
the fall in student support will act as a major disincentive for applicants from low-income 
backgrounds.  Targeted support, aimed at increasing take up of foundation degrees and 
2+2 full-time routes could be expanded via selective support mechanisms.  More general 
types of support, encouraging Higher Education Institutions to increase their intakes 
whilst providing more support for those on low incomes (e.g. full grant and fees) could 
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form the 'top-end' of a package designed to encourage 16-18 year olds to stay on in 
education as they prepare for Higher Education.  These would be temporary measures. 
 
Proposal 6.  Expand the numbers of teacher training places as soon as possible with an 
emphasis on training in further education 
 
There is growing interest in teaching as a career.  The number of people inquiring about 
becoming a teacher has risen by almost 34 per cent since the start of the credit crunch, 
according to new online figures from the Training and Development Agency for Schools 
(TDA).  From March to September 2007 the www.teach.gov.uk website received just 
over 758,308 unique web hits, while the same period in 2008 saw 1,018,580 hits. There 
has also been a 13 per cent year on year increase in the number of career changers taking 
a further step toward the profession by registering their interest with the TDA.  This 
interest in teaching is likely to rise as unemployment rises. 
A sensible response to this growing interest in teaching would be to i) provide further 
monetary incentives for young graduates to train as teachers; ii) rapidly expand the 
number of teacher training places in the first instance; iii) expand the number of places 
for teacher training in vocational subjects in further education for the new cohort of 16-17 
years olds who will be encouraged to stay on at school.  One advantage of this strategy is 
that it would put in place a new cohort of teachers before the large number of teachers in 
the “baby boomer” cohort retires. During the 2008/9 academic year in England, for 
example, there are approximately 37,000 individuals in initial teacher training (17,500 
primary and 19,500 secondary).   It would be especially appropriate to have a significant 
expansion of training for teachers in further education. 
A further possibility would to be to create a programme of teaching internships where the 
unemployed with a degree can volunteer to work in schools for a year on a half salary 
and receive teacher training certification at the end.  They could act as teacher’s aids and 
help to reduce class sizes.   
Proposal 7.  Do direct job creation through increased investment in the infrastructure 
with particular emphasis on ‘shovel ready’ projects that could start quickly. 
  
Local authorities, health authorities, universities, housing associations and others have 
construction projects ready to go if they had money available.  Allowing these projects to 
start would create private sector construction jobs and much needed infusions of money 
into the local economies.  This would be an opportunity to build a large number of social 
houses. It is essential that the planning system does not obstruct such initiatives. Close 
attention needs to be paid to the resourcing of local authority planning departments and to 
the extent to which legal barriers impede development. 
 
It would be appropriate that these infrastructure projects could have a concentration on 
green projects, the development of clean and renewable energy, the renewal of the 
National Grid and the upgrading of broadband networks.  Recent research by Robert 
Pollin and Jeannette Wicks-Lim (http://www.peri.umass.edu/green_jobs) suggests that 
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investments in green energy will create jobs that generally pay well above the typical 
wage.  Providing funds to green projects will likely create good new jobs.  It may well be 
necessary to expedite planning processes that so often hold up major investments in 
infrastructure projects such as placing wind turbines.  Current PFI projects that are 
currently under threat from a lack of public funding, following on from the financial 
crisis, should be guaranteed by public funds.  These are presumably projects that could be 
implemented quickly, without need for further planning, and many are large in scale. 
 
In addition, investment in social housing, particularly aimed at housing the UKs growing 
elderly population, would be a worthwhile investment. The emphasis should be on labour 
intensive activities that maximize the number of jobs. As we have discussed, current 
expenditure on such employment support programmes is very low by international 
standards. These jobs would require some associated training strategy.  
 
Proposal 8.  Allow public sector and non-profit organizations to fill available vacancies 
by providing increased funding for two years  
 
Provide funds directly to public sector organizations such as local authorities, health 
authorities and universities to fill the vacancies they have currently.  The idea is if the 
budget constraint were lifted - at least temporarily - many more teachers, police, youth 
workers and social workers be hired. The second stage would be to have them prepare 
claims for further money for short-term job creation with subsidies for the unemployed 
and training for the young.  A further possibility is to fund public works programs which 
would have the added bonus of providing work for unemployed construction workers. 
 
Proposal 9.  Temporary, limited and targeted expansion of ALMPs 
 
It would be appropriate to have some limited expansion of Active Labour Market 
Programmes, particularly for the young.  It is important they are piloted and carefully 
evaluated to see if the works when unemployment is high. What works in one region may 
not work in another.  If there is evidence that a particular programme works in a period of 
high unemployment, only then would it warrant further funding and increased numbers of 
participants.   
 
Proposal 10.  Provide incentives to encourage the use of short-time working and job 
sharing as alternatives to redundancy and unemployment.  These might take the form 
of time limited tax incentives. 
 
One possibility suggested to us by Paul Gregg in private communication, which we 
support, would be to temporarily reduce the ‘hours rules’ for tax credits.  Currently, 
except for lone parents people have to work 30 hours to claim tax credits. His suggestion, 
which we think is a good one, would be to reduce this to 16 or 20 hours for two years.  
Some people will lower their hours of work e.g. go part-time or share their jobs, to take 
advantage of this and so release hours of work for others.    
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Conclusions 
Unemployment will certainly increase sharply over the next two years or so.  Its effects 
on many participants in the labour market will be negative and long-lasting. While much 
of the remedy to the problems of the labour market lies within the product and credit 
markets, these alone will not prevent a substantial rise in unemployment. Hence direct 
interventions in the labour market will be necessary and even a very large intervention 
stimulus package is unlikely to be offset as much as 50 per cent of the increase in 
unemployment that some commentators are now forecasting.  The time to act is now. 
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Table 1.  UK and US changes in employment ('000s) 
 
                                 United Kingdom                         United States 
                           Total employment       monthly              Total employment   monthly    
                                                                 change                                               change 
2007 January 29,046 -41 137,108 126 
2007 February 29,059 13 137,133 25 
2007 March 29,085 26 137,310 177 
2007 April 29,157 72 137,356 46 
2007 May 29,159 2 137,518 162 
2007 Jun 29,199 40 137,625 107 
2007 July 29,220 21 137,682 57 
2007 August 29,272 52 137,756 74 
2007 September 29,319 47 137,837 81 
2007 October 29,368 49 137,977 140 
2007 November 29,398 30 138,037 60 
2007 December 29,454 56 138,078 41 
2008 January 29,494 40 138,002 -76 
2008 February 29,499 5 137,919 -83 
2008 March 29,506 7 137,831 -88 
2008 April 29,541 35 137,764 -67 
2008 May 29,505 -36 137,717 -47 
2008 June 29,491 -14 137,617 -100 
2008 July 29,419 -72 137,550 -67 
2008 August 29,407 -12 137,423 -127 
2008 September 29,377 -30 137,020 -403 
2008 October 29,393 +16 136,700 -320 
2008 November   136,167 -533 
 
Source: ONS and Bureau of Labor Statistics (Total non-farm payrolls)
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Table 2.  Growth rates of GDP in volume (based on seasonally adjusted data) 
 
 Q4 Q1  Q2  Q3  
 2007 2008 2008 2008  
EA15  0.3  0.7  -0.2  -0.2  
EU27  0.4  0.6  0.0  -0.2  
EA16  0.3  0.7  -0.2  -0.2  
EU Member States  
United Kingdom  0.6  0.4  0.0  -0.6  
Belgium  0.4  0.4  0.3  0.1  
Czech Republic  1.2  1.0  1.0  0.9  
Denmark  -0.2  -1.2  0.4  -0.4  
Germany  0.3  1.4  -0.4  -0.5  
Estonia  -0.1  -1.2  -1.5  -0.9  
Ireland  -0.2  -0.3  -0.6  1.2  
Greece  0.6  0.9  1.1  0.4  
Spain  0.6  0.3  0.1  -0.2  
France  0.4  0.4  -0.3  0.1  
Italy  -0.4  0.5  -0.4  -0.5  
Cyprus  0.9  1.1  0.9  0.6  
Latvia  -0.1  -0.6  -2.9  -1.2  
Lithuania  1.8  -0.3  1.0  0.3  
Luxembourg  0.9  0.1  1.1  :  
Hungary  0.1  0.5  0.4  -0.1  
Malta  1.2  0.2  1.0  0.1  
Netherlands  1.2  0.3  0.0  0.0  
Austria  0.6  0.5  0.3  0.1  
Poland  1.7  1.2  1.3  1.2  
Portugal  0.6  -0.2  0.3  -0.1  
Slovenia  0.4  1.9  0.5  0.7  
Slovakia  3.0  1.1  1.8  1.5  
Finland  0.6  0.2  0.5  0.1  
Sweden  0.4  0.0  -0.1  -0.1  
EFTA Countries  
Iceland  -0.4  -1.6  4.7  -3.4  
Norway  1.1  0.2  0.1  -0.7  
Switzerland  1.0  0.3  0.3  0.0  
Main economic partners  
United States  0.0  0.2  0.7  -0.1  
Japan  0.5  0.6  -1.0  -0.5 
 
Source: Eurostat Euro Indicator 4/2009 - (08/01/2009).  2nd estimates Q32008. 
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Table 3.  Unemployment duration 
 
a) ILO Unemployment 
                                                       #           <6 months               6-12                over 12  
                                                    '000s                                   months             months 
Sep-Nov 2006  1,675 1006 285 384    
Sep-Nov 2007  1,633 987 261 384   
Dec-Feb 2008  1,614  955 269 390   
Mar-May 2008  1,628 959  264 405 
Jun-Aug 2008  1,792 1078 274 440 
Sep-Nov 2008 1,923 1,178 312 432   
  
b) Claimant count 
2007 
November  811 555 132 125   
December  803 552 131 119   
2008 
January  794 548 130 116   
February  793 552 129 111   
March  796 557 131 108   
April  808 572 130 105   
May  821 587 131 103  
June  840 608 132 101   
July  869 635 134 100   
August  905 666 139 100   
September  941 698 144 100  
October  993 741 151 101  
November   1,076  812  161  103 
December   1,154  876  172  105  
  
Source: Labour Market First Release, December 2008, ONS Tables 9(1) and 11(1).
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Table 4.  Labour market expectations, average 1985-2009 and latest estimate, January 2009 
                                 Consumers                                                      Firms 
                          Manufacturing            Services                    Retail                   Construction 
                               Average  Latest        Average   Latest     Average   Latest     Average    Latest        Average    Latest           
Europe  24 61 -13 -34 7 -21 0 -18 -7 -31 
Euro area 25 58 -9 -31 6 -13 -1 -10 -9 -26 
Austria 23 60 -6 -30 9 -11 -6 -10 -14 -24 
Belgium 26 66 -8 -31 17 -21 3 -7 -2 -8 
Bulgaria 16 48 -16 -11 -3 0 1 -2 -7 -18 
Cyprus 38 51 +13 -39 5 4 1 -4 11 -36 
Czech Republic 29 60 -20 -54 -11 -18 4 0 -10 -5 
Denmark 8 53 -3 -33 14 -3 8 -16 -4 -31 
Estonia 28 61 -9 -42 14 -15 5 -38 10 -48 
Finland -1 46 -14 -38 19 -9 -1 -21 -5 -54 
France 29 68 -20 -41 2 -15 -3 -14 -5 -17 
Germany 24 53 -14 -31 3 -8 -9 -11 -20 -19 
Greece 39 59 -2 -30 10 -19 27 24 9 -27 
Hungary 31 79 -15 -36 -4 -24 -10 -13 -2 -27 
Italy 28 45 -6 -21 10 -16 13 0 -4 -26 
Latvia 22 78 -7 -43 9 -24 2 -34 -3 -53 
Lithuania -2 78 -23 -38 3 -22 2 -40 -12 -55 
Netherlands 11 68 -5 -23 18 -17 3 NA 4 -8 
Poland 19 14 -20 -26 3 -1 -9 -2 -7 -4 
Portugal 31 67 -14 -37 -1 -12 -5 -20 -8 -26 
Romania 32 63 -22 -18 3 5 -1 4 -3 -10 
Slovak Republic 15 52 -20 -46 -33 -23 -3 25 -7 0 
Slovenia 24 67 -19 -50 11 -12 -3 -31 5 -29 
Spain 18 68 -9 -34 15 -14 0 -15 -4 -50 
Sweden 5 62 -18 -48 12 -28 -2 -21 -17 -51 
United Kingdom 21 75 -17 -41 16 -52 -2 -51 0 -53 
Source: http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/db_indicators/db_indicators8650_en.htm  
Columns 1 and 2 relate to question ‘what do you expect to happen to unemployment over the next 12 months’.  Columns 3-10 relate to firms’ 
employment expectations over the next three months by sector. 
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Table 5.  Employment expectations, February  2008-January 2009 
         2008        2009 
                                               February  March     April    May        June       July       August    Sept        Oct         Nov  Dec   January 
a) EU (people)             
i) Unemployment  30 31 34 30 37 46 46 49 57 62 69 75 
 
b) EU (firms)             
i) Manufacturing  -15 -13 -17 -21 -23 -29 -21 -20 -32 -28 -30 -41 
ii) Services  2 19 16 9 0 8 -6 -1 -5 -29 -38 -52 
iii) Retail  -9 -13 -8 -12 -12 -19 -24 -24 -16 -19 -35 -51 
iv) Construction  0 -2 -3 -17 -20 -30 -33 -34 -41 -44 -44 -53 
 
c) CIPS (firms)             
i) Manufacturing 51.9 52.3 51.0 46.5 47.6 46.6 47.9 47.3 45.7 43.1 40.5 40.2 
ii) Services  50.2 50.6 49.7 48.3 45.8 43.4 43.0 40.2 39.9 35.7 33.9 33.5 
 
d) Nationwide (people) 
UK Employment Situation Current 
Many/Some jobs available 53% 49% 47% 51% 50% 41% 39% 37% 37% 30% 26% 23% 
Neither many nor few 18% 21% 23% 19% 19% 25% 22% 20% 17% 15% 12% 12% 
Not many/few jobs available 23% 24% 25% 24% 25% 28% 31% 35% 41% 49% 57% 61% 
Don't know 6% 6% 6% 7% 5% 6% 8% 7% 6% 6% 5% 4% 
             
UK Employment Situation - 6 months’ time            
Many/Some jobs available 39% 38% 32% 35% 37% 28% 28% 25% 22% 21% 21% 15% 
Neither many or few 25% 25% 32% 25% 26% 26% 21% 21% 18% 17% 14% 15% 
Not many/few jobs available 31% 31% 30% 31% 34% 42% 47% 48% 56% 59% 63% 67% 
Don't know 6% 6% 5% 8% 3% 4% 4% 5% 3% 3% 3% 3% 
  
Source: Nationwide Consumer Confidence Index, January 2009; CIPS Services and |Manufacturing, January 2009 and EU 
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/db_indicators/db_indicators8650_en.htm  
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Table 6.  Unemployment dprobits, 1984 and 1993 (ages 16-64) 
    1984                                               1993 
                                               All ages                 18-24                  All ages                   18-24 
Age 16-17   .1552 (16.71)   .1788 (35.60)  
Age 18-24   .1331 (23.49)   .1196 (43.51)  
Age 25-29    .0766 (13.44)   .0505 (20.01)  
Age 30-34   .0425 (7.90)   .0308 (12.65)  
Age 35-39   .0086 (1.76)   .0183 (7.60)  
Age 45-49  -.0164 (3.36)  -.0075 (3.32)  
Age 50-54  -.0204 (4.12)   .0034 (1.36)  
Age 55-59 -.0063 (1.21)   .0143 (5.21)  
Age 60-64 -.0027 (0.39)   .0029 (0.91)  
Male  .0115 (5.05) .0215 (3.04)  .0437 (38.59) .0731 (18.82) 
Black  .0789 (6.50)  .1604 (5.19)  .1329 (24.64) .2930 (14.77) 
Asian  .0612 (6.12)  .0766 (2.47)  .0556 (13.13) .1116 (8.61) 
Chinese -.0348 (1.55)   -.0158 (1.53) .0627 (1.49) 
Other race  .0919 (5.97)  .2010 (4.33)   .0753 (11.19) .1984 (8.17) 
UK born  -.0248 (4.37) -.0386 (1.90) -.0127 (5.12) .0002 (0.02) 
Higher degree   -.0761 (9.30)   -.0735 (25.80) -.0669 (2.73) 
Degree -.0701 (16.34) -.1274 (8.28) -.0686 (39.83) -.1088 (15.54) 
Other degree  -.0664 (9.04)  -.1549 (3.36) -.0666 (22.65) -.1440 (7.47) 
HND/HNC  -.0733 (12.29)  -.1548 (7.93)  -.0695 (31.66) -.1444 (19.49) 
Teacher secondary  -.0535 (5.16)  .0719 (0.45) -.0603 (8.24) -.1112 (1.16) 
Teacher primary   -.0539 (5.18)   -.0596 (9.62) -.0644 (0.94) 
Nursing  -.0612 (9.62)  -.1402 (6.76) -.0743 (24.18) -.1404 (9.72) 
OND/ONC  -.0656 (11.56)  -.1404 (10.19) -.0641 (25.41) -.1377 (21.21) 
City & Guilds  -.0599 (17.91)  -.1316 (13.69) -.0540 (19.56) -.0958 (9.97) 
A-level   -.0590 (14.80)  -.1175 (11.21) -.0564 (29.12) -.1195 (20.60) 
O-level  -.0540 (19.59)  -.1327 (16.40) -.0519 (35.61) -.1314 (24.77) 
CSE  -.0319 (8.06)  -.0716 (7.74) -.0256 (11.56) -.0763 (11.72) 
Other qualifications  -.0173 (3.52)  -.0810 (3.07) -.0326 (16.63) -.0765 (7.90) 
Rest of North -.0164 (2.11) -.0303 (1.20) -.0208 (5.11) -.0091 (0.60) 
South Yorkshire -.0153 (1.82)  .0071 (0.25) -.0061 (1.32) -.0117 (0.72) 
West Yorkshire -.0404 (5.77) -.0772 (3.42) -.0341 (8.99) -.0490 (3.61) 
Rest Yorks & Humber -.0396 (5.45) -.0779 (3.39) -.0338 (8.33) -.0757 (5.28) 
East Midlands -.0471 (7.60) -.0931 (4.66) -.0400 (11.79) -.0582 (4.69) 
East Anglia -.0570 (8.75) -.1039 (4.86) -.0375 (10.03) -.0649 (4.79) 
London -.0502 (8.34) -.0993 (5.17) -.0113 (3.05) -.0411 (3.30) 
Rest South East -.0629 (10.83) -.1163 (6.25) -.0377 (11.26) -.0706 (6.05) 
South West -.0491 (7.98) -.0838 (4.14) -.0357 (10.41) -.0521 (4.19) 
West Midlands -.0203 (2.78) -.0365 (1.55) -.0098 (2.43) -.0291 (2.11) 
Rest West Midlands  -.0322 (4.61) -.0666 (2.98) -.0369 (10.25) -.0737 (5.77) 
Greater Manchester -.0225 (3.08) -.0261 (1.08) -.0228 (5.85) -.0233 (1.66) 
Merseyside  .0185 (2.02)  .0211 (0.75)  .0079 (1.62)  .0279 (1.60) 
Rest North West -.0344 (4.88) -.0374 (1.55) -.0371 (10.07) -.0657 (5.06) 
Wales  -.0198 (2.72) -.0279 (1.17) -.0278 (7.37) -.0363 (2.70) 
Scotland -.0135 (1.97)  -.0366 (1.69) -.0232 (6.41) -.0369 (2.84) 
N                                          66,778                   11,859                  284,047                  39,561  
Pseudo R2  .0790 .0768 .0704 .0658 
Source: Labour Force Surveys 1984 & 1993.  Excluded categories Northern region/Tyne & Wear; 
white; 40-44 & no qualifications.  In 1993 equations include a total of 31 qualifications dummies. 
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Table 7.  Dprobit unemployment equations, 2006-2008 (September) 
                                                         2006                         2007                         2008 2006 2007                     2008 
 All ages All ages All ages       18-24 18-24                     18-24 
Age 16-17   .1994 (45.78)  .2215 (49.32)  .2059 (39.01)  
Age 18-24  .0839 (37.83)  .0902 (39.36)  .0935 (34.17)  
Age 25-29  .0205 (10.80)  .0213 (11.00)  .0251 (10.75)  
Age 30-34  .0090 (5.21)  .0134 (7.39)  .0134 (6.10)  
Age 35-39  .0012 (0.80)  .0041 (2.55)  .0056 (2.85)  
Age 45-49  -.0057 (3.64) -.0044 (2.78) -.0058 (3.11)  
Age 50-54 -.0087 (5.43) -.0077 (4.74) -.0061 (3.15)  
Age 55-59 -.0109 (6.71) -.0034 (2.05) -.0069 (3.41)  
Age 60-64 -.0222 (11.81 -.0194 (10.56) -.0184 (8.53)  
Male  .0067 (8.58)  .0042 (5.56)  .0063 (6.83)  .0208 (5.26)  .0146 (3.72)  .0272 (5.73) 
Mixed  .0352 (7.24)  .0274 (5.80)  .0304 (5.29)  .0686 (3.73)  .0993 (5.23)  .0482 (2.27) 
Asian  .0327 (13.55)  .0305 (13.00)  .0330 (11.80)  .1024 (9.60)  .1057 (9.83)  .0948 (7.45) 
Black  .0609 (17.76)  .0578 (17.40)  .0655 (15.63)  .1686 (9.91)  .1754 (10.35)  .1516 (7.01) 
Chinese  .0277 (3.92)  .0269 (4.07)  .0241 (3.17)  .0932 (2.60)  .1194 (3.42)  .0897 (2.15) 
Other races  .0463 (11.33)  .0427 (10.94)  .0418 (8.88)  .0692 (3.52)  .0721 (3.73)  .0526 (2.39) 
UK born -.0013 (0.90) -.0011 (0.79)  .0028 (1.73)  .0120 (1.55)  .0265 (3.62)  .0316 (3.64) 
DDA disabled & work  .0726 (35.62)  .0748 (36.57)  .0760 (30.96)  .0924 (8.01)  .0982 (7.97)  .1176 (8.10) 
DDA disabled  .0002 (0.12)  .0046 (2.38)  .0031 (1.39)  .0251 (1.75) -.0074 (0.56)  .0197 (1.20) 
Work limiting disabled  .0472 (18.05)  .0536 (19.72)  .0497 (15.56)  .0891 (7.06)  .1202 (8.80)  .0979 (6.17) 
Higher degree -.0326 (24.75) -.0311 (24.56) -.0339 (22.56) -.0938 (8.57) -.0966 (9.32) -.0942 (7.35) 
NVQ level 5 -.0271 (4.20) -.0318 (5.24) -.0317 (4.78) -.0979 (2.97) -.1004 (2.63) -.1028 (2.07) 
First degree -.0331 (29.95) -.0349 (32.94) -.0361 (28.17) -.0985 (15.89) -.1047 (17.95) -.0996 (13.7) 
Other degree -.0329 (12.56) -.0301 (11.77) -.0332 (9.87) -.0919 (3.94) -.0996 (5.63) -.1108 (3.79) 
NVQ level 4 -.0294 (8.90) -.0312 (10.12) -.0295 (8.36) -.0806 (3.48)   -.1116 (4.15) 
Diploma in HE -.0271 (11.54) -.0274 (12.64) -.0274 (10.40) -.0773 (5.74) -.0963 (8.57) -.0945 (6.37) 
HNC, HND, BTEC  -.0302 (19.78) -.0289 (19.34) -.0326 (18.25) -.0890 (9.83) -.0975 (11.42) -.1005 (9.54) 
Teaching, FE -.0340 (5.26) -.0241 (4.23) -.0273 (4.14)       
Teaching, secondary  -.0243 (3.38) -.0265 (3.56) -.0325 (3.63)       
Teaching, primary  -.0329 (5.05) -.0300 (4.78) -.0230 (3.13)    
Teaching foundation stage -.0302 (2.14) -.0113 (0.75) -.0122 (0.63)       
Teaching, level not stated -.0325 (3.37) -.0279 (2.86) -.0233 (2.08)       
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Nursing  -.0338 (14.86) -.0321 (14.50) -.0344 (12.65) -.1031 (5.22) -.1037 (4.65) -.1062 (4.00) 
Other HE <degree -.0219 (5.39) -.0245 (6.99) -.0247 (5.74) -.1007 (5.37) -.0919 (5.24) -.0796 (3.40) 
NVQ level 3 -.0287 (18.74) -.0282 (19.66) -.0310 (18.72) -.0960 (13.32) -.1018 (15.01) -.1039 (12.8) 
GNVQ/GSVQ advanced -.0289 (9.26) -.0298 (10.16) -.0290 (7.82) -.0995 (9.58) -.0917 (8.26) -.1018 (6.36) 
A level or equivalent -.0264 (21.17) -.0273 (23.06) -.0289 (20.18) -.0953 (15.52) -.1062 (18.24) -.1087 (15.4) 
OND, ONC, BTEC national -.0260 (12.80) -.0244 (12.24) -.0265 (11.45) -.0913 (9.59) -.0848 (9.40) -.0788 (7.08) 
City & Guilds advanced craft -.0267 (14.00) -.0259 (13.83) -.0267 (11.99) -.0831 (4.58) -.0846 (4.76) -.0970 (4.36) 
SCE higher  -.0310 (12.60) -.0278 (11.18) -.0308 (10.21) -.0995 (10.32) -.0978 (10.35) -.1058 (8.74) 
A, S level or equivalent -.0312 (15.18) -.0298 (14.88) -.0298 (11.86) -.0932 (11.95) -.0850 (10.81) -.0914 (9.76) 
Trade apprenticeship -.0264 (18.76) -.0257 (17.92) -.0276 (15.88) -.0952 (11.34) -.0932 (10.84) -.0995 (9.94) 
NVQ level 2 or equivalent -.0169 (10.38) -.0193 (12.71) -.0201 (11.14) -.0779 (10.74) -.0796 (11.46) -.0838 (9.73) 
GNVQ/GSVQ intermediate -.0223 (6.68) -.0148 (4.17) -.0223 (4.87) -.0764 (7.05) -.0539 (4.62) -.0859 (5.20) 
City & guilds craft/part 2 -.0134 (4.02) -.0172 (5.29) -.0179 (4.68) -.0660 (2.82) -.0695 (3.47) -.0723 (3.54) 
BTEC, SCOTVEC first -.0103 (1.88) -.0114 (2.19) -.0223 (4.27) -.0218 (0.85) -.0402 (1.83) -.0691 (3.50) 
O level, GCSE grade A-C  -.0253 (23.24) -.0236 (22.16) -.0250 (19.26) -.0888 (14.30) -.0788 (12.82) -.0794 (10.7) 
NVQ level 1 or equivalent  .0125 (2.83)  .0078 (1.85)  .0043 (0.86)  .0239 (1.26) -.0123 (0.76)  .0065 (0.29) 
GNVQ/GSVQ foundation  -.0101 (0.93)  .0039 (0.32)  .0108 (0.64) -.0535 (1.86) -.0036 (0.10) -.0315 (0.66) 
CSE below grade 1 -.0117 (6.39) -.0110 (6.09) -.0114 (5.25) -.0384 (4.13) -.0442 (4.94) -.0257 (2.27) 
RSA other -.0133 (2.87) -.0255 (5.41) -.0092 (1.53) -.0888 (1.42) -.0940 (1.73) -.0046 (0.06) 
City & Guilds foundation  .0016 (0.23)  .0064 (0.88) -.0024 (0.29)  .0668 (1.03)  .0221 (0.32)  .1837 (2.21) 
Key skills qualification  .0096 (0.91)  .0076 (0.71)  .0343 (2.04)  .0912 (1.69)  .0551 (0.99)  .2086 (2.07) 
Basic skills qualification  .0197 (2.41)  .0325 (4.62)  .0347 (4.26)  .0084 (0.20)  .0543 (1.54)  .1597 (3.65) 
Other qualification -.0189 (13.92) -.0198 (15.26) -.0209 (13.34) -.0798 (9.62) -.0628 (7.27) -.0784 (7.84) 
Rest of North -.0075 (2.60) -.0042 (1.37) -.0068 (1.97) -.0096 (0.62)  .0075 (0.46) -.0285 (1.61) 
South Yorkshire -.0030 (0.92) -.0030 (0.89)  .0001 (0.04) -.0023 (0.14) -.0185 (1.11)  .0093 (0.44) 
West Yorkshire -.0121 (4.52) -.0072 (2.46) -.0112 (3.50) -.0102 (0.70) -.0274 (1.91) -.0243 (1.46) 
Rest Yorks & Humber -.0122 (4.22) -.0072 (2.29) -.0201 (6.23) -.0088 (0.54) -.0245 (1.54) -.0677 (4.10) 
East Midlands -.0124 (5.08) -.0084 (3.13) -.0135 (4.65) -.0063 (0.46) -.0175 (1.28) -.0341 (2.21) 
East Anglia -.0128 (4.79) -.0105 (3.67) -.0163 (5.28)  -.0155 (1.05) -.0271 (1.83) -.0389 (2.29) 
Inner London  .0045 (1.43)  .0099 (2.85) -.0013 (0.37)  .0140 (0.85)  .0344 (1.94) -.0029 (0.15) 
Outer London  -.0047 (1.76) -.0060 (2.17) -.0101 (3.28)   .0053 (0.36) -.0014 (0.10) -.0301 (1.86) 
Rest South East -.0143 (6.14) -.0095 (3.71) -.0189 (6.89) -.0302 (2.48) -.0244 (1.91) -.0511 (3.57) 
South West -.0182 (7.86) -.0135 (5.33) -.0195 (7.13) -.0349 (2.75) -.0346 (2.64) -.0682 (4.91) 
West Midlands -.0031 (1.09)  .0044 (1.36) -.0026 (0.74)  .0036 (0.24)  .0074 (0.46) -.0157 (0.89) 
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Rest West Midlands -.0166 (6.60) -.0084 (2.92) -.0165 (5.49) -.0290 (2.08) -.0338 (2.35) -.0489 (3.05) 
Greater Manchester -.0113 (4.16) -.0026 (0.87) -.0051 (1.50) -.0268 (1.91) -.0116 (0.77) -.0153 (0.88) 
Merseyside -.0030 (0.90)  .0109 (2.76)  .0129 (2.86)  .0124 (0.70)  .0499 (2.47)  .0395 (1.69) 
Rest North West -.0163 (6.24) -.0081 (2.77) -.0143 (4.53)  -.0266 (1.83) -.0221 (1.50) -.0343 (2.04) 
Wales -.0107 (4.06) -.0057 (1.96) -.0103 (3.20) -.0115 (0.81) -.0148 (1.01) -.0416 (2.56) 
Strathclyde -.0020 (0.66) -.0029 (0.92) -.0091 (2.63)  .0021 (0.13)  .0013 (0.08) -.0187 (0.99) 
Rest Scotland -.0110 (4.09) -.0080 (2.78) -.0166 (5.46)  .0111 (0.69)  .0037 (0.23) -.0266 (1.49) 
Northern Ireland -.0157 (6.01) -.0127 (4.47) -.0189 (6.28) -.0456 (3.41) -.0244 (1.67) -.0329 (1.97) 
February  .0024 (1.29) -.0005 (0.32) -.0012 (0.63) -.0022 (0.24) -.0112 (1.19)  .0012 (0.12) 
March  .0002 (0.16)  -.0017 (0.93) -.0049 (2.76) -.0042 (0.44)  .0046 (0.47) -.0084 (0.87) 
April  .0015 (0.89) -.0030 (1.76) -.0024 (1.28) -.0004 (0.05) -.0032 (0.35) -.0102 (1.02) 
May  .0020 (1.08) -.0036 (2.00) -.0036 (1.91)  .0079 (0.84) -.0085 (0.90) -.0072 (0.72) 
June  .0016 (0.86) -.0023 (1.28)  .0000 (0.03)  .0117 (1.22)  .0061 (0.63)  .0125 (1.27) 
July  .0041 (2.32) -.0015 (0.88)  .0045 (2.30)  .0242 (2.66)  .0081 (0.87)  .0298 (2.83) 
August  .0028 (1.53) -.0012 (0.67)  .0022 (1.19)  .0122 (1.28)  .0092 (0.95)  .0235 (2.34) 
September  .0031 (1.63) -.0016 (0.93)  .0034 (1.61)  .0104 (1.08) -.0082 (0.90)  .0208 (1.81) 
October  .0046 (2.56) -.0031 (1.71)             n/a   .0133 (1.46) -.0044 (0.46) n/a 
November  .0013 (0.71) -.0027 (1.50)  n/a  -.0055 (0.58)  .0026 (0.27) n/a 
December -.0006 (0.36) -.0079 (4.67)  n/a   .0017 (0.19) -.0293 (3.31) n/a 
N                                                   229,143                    227,586                     163,553                       26,489                  26,181                     18,800 
Pseudo R2 .1191 .1279 .1263 .0604 .0716 .0792 
 
Notes: excluded categories January; no qualifications; white: Tyne & Wear.  T-statistics in parentheses.  Ages 16-64.   
Source: Labour Force Surveys January 2006-September 2008.   Dummies also included for International baccalaureate; RSA Diploma & RSA 
Advanced Diploma, YT and YTP certificate, Scottish CSYS; SCOTVEC modules, BTEC, SCOTVEC First; Access qualifications, Don't know 
and entry level qualifications but results not reported but mostly insignificant.  Excluded categories, Tyne & Wear; 40-44; no qualifications; white 
and January. 
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Table 8.  EU Life satisfaction, happiness and depression ordered logits, 2005-2007 
                                           Life satisfaction                           Happiness                         Down in the dumps                     Downhearted 
Unemployed     -.8266 (17.47) -.2364 (3.88)  .1862 (3.04)  .2686 (4.47) 
Retired    -.1645 (4.25) -.0959 (1.96)  .1023 (2.08)  .1704 (3.52) 
Farmer    -.3153 (4.18)  .2954 (3.08) -.1763 (1.82) -.0893 (0.96) 
Fisherman    -.4211 (1.06)  1.2834 (2.13) -.5877 (1.00) -.5430 (0.93) 
Professional     .4221 (5.41)  .2610 (2.61) -.1038 (1.01) -.1106 (1.11) 
Shop owner      .1136 (1.92)  .3110 (4.14) -.2592 (3.37) -.2336 (3.15) 
Business proprietor     .4696 (6.38)  .3878 (3.67) -.2387 (2.17) -.2644 (2.50) 
Employed professional     .3224 (5.22)  .3852 (4.70) -.5861 (6.54) -.3804 (4.62) 
General management     .5665 (6.29)  .1929 (1.65) -.6472 (4.70) -.4818 (3.89) 
Middle management     .2726 (5.82)  .2660 (4.37) -.4044 (6.25) -.3254 (5.26) 
Employed at a desk     .1336 (3.08)  .1859 (3.32) -.3076 (5.29) -.2026 (3.64) 
Employed traveling      .0577 (0.95)  .2497 (3.17) -.2414 (2.93) -.1715 (2.18) 
Employed in a service     .0512 (1.13)  .2218 (3.76) -.2911 (4.75) -.2322 (3.96) 
Supervisor     .0364 (0.37) -.1174 (0.94) -.0770 (0.59) -.0266 (0.22) 
Skilled manual    -.1350 (3.19)  .2578 (4.66) -.2322 (4.11) -.2733 (4.96) 
Unskilled manual     -.4328 (8.37)  .0949 (1.41) -.0869 (1.29) -.0217 (0.33) 
UK*unemployment  -.2704 (1.61) .0565 (0.26)   .4423 (1.99)  .2110 (0.95) 
cut1    -5.7400  -5.8636  .4231  .2329 
cut2    -3.8288  -4.1771  1.6826  1.6084 
cut3    -.7126   -2.4559  3.1893  3.2786 
cut4  -.0960  4.8315  5.0002 
N                                              57,338                    29,026    29,076              29,069 
Pseudo R2 .1264 .0568 .0537    .0466 
Notes: equations also include 31 country dummies; a male dummy; age and its square; 4 schooling dummies and 7 marital status dummies.  T-statistics in parent  
heses.  Excluded category 'responsible for home shopping'. Source: column 1 Eurobarometers #67.2: European Union Enlargement, Personal Data Privacy, the 
National Economy, and Scientific Research, April-May 2007 & #68.1: The European Parliament and Media Usage, September - November, 2007 pooled and 
columns 2-4 Eurobarometer #64.4: Mental Well-Being, Telecommunications, Harmful Internet Content, and Farm Animal Welfare, December 2005-January 
2006. Questions.  1. On the whole, are you very satisfied, fairly satisfied, not very satisfied or not at all satisfied with the life you lead? 2. Have you felt happy - 
all the time; most of the time: sometimes; rarely or never?  3. Have you felt so down in the dumps that nothing could cheer you up all the time; most of the time: 
sometimes; rarely or never?  4. Have you felt downhearted and depressed all the time; most of the time: sometimes; rarely or never? 
 76
Table 9.   Job satisfaction and job security, 2005 (ordered logits). 
     All ages  All ages      Ages 15-29 
Lose job disagree -.4778 (15.80) -.4596 (14.85)  -.4612 (6.64) 
Lose job neither -.7996 (19.81) -.7761 (18.98)  -.8227 (9.50) 
Lose job agree -1.1689 (26.57) -1.1459 (25.76) -1.2579 (13.17) 
Lose job strongly agree -1.4363 (25.46) -1.4292 (25.18) -1.6017 (13.64) 
Lose job DK -.7552 (12.81) -.7349 (12.30)   -.8800 (6.69) 
Lose job refuse -.6161 (2.96) -.6040 (2.90) -1.3253 (2.95) 
Lose job disagree*UK  -.3858 (2.68)   
Lose job neither*UK  -.7430 (2.97)   
Lose job agree*UK  -.8243 (2.83)   
Age 30-49 -.0042 (0.13) -.0018 (0.05)   
Age ≥50  .0846 (2.04)  .0879 (2.12)   
Male -.0930 (3.51) -.0920 (3.47)  -.0650 (1.10) 
Job tenure -.0126 (3.58) -.0128 (3.63)  -.1015 (4.52) 
Job tenure2  .0003 (3.38)  .0003 (3.44)   .0052 (2.48) 
Self-employed employees   .0008 (0.01)  .0003 (0.01)   .0594 (0.43) 
Self-employed no employees  .3115 (4.65)  .3132 (4.67)   .4346 (2.01) 
Supervisor  .4144 (11.51)  .4136 (11.48)   .4149 (4.04) 
Workplace size 2-4  -.2140 (3.51) -.2131 (3.49)  -.1013 (0.69) 
Workplace size 5-9  -.3694 (5.64) -.3695 (5.63)   -.3517 (2.32) 
Workplace size 10-49 -.4004 (6.46) -.3988 (6.43)  -.3215 (2.18) 
Workplace size 50-99 -.4832 (6.97) -.4811 (6.94)  -.4757 (2.88) 
Workplace size 100-249 -.4840 (6.78) -.4859 (6.80)  -.4865 (2.81) 
Workplace size 200-499 -.5943 (7.33) -.5931 (7.31)  -.5649 (2.87) 
Workplace size≥500  -.5262 (7.08) -.5250 (7.06)  -.6609 (3.60) 
Workplace size dk -.4895 (5.89) -.4904 (5.90)  -.4149 (2.18) 
Belgium -.2188 (2.40)  -.2177 (2.39)  -.5514 (2.55) 
Bulgaria -1.0992 (12.27)  -1.1033 (12.32) -1.2180 (5.62) 
Croatia -.7722 (8.26)  -.7734 (8.27)  -.7364 (3.82) 
Cyprus -.0003 (0.00)  -.0002 (0.00)  -.3568 (1.38) 
Czech Republic -.5501 (5.98)  -.5573 (6.06)  -.8613 (4.22) 
Denmark  .3721 (4.05)   .3762 (4.09)   .2260 (1.11) 
Estonia -1.0452 (10.06)  -1.0503 (10.11) -1.0339 (4.31) 
Finland -.6245 (6.96)  -.6229 (6.95)  -.8454 (4.13) 
France -.7558 (8.28)  -.7533 (8.25)  -.6901 (3.33) 
Germany -.2897 (3.15)  -.2938 (3.19)  -.5520 (2.73) 
Greece -1.5117 (16.17)  -1.5117 (16.17) -1.0410 (4.89) 
Hungary -1.0275 (11.30)  -1.0310 (11.33) -1.1636 (5.50) 
Ireland -.2494 (2.73)  -.2510 (2.75)   -.5613 (2.78) 
Italy -1.1265 (12.36)  -1.1271 (12.37) -1.2736 (6.46) 
Latvia -1.2194 (13.48)   -1.2245 (13.53) -1.3710 (6.56) 
Lithuania -1.1133 (12.16)   -1.1207 (12.24) -1.4000 (6.29) 
Luxembourg -.5685 (5.40)  -.5667 (5.38)  -.9537 (3.61) 
Malta -.6353 (5.99)   -.6362 (6.00)  -.7041 (3.31) 
Netherlands -.5045 (5.58)  -.5051 (5.59)  -.3407 (1.45) 
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Norway  .0115 (0.13)   .0160 (0.17)  -.3116 (1.47) 
Poland -.5661 (6.14)  -.5694 (6.18)  -.6608 (3.30) 
Portugal -.4285 (4.72)  -.4317 (4.76)  -.5248 (2.74) 
Romania -1.2223 (13.12)    -1.2245 (13.14) -1.5374 (7.40) 
Slovakia -.7672 (8.53)   -.7722 (8.59)  -.8802 (4.07) 
Slovenia -1.0306 (9.91)   -1.0323 (9.92)  -.8914 (3.98) 
Spain -.7979 (8.79)  -.7973 (8.78) -1.2059 (6.29) 
Sweden -.4264 (4.70)  -.4257 (4.69)  -.6693 (2.80) 
Switzerland  .0235 (0.26)   .0245 (0.27)  -.2177 (0.97) 
Turkey -1.6826 (17.77)  -1.6856 (17.80) -1.8777 (9.39) 
UK  .3161 (3.50)   .5564 (4.98)   .3099 (1.55) 
cut1 -3.9446  -3.9322 -4.1484   
cut2 -2.0303   -2.0183 -2.2988 
cut3  .8919    .9040   .5746 
N                                                       28,425                         28,425                       5,601 
Pseudo R2  .0815 .0818 .0870 
 
Source: 4th European Working Conditions Survey, 2005.  Notes: excluded categories: 
Austria; works alone; employee; age 15-29 and lose job strongly disagree.  All equations 
also include 64 industry dummies. 
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Table 10.  Life satisfaction equations, Europe, 1973-2006. 
                                                     All                               All                           Unemployed                 Workers                           OLF 
Age  -0.0134 (17.01) -.0134 (17.00) -.0362 (13.95) -.0145 (14.32) -.0095 (10.44) 
Age2  0.0001 (19.29)  .0001 (19.26)  .0004 (13.73)  .0001 (13.68)  .0001 (13.48) 
Male  -0.0322 (10.78) -.0319 (10.78) -.1491 (15.64) -.0302 (9.12) -.0095 (2.38) 
16-19 yrs schooling   0.0863 (18.22)  .0861 (18.34)  .0541 (4.70)  .0643 (13.03)  .1014 (18.40) 
20+ yrs schooling    0.1669 (27.06)  .1666 (27.17)  .1404 (10.08)  .1453 (22.63)  .1717 (22.12) 
Still studying  0.1180 (8.04)   .1167 (8.01)  .2063 (5.15)  .0922 (4.75)  .1332 (6.89) 
Married  0.1199 (20.90)  .1197 (20.79)  .1619 (11.75)  .1169 (19.97)  .1449 (17.67) 
Living as married 0.0502 (8.01)  .0497 (7.91)  .0841 (4.91)  .0496 (7.42)  .0343 (3.36) 
Divorced  -0.1595 (20.64) -.1600 (20.60) -.1850 (8.60) -.1357 (16.76) -.1725 (13.79) 
Separated  -0.2064 (19.57)  -.2069 (19.60) -.1755 (5.95) -.1900 (14.16) -.2504 (12.72) 
Widowed  -0.0859 (13.60) -.0860 (13.59) -.0076 (0.22) -.1038 (9.89) -.0589 (7.29) 
Unemployed  -0.3636 (30.66) -.2442 (8.44)       
Home  -0.0216 (4.44) -.0218 (4.47)     .0251 (4.01) 
Student  0.0712 (5.01)  .0715 (5.05)     .1675 (7.91) 
Retired  -0.0407 (7.26) -.0404 (7.22)       
Austria  -0.0960 (4.13)  -.0944 (4.07) -.2059 (4.15) -.0932 (3.58) -.0823 (3.74) 
Belgium  -0.0802 (4.27) -.0802 (4.27) -.0080 (0.37) -.0753 (3.42) -.0886 (4.58) 
Czech Republic  -0.3190 (16.59) -.3190 (16.50) -.2630 (9.53) -.3615 (22.04) -.2974 (12.55) 
Denmark  0.3229 (22.15)  .3234 (22.17)  .4192 (14.58)  .3423 (25.03)  .2886 (17.47) 
Finland  -0.0023 (0.12) -.0019 (0.10)  .1757 (6.15)  -.0064 (0.29) -.0275 (1.39) 
France  -0.3273 (23.59) -.3278 (23.62) -.2363 (10.10) -.3840 (23.26) -.2757 (20.09) 
Germany  -0.2282 (19.04) -.2277 (18.92) -.3502 (13.49) -.2388 (18.25) -.2064 (15.90) 
Greece  -0.4634 (21.04) -.4639 (21.05) -.1077 (3.05) -.4510 (18.76) -.4979 (22.56) 
Hungary  -0.6803 (35.32) -.6807 (35.06) -.5363 (8.94) -.6670 (36.06) -.7115 (27.04) 
Ireland  0.0506 (3.41)   .0516 (3.51)  .0262 (0.91)  .0408 (2.67)  .0491 (3.19) 
Italy  -0.3445 (17.64) -.3447 (17.66) -.2527 (6.41) -.3317 (16.82) -.3787 (19.09) 
Luxembourg  0.0416 (2.57)  .0460 (2.88) -.1121 (2.27)  .0342 (1.92)  .0702 (3.79) 
Netherlands  0.1211 (10.78)  .1225 (10.91)  .1036 (3.31)  .1236 (9.72)  .1277 (10.28) 
Norway  0.1078 (3.51)  .1086 (3.55)  .1231 (2.04)  .1497 (5.20)  .0591 ( 1.95) 
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Poland  -0.3277 (11.62) -.3209 (11.16)  .0190 (0.31) -.3094 (8.72) -.4095 (15.57) 
Portugal  -0.4991 (21.47) -.4984 (21.40) -.3846 (10.09) -.4706 (21.03) -.5571 (21.04) 
Slovakia  -0.4988 (17.26) -.4966 (17.15) -.1586 (2.52) -.5084 (20.85) -.6083 (13.18) 
Spain  -0.1274 (7.76) -.1275 (7.78)  .1535 (4.75) -.1540 (7.88) -.1578 (9.25) 
Sweden  0.1055 (8.35)  .1063 (8.42)  .1772 (4.76)  .1091 (8.21)  .0839 (4.97) 
Unemployment rate -0.0110 (5.84) -.0101 (5.05) -.0321 (8.69) -.0089 (4.55) -.0079 (4.17) 
Inflation rate -0.0090 (5.09) -.0090 (5.05) -.0275 (7.65) -.0100 (5.67) -.0061 (3.34) 
Unemployment* 
  unemployment rate  -.0136 (3.99)      
 
Constant 3.4793  3.4718 3.8915   3.5211 3.2389 
 
N 743,397    743,397                        43,118                300,306                      330,594 
R2 .1582 .1584 .1285 .1580 .1472 
 
Notes:  excluded categories UK; employee, left school before age 15; single.  All equations include 29 year dummies.  Standard errors 
are clustered by country and year.  Unemployment rate is measured by country and year – source: OECD.  T-statistics in parentheses. 
Source: Eurobarometer trend file (ICPSR# 4357) plus Eurobarometers #65.2 (2006); 64.2 (2005); 63.4 (2005); 62.0 (2004); 61.0 
(2004); 60.1 (2003).  For further details see Blanchflower (2007). 
Sample periods covered by country in the Eurobarometers are as follows with sample sizes in parentheses (n=820,313). 
1975-2006 – Belgium (63,799); France (65,270); Denmark (62,967); Germany (96,353); Ireland (62,585); Italy (66,124); Luxembourg 
(26,305); Netherlands (63,781) and the UK (71,656). 
1985-2006 – Portugal (43,690) and Spain (43,430). 
1981-2006 – Greece (51,955). 
1997-2006 – Austria (20,863); Finland (21,185) and Sweden (21,007). 
2004-2006 - Czech Republic (4,367); Hungary (4,037); Poland (3,885) and Slovakia (4,514).  
1990-1994 - Norway (8,962). 
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Table 11. Scoreboard for youth under 25 around the World and the United Kingdom, 1997, 2006 and 2007 (%). 
 
                                                      Youth employment/                  Ratios of youth-to-adult             Youth unemployment rates 
                       population rates         unemployment rates 
                1997 2006 2007 1997 2006 2007 1997 2006 2007 
WORLD  49.2 44.7 44.5 2.6 2.8 2.8 10.9 12.2 11.9 
Developed Economies & EU  45.1 44.2 44.6 2.4 2.4 2.4 14.8 13.1 12.4 
Central & South-Eastern Europe 35.5 32.6 32.2 2.3 2.5 2.5 21.2 18.5 18.0 
South Asia  45.7 41.7 41.6 3.7 3.0 3.0 6.7 11.1 10.8 
South-East Asia & the Pacific 51.1 44.3 44.3 4.4 5.3 5.0 9.8 17.1 15.8 
East Asia  64.6 54.2 53.6 2.8 2.8 2.8 7.3 6.8 6.7 
Latin America & the Caribbean 47.3 45.9 45.9 2.6 2.8 2.8 14.0 15.0 14.5 
Middle East  27.3 29.2 29.0 3.2 3.1 3.1 23.6 20.4 20.4 
North Africa  28.5 27.2 26.9 3.2 3.4 3.4 25.3 23.7 23.8 
Sub-Saharan Africa  51.3 50.1 49.8 2.0 1.8 1.8 12.0 11.6 11.5 
 
UK  60.8 57.3 55.9 2.4 3.8 3.9 13.4 13.9 14.4  
 
Source: ILO (2008) and OECD for the UK and own calculations from the LFS for 25+ unemployment rates.   
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Table 12.  The impact of youth unemployment ≤age 23 on adult outcomes two decades later at age 46 in 2004/5 (NCDS) 
                                   Life satisfaction          Life satisfaction           Health status            Job satisfaction         Log weekly wage            
                                    Ordered logit               Ordered logit     Ordered logit            Ordered logit                     OLS                
Unemployed age≤23 -.1270 (2.62)  -.1169 (2.40) -.1534 (3.05) -.1965 (3.65) -.0770 (3.82) 
Unemployed age 33  .0440 (0.31)   .0620 (0.44) -.0689 (0.48) -.1182 (0.69) -.2256 (3.52) 
Unempd*Unemp≤23   -.9090 (2.17)  
Male    -.4474 (7.94)  -.4446 (7.89) -.0648 (1.11) -.4094 (5.90) .3674 (14.32) 
PT employee    -.0878 (1.22)  -.0857 (1.19) -.1152 (1.54) -.0860 (1.12) -.7876 (29.18) 
FT self-employed     .2211 (2.86)   .2208 (2.86) -.0061 (0.08)   .5117 (5.76) 
PT self-employed   -.2716 (1.56)  -.2687 (1.54)  .0489 (0.28)  .3987 (2.07) 
Unemployed  -.7668 (3.62)  -.2938 (0.97) -.8126 (3.93)  
Student    -.5316 (1.24)  -.5310 (1.24) -.2219 (0.54)  
Govt. scheme    -.1702 (0.19)  -.1819 (0.20) -.9344 (0.86)  
Temporary sick     .3544 (0.70)   .3478 (0.68) -2.2099 (4.13)  
Permanent sick    1.4352 (9.85)  -1.4431 (9.90) -3.2899 (1.72)  
Home maker    -.2506 (2.15)  -.2503 (2.15) -.4910 (4.15)  
Retired    -.2715 (0.54)  -.2728 (0.54) -1.7514 (3.41)  
Married    1.1321 (11.66)  1.1272 (11.62)  .1543 (11.56)  
Living together     .6872 (5.83)    .6888 (5.84)    .2507 (2.07)  
Separated    -.2207 (1.32)  -.2352 (1.40)    .2174 (1.27)  
Divorced    -.0020 (0.02)  -.0085 (0.07)  .1341 (1.09)  
Widowed    -.6509 (2.34)  -.6742 (2.42)  .2870 (1.02)  
Yorks & Humber    .1673 (1.36)   .1679 (1.37) -.2394 (1.90)  .0783 (0.57)  .0463 (0.92) 
East Midlands     .0946 (0.75)   .0937 (0.74) -.2073 (1.62)  .2620 (1.88)  .0664 (1.29) 
East Anglia    -.0579 (0.40)  -.0600 (0.42) -.1961 (1.32)  .0228 (0.14) -.0503 (0.85) 
South East     .0000 (0.00)   .0004 (0.00)  -.1926 (1.79)  .0383 (0.33)   .1682 (3.95) 
South West     .1476 (1.20)  .1493 (1.22) -.2075 (1.65)  .1825 (1.35)  .0460 (0.92) 
West Midlands     .1787 (1.45)  .1793 (1.46) -.1990 (1.59)   .1748 (1.29)  .0929 (1.87) 
North West     .0469 (0.39)  .0486 (0.40)  .0191 (0.15)  .1047 (0.78)  .0203 (0.41) 
Wales     .1570 (1.17)  .1643 (1.23)  .0518 (0.37)  .4009 (2.63)  .0101 (0.18) 
Scotland     .0460 (0.38)  .0484 (0.40) -.3379 (2.70) -.0056 (0.04)  .0555 (1.12) 
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CSE's grade 2-5   -.1800 (1.99) -.1854 (2.05) -.0274 (0.30)  -.0092 (0.09)  .0283 (0.74) 
GCSE A-C   -.2520 (3.08) -.2581 (3.15)   .1820 (2.19) -.0972 (1.04)  .1301 (3.71) 
AS levels (1)    -1.1583 (2.85) -1.1620 (2.86) -.2951 (0.72) -.2452 (0.54)  .1545 (0.99) 
A-levels (>=2)    -.3435 (3.14) -.3482 (3.18)  .3449 (3.02)  .0799 (0.64)  .3549 (7.60) 
Diploma    -.1251 (0.93) -.1263 (0.94)  .3107 (2.22) -.1866 (1.22)  .3438 (16.16) 
Degree    -.2082 (2.04) -.2145 (2.10)  .2620 (2.48) -.1448 (1.22)  .5988 (13.70) 
Higher degree   -.0229 (0.15) -.0244 (0.16)  .2920 (1.75) .1570 (0.89)  .72901.14 
House mortgage    -.2995 (4.32) -.3025 (4.36) -.0116 (0.16)  
Rent    -.7285 (7.11) -.7323 (7.15) -.1058 (1.02)  
Social class i PMS  .2101 (1.05)  .2197 (1.10)  .2459 (1.19)  .1868 (0.83) .0124 (0.15) 
Social class ii PMS  .1868 (1.05)  .1938 (1.09)  .0231 (0.13)  .0510 (0.25) -.0884 (1.20) 
Social class iii PMS  .3132 (1.86)  .3198 (1.90) -.0088 (0.05)  .2167 (1.12) -.1288 (1.85) 
Social class iv PMS  .3237 (1.81)  .3308 (1.85) -.1051 (0.57)  .2440 (1.19) -.1751 (2.35) 
Social class v PMS  .2357 (1.25)  .2434 (1.29) -.2590 (1.33)  .1888 (0.88) -.1417 (1.82) 
IQ score NCDS2 -.0023 (1.22) -.0023 (1.24)  .0018 (0.93) -.0004 (0.19) .0024 (3.01) 
Malaise NCDS4  -.1250 (13.39) -.1245 (13.33) -.1424 (15.05) -.0557 (5.31) -.0148 (3.78) 
Industry dummies No No No 58 58 
cut1   -6.4392 -6.4424 -5.1878 -3.8119 6.0671 
cut2   -5.9477 -5.9509 -3.4554 -2.8358 
cut3   -5.2196 -5.2224 -1.8254 -2.4125 
cut4   -4.6091 -4.6112  .4221 -.4425 
cut5   -3.8722 -3.8736 
cut6   -2.6808 -2.6812 
cut7   -1.9470 -1.9465 
cut8   -.5206 -.5189 
cut9    1.3464 1.3481 
cut10    2.6866 2.6884 
N 6187 6187             6196 5503 3755 
Pseudo R2/R2 .0470 .0472 .0751 .0196 .4991 
Notes: excluded categories: North; no qualifications; own house outright: FT employee; no husband.  Workers only columns 4 & 5 
Source: National Child Development Study, 1958-2004/5.  Outcomes measured at NCDS7  
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Figure 1.  Unemployment rates for ten countries, 1960-2008 
.
a) The United States and the UK  
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b)  The UK, Australia, Canada and Japan   
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c)  The UK, France, Germany and Italy  
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d)  The UK, Netherlands and Sweden. 
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Figure 2.  Youth unemployment, 1992-2008
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Figure 3. Self-employment ('000s), 1992-2008
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Figure 4. Fear of unemployment, 1985-2008
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Figure 5. The Economic Sentiment Indicator, 1985-2008
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Figure 6. CIPS Employment Surveys
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Figure 7. REC Survey of Demand for Staff
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Figure 8. Bank of England Agents' Survey of Employment Intentions
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Figure 9. BCC Employment Intentions
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Figure 10 – Unemployment and GDP Deviations from Trend 1971 to 2008 
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Figure 11.  % Increase in claimant count, 1991 and 2008 by region 
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Figure 12.  % Increase in claimant count, 1991 and 2008 by TTWA 
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Figure 13: Employment Growth and Share of 16-24 Year Olds in “Lousy” and “Lovely” Jobs 2002-2008 
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Figure 14: Expenditure on Active Labour Market Policies as a Share of GDP. 
 
Source: Eurostat (2007)
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Appendix Table A1.  Annual Standardized Unemployment Rates, 1996-2007 (%) 
 
                                          1996     1997    1998    1999    2000    2001    2002    2003    2004     2005    2006     2007 
United Kingdom 7.9 6.8 6.1 5.9 5.4 5.0 5.1 5.0 4.7 4.8 5.4 5.3 
EU (27 countries) : : : : 8.7 8.5 8.9 9.0 9.0 8.9 8.2 7.1 
EU (25 countries) : : 9.4 9.1 8.6 8.4 8.8 9.0 9.0 8.9 8.2 7.2 
EU (15 countries) 10.1 9.8 9.3 8.5 7.7 7.2 7.6 7.9 8.1 8.1 7.7 7.0 
Euro area  10.7 10.6 10.0 9.1 8.2 7.8 8.3 8.7 8.8 8.9 8.3 7.4 
Euro area (15 countries) 10.6 10.5 10.0 9.2 8.3 7.8 8.2 8.6 8.8 8.9 8.3 7.4 
Euro area (13 countries) 10.6 10.5 10.0 9.2 8.3 7.8 8.2 8.7 8.8 8.9 8.3 7.4 
Euro area (12 countries) 10.6 10.6 10.1 9.2 8.3 7.8 8.3 8.7 8.8 8.9 8.3 7.4 
Austria  4.3 4.4 4.5 3.9 3.6 3.6 4.2 4.3 4.9 5.2 4.8 4.4 
Belgium  9.5 9.2 9.3 8.5 6.9 6.6 7.5 8.2 8.4 8.5 8.3 7.5 
Denmark  6.3 5.2 4.9 5.2 4.3 4.5 4.6 5.4 5.5 4.8 3.9 3.8 
Finland  14.6 12.7 11.4 10.2 9.8 9.1 9.1 9.0 8.8 8.4 7.7 6.9 
France  11.5 11.5 11 10.4 9.0 8.3 8.6 9.0 9.3 9.2 9.2 8.3 
Germany  8.7 9.4 9.1 8.2 7.5 7.6 8.4 9.3 9.8 10.7 9.8 8.4 
Greece  : : 10.8 12 11.2 10.7 10.3 9.7 10.5 9.9 8.9 8.3 
Ireland  11.7 9.9 7.5 5.7 4.3 4.0 4.5 4.7 4.5 4.4 4.5 4.6 
Italy  11.2 11.3 11.4 11.0 10.1 9.1 8.6 8.5 8.1 7.7 6.8 6.1 
Japan  3.4 3.4 4.1 4.7 4.7 5.0 5.4 5.3 4.7 4.4 4.1 3.9 
Netherlands  6.0 4.9 3.8 3.2 2.8 2.2 2.8 3.7 4.6 4.7 3.9 3.2 
Norway  4.7 4.0 3.2 3.2 3.4 3.6 3.9 4.5 4.4 4.6 3.5 2.6 
Poland  : 10.9 10.2 13.4 16.1 18.3 20 19.7 19.0 17.8 13.9 9.6 
Portugal  7.2 6.7 5.0 4.5 4.0 4.1 5.1 6.4 6.7 7.7 7.8 8.1 
Spain  17.8 16.7 15 12.5 11.1 10.3 11.1 11.1 10.6 9.2 8.5 8.3 
Sweden  9.6 9.9 8.2 6.7 5.6 4.9 4.9 5.6 6.3 7.4   7.0 6.1 
United States  5.4 4.9 4.5 4.2 4.0 4.8 5.8 6.0 5.5 5.1 4.6 4.6 
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Appendix Table A2.  Monthly Standardized Unemployment Rates, December 2007-November 2008     
                                             Dec       Jan      Feb   March   April   May     June      July   August    Sept     Oct    Nov 
                                            2007    2008    2008    2008    2008    2008    2008     2008    2008     2008   2008    2008 
United Kingdom  5.1 5.1 5.1 5.2 5.2 5.4 5.5 5.7 5.8 5.9 6.0 6.1 
Euro area   7.2 7.2 7.2 7.2 7.3 7.4 7.4 7.5 7.5 7.6 7.7 : 
Euro area (15 countries)  7.2 7.2 7.2 7.2 7.3 7.4 7.4 7.5 7.5 7.6 7.7 : 
Euro area (13 countries)  7.2 7.3 7.2 7.2 7.3 7.4 7.4 7.5 7.5 7.6 7.7 : 
Euro area (12 countries)  7.2 7.3 7.2 7.2 7.3 7.4 7.4 7.5 7.6 7.6 7.7 : 
EU (27 countries)  6.8 6.8 6.8 6.8 6.8 6.9 6.9 6.9 7.0 7.0 7.1 : 
EU (25 countries)  6.9 6.9 6.8 6.8 6.9 6.9 7.0 7.0 7.1 7.1 7.2 : 
EU (15 countries)  6.8 6.8 6.8 6.8 6.9 7.0 7.0 7.1 7.2 7.2 7.3 : 
Austria   4.0 4.1 4.0 3.9 3.7 3.6 3.4 3.4 3.2 3.1 3.0 : 
Belgium   7.0 7.0 6.9 6.8 6.8 6.6 6.6 6.6 6.6 6.6 6.6 : 
Denmark   3.3 3.3 3.2 3.2 3.2 3.2 3.1 3.0 2.9 3.0 3.2 : 
Finland   6.5 6.4 6.3 6.3 6.3 6.3 6.4 6.4 6.4 6.4 6.4 6.4 
France   7.7 7.8 7.7 7.6 7.7 7.7 7.7 7.9 8.1 8.0 8.2 : 
Germany   7.9 7.7 7.6 7.4 7.4 7.4 7.3 7.2 7.1 7.1 7.1 : 
Greece   8.0 7.8 7.8 7.8 7.5 7.5 7.5 :  :  :  :  : 
Ireland   4.7 4.7 4.9 5.2 5.3 5.5 5.7 6.0 6.3 6.6 7.1 : 
Italy   6.3 6.7 6.7 6.7 6.8 6.8 6.8 :  :  :  :  : 
Japan   3.8 3.8 3.9 3.8 4.0 4.0 4.1 4.0 4.2 4.0 3.7 : 
Netherlands   2.9 2.8 2.8 2.9 2.9 2.8 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.7 2.7 
Norway   2.5 2.5 2.5 2.4 2.5 2.5 2.6 2.4 2.4 2.5 :  : 
Portugal   7.7 7.7 7.7 7.6 7.6 7.7 7.8 7.8 7.8 7.8 7.8 : 
Spain   8.7 9.0 9.3 9.6 10.1 10.6 11.0 11.3 11.6 12.1 12.8 : 
Sweden   5.8 5.8 5.9 5.9 5.9 5.8 5.8 5.9 6.2 6.4 6.7 7.0 
United States   5.0 4.9 4.8 5.1 5.0 5.5 5.5 5.7 6.1 6.1 6.5 : 
Notes :=Not available.  Source: Eurostat   
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Appendix Table B1. Unemployment rates of 15-24 year olds (Source: OECD)       
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
United Kingdom 11.7 10.4 11.0 11.5 10.9 12.2 13.9 14.4 
Australia 12.1  13.6 12.9 12.2 11.6 10.8 10.0 9.4 
Austria  5.1 5.6 6.2  7.0 9.7 10.3 9.1 8.7 
Belgium 15.2 15.3 15.7 19.0 17.5 19.9 18.9 19.2 
Canada 12.7 12.9 13.6 13.6 13.4 12.4 11.6 11.2 
Czech Republic 17.0 16.6 16.0 17.6 20.4 19.3 17.5 10.7 
Denmark 6.7 8.3 7.1 9.8 7.8 7.9 7.6 7.2 
Finland 20.3 18.8 19.5 20.4 19.5 18.9 17.6 15.7 
France 20.7 18.7  20.2 18.3 19.7 20.2 21.3 18.7 
Germany 8.4 8.3 9.8 10.6  12.6 15.2 13.6 11.7 
Greece 29.5 28.0 26.1 25.7 26.5 25.3 24.5 22.0 
Hungary 12.7 11.2 12.6 13.4 15.5 19.4 19.1 18.0 
Iceland 4.7 4.8  7.2  8.2  8.1 7.2 8.4 7.2 
Ireland 6.4 6.2 7.7 7.8 8.1 8.3 8.3 8.7 
Italy 29.7 27.0 26.3  26.3  23.5 24.0 21.6 20.3 
Japan 9.2 9.7 10.0 10.2 9.5 8.6 8.0 7.7 
Korea 10.8 10.2 8.5 10.1  10.5 10.2 10.0 8.8 
Luxembourg 6.4 6.3  7.0  10.9 16.9 13.7 16.2 14.9 
Mexico  5.1 4.9 5.9 6.2 7.6 6.6 6.2 6.7 
Netherlands 6.1 5.8 6.0 7.8 9.2 9.6 7.6 7.3 
New Zealand 13.2 11.8 11.5 10.2 9.3 9.4 9.6 9.7 
Norway 10.2 10.5 11.5 11.7 11.7 12.0 8.3 7.5 
Poland  35.2 41.0  43.9 43.0 40.8 37.8 29.8 21.7 
Portugal 8.6 9.4 11.5 14.6 15.3 16.1 16.2 16.6 
Slovak Republic  37.0 39.1 37.4  33.1 32.7 29.9 26.6 20.1 
Spain  25.3  20.8 22.2 22.7  22.0  19.7 17.9 18.2 
Sweden 11.9 11.8 12.9 13.8  17.0  22.3 21.3 18.9 
Switzerland 4.9 5.5 5.6 8.5 7.7 8.8 7.7 7.1 
Turkey  13.1 16.2 19.2 20.5 19.7 19.3 18.7 19.6 
United States  9.3 10.6 12.0 12.4 11.8 11.3 10.5 10.5 
European Union 19 17.7 16.9 17.6 17.9 18.0 18.3 17.2 15.4 
European Union 15 15.7 14.1 14.8 15.4 15.7 16.4 15.8 14.9 
Europe 16.6 16.5 17.6 18.1 18.0 18.2 17.1 15.7 
OECD countries 11.9 12.3 13.3 13.7 13.6 13.3 12.4 11.9 
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Appendix Table B2. Employment/Population rates of 15-24 year olds (Source: OECD)     
  
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
United Kingdom 61.5 61.0 60.9 59.7 60.1 58.6 57.3 55.9 
Australia 62.1  61.2 61.1 61.8 62.4 63.6 63.9 64.2 
Austria  52.8 51.6 51.7  51.1 51.9 53.1 54.0 55.5 
Belgium 30.3 28.5 28.5 27.1 28.1 26.6 26.2 26.8 
Canada 56.3 56.3 57.5 58.3 58.0 57.8 58.7 59.5 
Czech Republic 38.3 36.1 33.7 31.4 28.5 27.3 27.7 28.5 
Denmark 67.1 61.7 64.0 59.4 61.3 62.0 63.7 67.4 
Finland  42.9 43.5  42.4 41.4 41.3 42.1 44.1 46.4 
France 23.2 24.3  24.1  29.7 29.3 29.3 28.9 30.1 
Germany 47.2 47.0 44.8 42.4  41.9 42.6 44.0 45.9 
Greece 26.9 26.0 26.8 26.2 27.4 25.3 24.5 24.2 
Hungary 32.5 30.7  28.5 26.7 23.6 21.8 21.7 21.0 
Iceland 68.2 66.8  59.4  68.1  66.3 71.6 72.9 74.3 
Ireland 48.2 47.0 44.8 45.2 44.7 46.4 48.4 48.8 
Italy 27.8 27.4 26.7  26.0  27.2 25.5 25.5 24.7 
Japan 42.7 42.0 41.0 40.3 40.0 40.9 41.4 41.4 
Korea 29.4 30.1 31.5 30.8  31.2  29.9 27.2 25.7 
Luxembourg 31.8 32.3  32.3  27.0 23.3 24.9 23.3 22.1 
Mexico  48.9 47.2 45.4 44.1 44.3 43.7 44.8 44.2 
Netherlands 66.5 66.8 66.7 64.9 63.2 61.9 63.9 65.4 
New Zealand 54.6 55.8 56.6 56.3 56.8 56.9 58.8 58.7 
Norway 58.1 56.5 56.9 55.3 54.4 52.9 55.8 56.0 
Poland  24.5 22.1  20.0 19.6 20.0 20.9 24.0 25.8 
Portugal 42.0 42.7 41.9 38.4 36.9 36.1 35.8 34.9 
Slovak Republic  29.0 27.9  27.2  27.6 26.5 25.6 25.7 27.6 
Spain  36.3  37.1 36.6 36.8  38.4  41.9 43.3 42.9 
Sweden 46.1 47.8 46.5 45.1  42.8  42.5 44.0 46.3 
Switzerland 65.1 63.9 65.4 63.5 61.9 59.9 63.3 62.6 
Turkey  37.0 35.3 33.0 30.5 31.6 31.2 30.8 30.4 
United States  59.7 57.7 55.7 53.9 53.9 53.9 54.2 53.1 
European Union 19 38.5 38.2 37.4 37.1 37.3 37.4 38.1 38.8 
European Union 15 40.7 40.9 40.2 40.1 40.4 40.4 40.9 41.5 
Europe 38.7 38.1 37.1 36.4 36.7 36.7 37.3 37.9 
OECD countries 45.6 44.8 43.7 42.8 43.1 43.1 43.5 43.5
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Appendix Table B3. Participation  rates of 15-24 year olds (Source: OECD)       
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
United Kingdom 69.7 68.2 68.5 67.4 67.4 66.7 66.6 65.3 
Australia 70.6  70.9 70.1 70.4 70.6 71.3 71.0 70.8 
Austria  55.7 54.7 55.2  55.0 57.4 59.2 59.4 60.8 
Belgium 35.7 33.6 33.8 33.5 34.0 33.2 32.3 33.1 
Canada 64.4 64.7 66.6 67.4 67.0 65.9 66.4 67.0 
Czech Republic 46.1 43.2 40.1 38.1 35.8 33.9 33.5 31.9 
Denmark 71.9 67.2 68.8 65.9 66.4 67.2 69.0 72.6 
Finland  53.8 53.6  52.7 52.0 51.3 51.9 53.6 55.0 
France 29.3 29.9  30.2  36.4 36.5 36.7 36.7 37.0 
Germany 51.5 51.3 49.7 47.4 48.0 50.2 50.9 52.0 
Greece 38.1 36.2 36.3 35.2 37.3 33.9 32.5 31.0 
Hungary 37.2 34.6  32.6 30.8 27.9 27.1 26.8 25.6 
Iceland 71.6 70.2  64.0  74.2  72.1 77.1 79.5 80.1 
Ireland 51.6 50.1 48.6 49.1 48.6 50.6 52.8 53.4 
Italy 39.5 37.6 36.3  35.3 35.6 33.5 32.5 30.9 
Japan 47.0 46.5 45.6 44.8 44.2 44.8 45.0 44.9 
Korea 33.0 33.5 34.4 34.3  34.8  33.3 30.2 28.2 
Luxembourg 34.0 34.5  34.7  30.4 28.0 28.8 27.8 26.0 
Mexico  51.5 49.6 48.2 47.0 48.0 46.8 47.8 47.4 
Netherlands 70.8 71.0 70.9 70.4 69.6 68.5 69.2 70.5 
New Zealand 62.9 63.3 64.0 62.8 62.6 62.8 65.0 65.0 
Norway 64.7 63.1 64.2 62.6 61.6 60.2 60.9 60.6 
Poland  37.8 37.4  35.6 34.4 33.9 33.5 34.2 33.0 
Portugal 46.0 47.1 47.3 45.0 43.6 43.0 42.7 41.9 
Slovak Republic 46.0 45.7 43.5  41.2 39.4 36.5 35.1 34.5 
Spain 48.5 46.8 47.0 47.6 49.2  52.1 52.7 52.4 
Sweden 52.3 54.2 53.4 52.3 51.5  54.7 56.0 57.1 
Switzerland 68.4 67.6 69.3 69.3 67.0 65.6 68.6 67.4 
Turkey 42.5 42.1 40.9 38.4 39.3 38.7 37.9 37.8 
United States 65.8 64.5 63.3 61.6 61.1 60.8 60.6 59.4 
European Union 19 46.8 46.0 45.4 45.2 45.5 45.8 46.0 45.9 
European Union 15 48.3 47.6 47.2 47.4 47.9 48.4 48.6 48.7 
Europe 46.4 45.7 45.0 44.4 44.8 44.9 44.9 44.9 
OECD countries 51.8 51.0 50.4 49.6 49.8 49.7 49.7 49.4 
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Appendix Table C1. The situation of youth in the labour market, 1996 and 2006 (Source OECD 2008b) 
 
Incidence of long-term 
unemployment NEET rates Low-skilled NEET 
School drop-out rates of 
teenagers (15-19) 
School enrolment rates 
(15-24) 
 2006 1996-2006 2005 
1996-
2005a 2005 
1996-
2005b 2005 
1996-
2005c 2005 
1995-
2005d 
 
% Percentage change % 
Percentage 
change % 
Percentage 
change % 
Percentage 
change % 
Percentage 
change 
Australia 10.9 -7.9 9.6 -2.5 58.2 -8.9 5.1 -0.8 26.2 -1.2 
Austria 15.8 -2.4 9.7 .. 44.7 .. 4.6 .. 38.0 .. 
Belgium 32.3 -5.9 12.4 -1.3 47.4 -4.7 4.4 -1.5 59.5 -0.4 
Canada 2.6 -4.5 9.8 -3.1 39.5 -3.4 3.6 -1.4 36.5 -1.7 
Czech Republic 38.4 18.8 11.2 -0.9 27.3 1.6 2.2 -1.0 61.5 .. 
Denmark 0.9 -9.6 6.2 -0.7 62.0 .. 3.5 2.7 32.0 5.3 
Finland 5.5 -5.2 9.3 .. 41.4 .. 3.6 .. 56.0 .. 
France 26.6 6.5 11.3 1.2 48.7 .. 4.3 1.6 60.5 -6.2 
Germany 36.7 9.1 11.6 0.0 52.3 7.7 3.6 0.3 47.4 .. 
Greece 47.7 -5.8 15.4 -3.1 37.8 -4.1 5.7 -0.1 59.3 2.9 
Hungary 37.5 -5.3 12.9 -8.0 50.9 3.8 5.2 -2.0 64.9 10.5 
Iceland 1.5 -3.9 6.4 -0.4 73.5 .. 2.9 1.0 38.0 6.6 
Ireland 25.3 -21.7 8.6 0.6 48.1 -11.5 3.0 -0.8 45.1 .. 
Italy 50.5 -13.7 18.0 -5.5 54.9 -2.8 8.6 -3.5 56.6 5.0 
Japan 20.4 9.9 8.8 1.2 74.6 55.5 .. .. 46.2 0.9 
Korea 0.4 -1.9 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 
Luxembourg 14.0 -19.3 5.7 -3.3 56.9 .. 1.9 -2.3 69.4 16.2 
Mexico 1.9 0.7 21.8 -3.9 91.3 1.5 16.5 -4.3 33.0 -25.4 
Netherlands 21.1 -13.8 6.5 1.4 59.2 -5.7 2.8 2.8 31.7 -1.9 
New Zealand 2.8 -9.1 12.4 .. 55.0 .. 5.3 .. 30.9 .. 
Norway 4.3 -0.1 5.9 -0.9 66.5 3.5 2.1 1.5 46.5 -5.4 
Poland 37.2 8.2 12.2 -8.3 62.2 4.8 1.7 .. 69.6 14.6 
Portugal 34.5 -6.3 11.6 0.4 78.7 0.9 7.8 1.2 52.5 -0.7 
Slovak Republic 57.6 19.8 16.1 -3.9 28.8 2.8 3.4 -2.5 58.4 23.6 
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Spain 17.9 -28.9 12.3 -5.6 70.4 1.4 7.5 -2.0 52.5 -4.4 
Sweden 4.0 -9.4 8.6 -2.9 28.3 2.2 1.6 -1.4 57.1 6.7 
Switzerland .. .. 9.1 -1.8 57.6 2.1 6.3 -1.2 28.9 3.2 
Turkey 32.9 -10.2 42.2 8.5 53.7 -10.8 16.2 -3.7 26.5 2.7 
United Kingdom 14.5 -10.6 13.0 .. 55.9 -0.7 5.7 .. 35.4 .. 
United States 6.3 1.0 10.8 -1.4 35.0 0.4 2.9 -1.3 39.6 4.2 
EU15 27.0 -13.2 11.5 -0.6 58.1 1.3 5.3 -0.5 48.9 0.5 
OECD 19.6 -5.2 15.6 -0.3 57.3 -0.2 7.0 -1.8 42.2 2.6 
 
a) 1997 for the Netherlands; 1998 for Italy; 1999 for Germany and Ireland; and 2004 for Mexico.    
b) 1997 for Australia, Japan and the Netherlands; 1998 for Italy; 1999 for Germany, Iceland, Ireland and Luxembourg; 2000 for the United Kingdom; 
and 2004 for Mexico.    
c) 1997 for Australia; 1998 for Italy; 1999 for Germany and Ireland; and 2004 for Mexico.    
d) 1997 for the Netherlands; 1998 for Japan; 1999 for Greece and Italy; 2000 for the United Kingdom; and 2004 for Mexico.    
Source: OECD Labour Force Statistics and Education databases.   
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Appendix Table D1.  Youth unemployment indicators (most recent available) 
      Total unemployment                      Youth unemployment   Ratio of       Total unempt       Ratio          Share       Unempd 
    (000s)                                       rates by sex               female          rates (%)        youth/       unempd     youth/ 
                                                                               to male         adult          youth in    youth 
                                          Year      Youth          Youth           Unemployed               unempt                                    rates          total             popn. 
                              population      labor                 youth            Male           Female        rates          Youth  Adult         (%)          unempt          (%) 
AFRICA            
Algeria  2004 .. 1756.3 762.3 46.3 42.8 1.1 43.4 13.9 3.1 45.6 .. 
Botswana  2001 374.3 140.9 55.9 46.1 33.9 1.4 39.6 11.9 3.3 51.6 14.9 
Burkina Faso  1985 1351.5 1112.3 23.7 .. 4.1 .. 2.1 0.8 2.6 55.6 1.8 
Egypt  2003 .. .. 1476.9 .. .. .. .. .. .. 65.9 .. 
Ethiopia  2005 11712.8 9237.9 713.5 11.2 4.1 2.7 7.7 4.2 1.8 47 6.1 
Gabon  1993 .. .. 27.3 .. .. .. .. .. .. 41.2 .. 
Ghana  1999 3170 2160 343.4 19.4 12.7 1.5 15.9 8 2 41.4 10.8 
Lesotho  1997 330.2 166.8 79 58.5 37.9 1.5 47.4 35.8 1.3 36.6 23.9 
Madagascar  2003 3058.1 2066.6 144.3 7.3 6.7 1.1 7 4.3 1.6 38.1 4.7 
Malawi 1987 1441.6 808.5 6.7 0.3 1.6 0.2 0.8 0.5 1.6 32.1 0.5 
Mauritius  2005 195.7 86.2 22.3 34.3 20.5 1.7 25.9 6.5 4 42.8 11.4 
Morocco  2005 6300 2681.5 420.9 14.4 16.2 0.9 15.7 9.5 1.7 34.3 6.7 
Namibia 2001 375.1 156.3 70 49.3 40.4 1.2 44.8 26.2 1.7 37.8 18.7 
Réunion  2005 .. .. 24.8 .. .. .. .. .. .. 25.2 .. 
Rwanda  1996 1161.6 917.5 6.8 0.5 1 0.5 0.7 0.5 1.4 45.3 0.6 
South Africa  2003 9601 2856 1717 64.7 55.8 1.2 60.1 25.3 2.4 32.7 17.9 
Swaziland  1997 197.4 60.3 33.3 48.3 41.7 1.2 55.2 14.9 3.7 56 16.8 
Tunisia  2005 2043.1 671.1 205.9 29.3 31.4 0.9 30.7 10.2 3 42.3 10.1 
Zambia  1990 2186 868 181 21 20.7 1 20.9 7.3 2.9 63.4 8.3 
Zimbabwe  2002 2726.5 1519.7 378.1 21.4 28.2 0.8 24.9 4.4 5.7 67.5 13.9 
ASIA             
Bangladesh  2003 24038 12407 823 5.8 7 0.8 6.6 3.5 1.9 41.1 3.4 
Cambodia  2001 .. .. 62.1 .. .. .. .. .. .. 59.6 .. 
China  1994 .. .. 3 10 .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 
Hong Kong 2005 903.6 393.5 42.7 8 13.8 0.6 10.9 4.9 2.2 21.3 4.7 
India  2004 177270 80119.2 8434.7 10.8 10.4 1 10.5 3.5 3 45.8 4.8 
Indonesia  2005 42316.5 22995.4 6597.1 33.8 25.2 1.3 28.7 5.1 5.6 60.8 15.6 
Iran,  2005 16028 5633 1303 32.1 20.3 1.6 23.1 7.5 3.1 51.4 8.1 
Israel  2005 1129.2 365.5 65.1 18.6 17 1.1 17.8 7.6 2.3 26.4 5.8 
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      Total unemployment                      Youth unemployment   Ratio of       Total unempt       Ratio          Share       Unempd 
    (000s)                                       rates by sex               female          rates (%)        youth         unempd     youth/ 
                                                                               to male         adult          youth in     youth 
                                          Year      Youth          Youth          Unemployed               unempt                                    rates          total             popn. 
                              population      labor                 youth            Male           Female        rates          Youth  Adult         (%)          unempt          (%) 
Japan  2005 14210 6340 550 7.4 9.9 0.7 8.7 4 2.2 18.8 3.9 
Kazakhstan  2004 2712.7 1342.5 191.6 15.7 13.1 1.2 14.3 7.2 2 29.1 7.1 
Korea, Republic of  2005 6113.1 2033.7 207.7 9 12.2 0.7 10.2 3.1 3.3 23.4 3.4 
Kyrgyzstan  2004 1048.6 476.3 72.6 17.8 13.5 1.3 15.2 6.7 2.3 39.1 6.9 
Lao PDR 1995 819.8 607.8 30.5 3.9 6.4 0.6 5 0.9 5.6 56.8 3.7 
Macau 2005 84.7 29.3 2.4 5.8 10.8 0.5 8.2 3.5 2.3 23.5 2.8 
Malaysia  2003 .. .. 240.6 .. .. .. .. .. .. 65.1 .. 
Maldives  2000 56.8 22.2 1 5.1 4 1.3 4.4 1.1 4 57.4 1.7 
Mongolia  2003 456.8 199.3 39.9 20.7 19.5 1.1 20 12.7 1.6 28 8.7 
Nepal  1999 3456 2818 84 2.2 4 0.6 3 1.4 2.1 47.2 2.4 
Pakistan  2005 .. .. 1 557 .. .. .. .. .. .. 48 
Papua New Guinea  2000 1029.3 609.3 32.1 .. .. .. 5.3 2.1 2.5 48.7 3.1 
Philippines  2005 16430 7787 1280 18.9 14.9 1.3 16.4 4.8 3.4 48.9 7.8 
Qatar  2001 .. .. 5.7 .. .. .. .. .. .. 45.2 .. 
Saudi Arabia  2002 .. .. 192.8 .. .. .. .. .. .. 58.7 .. 
Singapore  2005 .. 299.8 15.6 6.3 4.1 1.5 5.2 4.1 1.3 15.5 .. 
Sri Lanka  2005 3641.2 1521 398.3 37.1 20.1 1.8 26.2 3.3 7.9 64.3 10.9 
Syria 2002 3640 1895 498.8 38.9 21.4 1.8 26.3 3.9 6.7 78.2 13.7 
Taiwan 2000 .. .. 94 .. .. .. .. .. .. 32.1 .. 
Thailand  2005 10577.7 5462.1 260 4.6 4.9 0.9 4.8 0.8 6 52.4 2.5 
Turkey  2005 12175 4710 910 19.3 19.3 1 19.3 8.1 2.4 36.1 7.5 
UAE 2000 .. .. 19.3 .. .. .. .. .. .. 47 .. 
Viet Nam  2004 15523.7 9276.3 428.3 4.9 4.4 1.1 4.6 1.5 3.1 46.2 2.8 
West Bank/Gaza  2004 701.7 179.3 71.3 44.9 38.9 1.2 39.8 23 1.7 33.7 10.2 
Yemen  1999 .. .. 227.1 .. .. .. .. .. .. 48.4 .. 
EUROPE             
Albania  2001 527.4 315.3 111.8 27.1 41.6 0.7 35.5 18.8 1.9 36.6 21.2 
Austria  2005 983.3 581.7 60.1 9.9 10.7 0.9 10.3 4.3 2.4 28.9 6.1 
Belgium  2005 1263.6 419 83.3 19.1 20.6 0.9 19.9 6.9 2.9 22.5 6.6 
Bulgaria  2005 1048.5 292 65.2 21.1 23.3 0.9 22.3 8.9 2.5 19.5 6.2 
Croatia  2005 .. 205.7 66.9 35.5 30.4 1.2 32.5 10.2 3.2 29.2 .. 
Cyprus  2005 93.2 39.7 5.5 14.6 13.7 1.1 13.9 4.2 3.3 28.2 5.9 
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      Total unemployment                      Youth unemployment   Ratio of       Total unempt       Ratio          Share       Unempd 
    (000s)                                       rates by sex               female          rates (%)        youth         unempd     youth/ 
                                                                               to male         adult          youth in     youth 
                                          Year      Youth          Youth          Unemployed               unempt                                    rates          total             popn. 
                              population      labor                 youth            Male           Female        rates          Youth  Adult         (%)          unempt          (%) 
Czech Republic  2005 1357 459.6 88.5 19.1 19.4 1.0 19.3 6.8 2.8 21.6 6.5 
Denmark  2005 591.1 397.5 31.2 9.8 6.1 1.6 7.9 4.3 1.8 22.6 5.3 
Estonia  2005 207.8 70.8 11.2 15.1 16.4 0.9 15.8 6.9 2.3 21.5 5.4 
Finland  2005 653 321 64 19.3 20.6 0.9 19.9 6.8 2.9 29.0 9.8 
France  2005 7833.9 2636.6 600.8 24.6 21.4 1.1 22.8 8.5 2.7 22.1 7.7 
Georgia  2005 578.3 195.5 55.3 30.6 26.8 1.1 28.3 12.3 2.3 19.8 9.6 
Germany  2005 9783 4911 746 14.0 16.1 0.9 15.2 10.6 1.4 16.3 7.6 
Greece  2005 1232.1 417.1 105.4 34.7 17.5 2.0 25.3 8.2 3.1 22.6 8.6 
Hungary  2005 1271 344.2 66.9 19.1 19.7 1.0 19.4 6.1 3.2 22.0 5.3 
Iceland  2005 36.7 28.3 2.0 6.0 8.5 0.7 7.2 1.6 4.5 47.7 5.6 
Ireland  2005 637.3 321.8 26.6 7.3 9.1 0.8 8.3 3.5 2.4 31.1 4.2 
Italy  2005 6103 2044 490 27.4 21.5 1.3 24.0 6.2 3.9 25.9 8.0 
Latvia  2005 359.6 134.6 17.5 14.2 11.9 1.2 13.0 8.2 1.6 17.7 4.9 
Lithuania  2005 526.1 131.6 20.7 15.3 15.9 1.0 15.7 7.6 2.1 15.6 3.9 
Luxembourg  2005 51.9 15.0 2.1 16.2 11.7 1.4 13.7 3.8 3.6 22.6 4.0 
Malta  2004 61.0 33.8 5.6 17.4 15.8 1.1 16.6 4.5 3.7 48.6 9.2 
Netherlands  2005 1938 1326 127 9.7 9.5 1.0 9.6 4.4 2.2 29.5 6.6 
Norway  2005 508.4 306 36.8 11.5 12.5 0.9 12.0 3.5 3.4 33.3 7.2 
Poland  2005 5594.4 1876.5 708.8 39.2 36.7 1.1 37.8 15.3 2.5 23.3 12.7 
Portugal  2005 1312.9 564.2 90.7 19.1 13.7 1.4 16.1 6.7 2.4 21.5 6.9 
Moldova  2005 701.1 152.2 28.6 18.3 19.1 1.0 18.8 5.9 3.2 27.6 4.1 
Romania  2005 3354.3 1068.7 210.3 18.4 20.5 0.9 19.7 5.6 3.5 29.9 6.3 
Russia  1999 22162.4 9284 2296 25.9 23.9 1.1 24.7 11.6 2.1 24.6 10.4 
Slovakia  2005 875.3 319.6 95.5 28.7 30.8 0.9 29.9 14.3 2.1 22.3 10.9 
Slovenia  2005 265 97 13 12.2 10.7 1.1 13.4 4.9 2.7 22.4 4.9 
Spain  2005 4784.8 2494.7 490.5 23.5 16.7 1.4 19.7 7.7 2.6 25.6 10.3 
Sweden  2005 983 538 120 21.6 23.0 0.9 22.3 5.8 3.8 33.3 12.2 
Switzerland  2005 875.1 575.3 50.8 9.2 8.5 1.1 8.8 3.7 2.4 27.5 5.8 
Macedonia  2005 326.5 107.3 67.2 62.1 63.0 1.0 62.6 33.7 1.9 20.7 20.6 
Ukraine  2005 7491.7 3011.7 448.3 14.4 15.2 0.9 14.9 6.0 2.5 28.0 6.0 
United Kingdom  2005 6726 4430 521 10.0 13.4 0.7 11.8 3.3 3.6 38.6 7.7 
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      Total unemployment                      Youth unemployment   Ratio of       Total unempt       Ratio          Share       Unempd 
    (000s)                                       rates by sex               female          rates (%)        youth         unempd     youth/ 
                                                                               to male         adult          youth in     youth 
                                          Year      Youth          Youth          Unemployed               unempt                                    rates          total             popn. 
                              population      labor                 youth            Male           Female        rates          Youth  Adult         (%)          unempt          (%) 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN           
Anguilla  2001 1.8 1.1 0.1 17.8 10.0 1.8 13.5 5.2 2.6 36.8 8.3 
Antigua & Barbuda  1991 .. 6.4 0.8 .. .. .. 13.1 4.1 3.2 47.5 .. 
Argentina  2005 4083.3 1859.9 450.1 28 21.6 1.3 24.2 7.7 3.1 39.6 11.0 
Aruba  1997 .. 5.0 1.0 24.5 16.7 1.5 20.4 5.8 3.5 31.1 .. 
Bahamas 2005 .. 30.7 6.2 24.1 16.9 1.4 20.2 8.1 2.5 34.3 .. 
Barbados  2003 36.1 20.6 5.4 28.7 24.1 1.2 26.2 8.5 3.1 33.8 15.0 
Belize 2005 .. 29.2 5.7 28.9 13.8 2.1 19.5 8 2.4 46.8 .. 
Bolivia  2002 .. 911.3 84 11.8 7.3 1.6 9.2 4.1 2.2 42.1 .. 
Brazil 2004 34814.4 22254.1 4021.8 23.3 14.2 1.6 18.1 5.9 3.1 49.8 11.6 
British Virgin Islands  1991 .. 1.7 0.1 7.2 7.6 0.9 7.5 2.7 2.8 40.6 .. 
Cayman Islands  1997 .. 2.7 0.3 .. .. .. 9.3 3.4 2.7 28.1 .. 
Chile  2005 2639.6 819.8 141.9 21.0 15.2 1.4 17.3 5.4 3.2 32.2 5.4 
Colombia  2005 10469.6 4447.8 660.9 19.4 11.6 1.7 14.9 8 1.9 34 6.3 
Costa Rica  2005 856.7 419.3 63 21.5 11.3 1.9 15 4.2 3.6 50.3 7.4 
Dominica  2001 11.0 4.7 1.2 26.7 25.5 1 26 7.7 3.4 40 11.1 
Dominican Republic  2004 .. .. 301.8 .. .. .. .. .. .. 42.5 .. 
Ecuador  2005 1731.5 863.9 134.1 20.6 12.2 1.7 15.5 5.7 2.7 41.7 7.7 
El Salvador  2004 1333.2 626.6 72.2 9.4 12.7 0.7 11.5 5.3 2.2 40.2 5.4 
French Guiana  2005 .. .. 2.9 .. .. .. .. .. .. 18.5 .. 
Grenada  1998 16.0 9.7 3.0 39.4 25.4 1.6 31.5 10.2 3.1 49 19.0 
Guadeloupe  2005 .. .. 6.3 .. .. .. .. .. .. 14.9 .. 
Guyana  2001 .. 61 12.2 24.4 17.5 1.4 20 5.8 3.4 51 .. 
Haiti  1999 1553.9 496.5 89.1 21.1 15.1 1.4 17.9 5.0 3.6 42.6 5.7 
Honduras  2005 1562.3 756.9 53.2 11.2 5.2 2.2 7.0 3.0 2.3 50.2 3.4 
Jamaica  2005 .. .. 51.9 .. .. .. .. .. .. 39.8 .. 
Martinique  2005 .. .. 5.5 .. .. .. .. .. .. 15.7 .. 
Mexico  2005 19553.7 9145.5 600.5 7.4 6.1 1.2 6.6 2.7 2.4 40.4 3.1 
Netherlands Antilles  2000 16.8 5.7 1.5 29.7 25.4 1.2 26.9 12.7 2.1 18 9.1 
Nicaragua  2003 1165.1 589.6 73.8 15.8 10.8 1.5 12.5 6.1 2.0 45.7 6.3 
Panama  2005 523 255.9 57.6 29.6 18.5 1.6 22.5 7.4 3.0 42.1 11.0 
Paraguay  2003 .. 664 101.3 20.5 12.1 1.7 15.3 5.2 2.9 52.3 .. 
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Peru  2005 1723.6 836.3 174.5 20.7 21.0 1.0 20.9 8.8 2.4 39.9 10.1 
Puerto Rico  2005 539 215 50.0 20.9 24.8 0.8 23.3 9.2 2.5 31.3 9.3 
St Helena  1998 0.8 0.5 0.1 30.5 32.5 0.9 25.2 16.0 1.6 28.1 16.8 
St Lucia  2003 .. 16.2 6.5 49.2 31.8 1.5 40.0 20.5 2.0 35.6 .. 
St Vincent  1991 .. 12.6 4.6 43.0 32.8 1.3 36.3 12.7 2.9 55.3 
Suriname  1999 47.6 12.2 4.1 58.1 24.1 2.4 33.9 10.4 3.3 35.0 8.7 
Trinidad & Tobago  2005 .. .. 21.7 .. .. .. .. .. .. 43.7 .. 
Uruguay  2005 457.8 219.6 64.8 34.9 25.4 1.4 29.5 8.6 3.4 41.8 14.2 
Venezuela  2003 4976.8 2691.6 752.5 34.8 23.7 1.5 28.0 13.5 2.1 37.3 15.1 
NORTH AMERICA             
Canada  2005 4280.2 2822.7 350.2 10.6 14.2 0.7 12.4 5.7 2.2 29.9 8.2 
USA 2005 36674 22291 2521 10.1 12.4 0.8 11.3 4.0 2.8 33.2 6.9 
OCEANIA             
Australia  2005 2842.9 2025.8 219.1 10.5 11.1 0.9 10.8 3.7 2.9 40.8 7.7 
New Zealand  2005 590.9 371.2 34.9 9.8 9.1 1.1 9.4 2.5 3.8 44.0 5.9 
New Caledonia  1996 .. 29.5 9.9 38.5 29.7 1.3 33.6 19.4 1.7 66.0 .. 
 
Source:  United Nations (2007) Source: International Labour Organization, Key Indicators of the Labour Market, 5th edition (Geneva: 2007). 
Notes: Data repositories are mainly LABORSTA, an International Labour Office database on labour statistics; and the Organization for Economic Cooperation 
and Development (OECD).  Two dots (..) indicate that data are not available or are not separately reported.  
 
